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A Jungian Model of Psychosocial Development

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by

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The dissertation of Bruce Hovis Bess is approved, and it is acceptable in quality for publication on microfilm.

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

A Jungian Model

of Psychosocial Development

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This paper applies Jungian concepts to the interpretation of psychosocial development. Jung's central concept of individuation is outlined. Theoretical principles and concepts which are contained in this central concept are defined.

Jung considered individuation to be the goal of psychological development and described it as an innate, or archetypal, potential which cannot be reduced to causal determinants in genetic development. His theory has been criticized for neglecting developmental factors. Some critics maintain that because Jung's model lacks a developmental perspective it also fails to show the interaction between intrapsychic and psychosocial processes. These criticisms are presented. Attempts within the Jungian school to relate Jung's concepts more clearly to

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psychosocial development are reviewed, particularly the work of Michael Fordham, Jolanda Jacobi, and Erich Neumann.

Erik Erikson's conceptualization of psychosocial development is discussed as compatible with the Jungian framework. Jungian and Eriksonian concepts are related to form principles for a Jungian model of psychosocial development. Archetypes are related to psychosocial stages as representations of an inborn capacity to assume typical structures of becoming. Individuation is conceived as a cyclical process of Self-realization which energizes psychosocial development. Archetypal processes are described as existentially evoked by psychosocial crises, their function being to compensate for inadequacies in development at particular stages. These principles are illustrated by means of a commentary on Jung's autobiography which attempts to describe the interaction between psychosocial crises and compensatory archetypal processes in his own development.

PART I: THEORY

INDIVIDUATION AND PSYCHOSOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Paracelsus, who was above all a physician of genius, emphasized that nobody could be a doctor who did not understand the art of "theorizing." What he meant was that the doctor must induce, not only in himself but also in his patient, a way of looking at the illness which would enable the doctor to cure and the patient to recover, or at least to endure being ill.

--C. G. Jung
(1953-1971, v. 16, p. 100)

INTRODUCTION

C. G. Jung (1965, p. 209) considered the process of individuation to be the central concept of his psychology. He said it was a concept based on his realization "that the unconscious is a process, and that the psyche is transformed or developed by the relationship of the ego to the contents of the unconscious (Jung, 1965, p. 209)." He felt that this transformation or development of the psyche could be read from the dreams and fantasies of individuals and was also evident in collective life in the various religious systems and their changing symbols. Among the various individual and collective transformation processes he studied, Jung (1953-1971) detected certain common features which he considered the fundamentals of the individuation process, a universal human potential the realization of which was the highest goal of human life:

> Individuation means becoming a single, homogeneous being, and, insofar as "individuality" embraces our innermost, last, and incomparable uniqueness, it also implies becoming one's own self. We could therefore translate individuation as "coming to selfhood" or "self-realization" (v.7, p. 171).

Jung's theory of individuation has been criticized on the grounds that it disregards developmental processes and ignores the sociological dimensions of an individual's "coming to selfhood." I wish to propose the thesis that

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his concepts can be meaningfully related to developmental and psychosocial processes. I will compare his central concepts with Erik Erikson's psychosocial model of human development and thereby formulate a Jungian model of psychosocial development.

The theoretical basis for this model will be presented in Part I. The beginning chapter characterizes Jung's concept of individuation as an expression of his desire to develop a nonreductionistic psychology--one which would rectify the tendency of psychoanalytic schools to explain psychological phenomena primarily in terms of their origins in developmental processes. For purposes of clarification, the theoretical principles and concepts central to his theory of individuation are summarized and defined. The following chapter reviews criticisms of Jung's theory which are based on the contention that it lacks a psychosocial or developmental focus. Within the Jungian school, which is termed "Analytical Psychology," attempts have been made to relate Jung's theory more clearly to developmental processes. The work of Jolanda Jacobi, Michael Fordham, and Erich Neumann is reviewed in terms of two rather controversial issues: (1) the conceptualization of individuation as a lifelong process and (2) the application of Jungian concepts to specific developmental processes or stages. Chapter III compares Erik Erikson's psychosocial model of

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development with the Jungian framework and suggests that this comparison provides a way of building upon the Jungian work reviewed in Chapter II. Finally, in Chapter IV, principles for a Jungian model of psychosocial development are formulated. These principles are divided into two sections. Once section discusses the interrelationship between Jung's concept of archetypes and Erikson's concept of psychosocial stages. The other section discusses Jung's concept of Self[1]-realization as a process which occurs throughout psychosocial development.

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[1]To emphasize its distinction from the self-concept in other psychologies, it has become the practice of many Analytical Psychologists to capitalize the term "Self" when referring to Jung's concepts. That practice will be followed in this work. A definition of the Self will be given in Chapter I.

I. JUNG'S CONCEPT OF INDIVIDUATION

> True sanity entails in one way or another the dissolution of the normal ego, that false self competently adjusted to our alienated social reality; the emergence of the "inner" archetypal mediators of divine power, and through this death a rebirth, and the eventual re-establishment of a new kind of ego-functioning, the ego now being the servant of the divine, no longer its betrayer.
>
> --R. D. Laing,
> (1968, pp. 144-145).

Towards a Nonreductionistic Psychology

The psychology of C. G. Jung is primarily a psychology of adulthood. Jung felt that there was a tendency in the psychoanalytic school to over-emphasize the importance of childhood experiences in determining the psychology of the adult. As he developed his psychology he differentiated it from the tendency of psychoanalytic schools to explain the symptoms, dreams, and fantasies of adult patients by reducing them to their origins in childhood experiences. In his own work, he attempted to describe the developmental processes of adulthood as unique phenomena.

In the following passages, Jung (1953-1971) expresses his contention that his age was too preoccupied with childhood:

> Our age has been extravagantly praised as the "century of the child." This boundless expansion of the kindergarten amounts to complete forgetfulness of the problems of adult education. . . .

> Nobody will deny or underestimate the importance of childhood; the severe and often life-long injuries caused by stupid upbringing at home or in school are too obvious, and the need for more reasonable pedagogic methods is far too urgent. But if this evil is to be attacked at the root, one must in all seriousness face the question of how such idiotic and bigoted methods of education ever come to be employed and still are employed. . . . Anyone who wants to educate must himself be educated (v. 17, p. 168).

It was just such self-education which Jung felt was most lacking in the contemporary adult culture. He suspected that the over-emphasis on childhood was produced by a widespread avoidance of the problems of adult life:

> The fact is that the high ideal of educating the personality is not for children: for what is usually meant by personality--a well-rounded psychic whole that is capable of resistance and abounding in energy--is an adult ideal. It is only in an age like ours, when the individual is unconscious of the problems of adult life, or--what is worse--when he consciously shirks them, that people could wish to foist this ideal on to childhood. I suspect our contemporary pedagogical and psychological enthusiasm for the child of dishonourable intentions: we talk about the child, but we should mean the child in the adult. For in every adult there lurks a child--an eternal child, something that is always becoming, is never completed, and calls for unceasing care, attention, and education. That is the part of the human personality which wants to develop and become whole. But the man of today is far indeed from this wholeness. Dimly suspecting his own deficiencies, he seizes upon child education and fervently devotes himself to child psychology, fondly supposing that something must have gone wrong in his own upbringing and childhood development that can be weeded out in the next generation. This intention is highly commendable, but comes to grief on the psychological fact that we cannot correct in a child a fault that we ourselves still commit (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 17, pp. 169-170).

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In his writings, Jung described the ways in which this "eternal child in the adult," this tendency towards wholeness, could be developed and realized in adult life. Characterizing their methods as "causal-reductive," Jung found the psychologies of Freud and Adler inadequate for this task. According to Jung, both Freud and Adler sought to explain psychological phenomena as the direct or indirect expression of certain instincts, which they defined rather narrowly as the pleasure principle or the will to power, and to explain the dynamics and modalities of such instinctual expression as caused and determined by factors in the individual's childhood development. He agreed that there were psychological phenomena which could be understood by reduction to such instincts and ontogenetic factors but objected to the exclusive use of such a causal-reductive method of understanding:

> The two theories [of Freud and Adler]. . . are destructive and reductive. They say to everything, "You are nothing but . . ." They explain to the sufferer that his symptoms come from here and from there and are nothing but this or that. It would be unjust to assert that this reduction is wrong in a given case; but, exalted to the status of a general explanation of the healthy psyche as well as the sick, a reductive theory by itself is impossible. For the human psyche, be it sick or healthy, cannot be explained <u>solely</u> by reduction. Eros is certainly always and everywhere present, the urge to power certainly pervades the heights and depths of the psyche, but the psyche is not <u>just</u> the one or the other, nor for that matter both together. A man is only half understood when we know how everything in him came into being. . . .- As a living being he is not understood, for life does not have only a yesterday, nor is it explained by reducing today to

> yesterday. Life has also a tomorrow, and today is understood only when we can add to our knowledge of what was yesterday the beginnings of tomorrow. This is true of all life's psychological expressions, even of pathological symptoms. The symptoms of a neurosis are not simply the effects of long-past causes, whether "infantile sexuality" or the infantile urge to power; they are also attempts at a new synthesis of life--unsuccessful attempts, let it be added in the same breath, yet attempts nevertheless, with a core of value and meaning (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 7, pp. 44-45).

It was this prospective tendency, this attempt at a new synthesis of life, in pathological symptoms and other psychological phenomena, which Jung focused on in his own work. His contribution is based on what he terms the synthetic or constructive method. Jung (1953-1971) says that this method "takes the unconscious product as a symbolic expression which anticipates a coming phase of psychological development (v. 6, p. 422)" and "seeks to elucidate the symbolically expressed meaning in such a way as to indicate how the conscious orientation may be corrected, and how the subject may act in harmony with the unconscious (v. 6, p. 423)." It is nonreductive in two senses: it does not reduce psychological phenomena to a reconstruction of their genetic origins, and it does not reduce the dynamics of these phenomena to instincts narrowly conceived.

The foundation of this method is a conception of the unconscious which Jung distinguished from Freud's. According to Jung (1953-1971):

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> In Freud's view . . . the contents of the unconscious are limited to infantile tendencies which are repressed because of their incompatible character. . . . According to this theory, the unconscious contains only those parts of the personality which could just as well be conscious and are in fact suppressed only through upbringing (v. 7, p. 124).

As these unconscious contents are the products of a personal history, Jung refers to them as the personal unconscious. Jung (1953-1971) maintains that, in addition to this repressed material, "the unconscious also contains components that have not yet reached the threshold of consciousness" and which "are the seeds of future conscious contents (v. 7, p. 125)."

To distinguish this material from the personal unconscious, Jung refers to it as the impersonal or collective unconscious. The collective unconscious is constituted by certain inborn predispositions or archetypes. Jung's concept of the archetypes wll be discussed later. Here it will suffice to note that for Jung, in addition to the contents of the unconscious described by Freud, there are unconscious psychological processes that seem to represent an inborn predisposition to form certain types of dream and fantasy material. Whereas Freud would interpret such material "reductively" by tracing it back to the childhood experiences from which it presumably originated, Jung meant to interpret it "constructively" as a symbolic expression of future developmental possibilities.

The Principle of Compensation

Underlying Jung's method is the assumption of a compensatory relationship between unconscious and conscious processes. Jung conceived of the conscious and the unconscious as two aspects of a greater totality. He believed that the psyche as a whole is inherently self-regulating. Consciousness by its very nature is one-sided:

> The activity of consciousness is selective. Selection demands direction. But direction requires the exclusion of everything irrelevant. This is bound to make the conscious orientation one-sided (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 6, p. 419).

Those contents which are not included in the conscious orientation become or remain part of the unconscious psychic processes. This "unconscious psyche" is continually engaged in grouping and regrouping its contents in such a way as to balance the one-sidedness of the conscious orientation:

> The contents that are excluded and inhibited by the chosen direction . . . form a counter-weight to the conscious orientation. The strengthening of this counterposition keeps pace with the increase of conscious one-sidedness until finally a noticeable tension is produced. This tension inhibits the activity of consciousness to a certain extent, and though at first the inhibition can be broken down by increased conscious effort, in the end the tension becomes so acute that the repressed unconscious contents break through in the form of dreams and spontaneous images. The more one-sided the conscious attitude, the more antagonistic are the contents arising from the unconscious, so that we may speak of a real opposition between the two. In this case the compensation appears in the form of a counter-function, but this case is extreme.

> As a rule, the unconscious compensation does not run counter to consciousness, but is rather a balancing or supplementing of the conscious orientation. In dreams, for instance, the unconscious supplies all those contents that are constellated by the conscious situation but are inhibited by conscious selection, although a knowledge of them would be indispensable for complete adaptation (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 6, pp. 419-420).

The unconscious contents which compensate the conscious orientation may be aspects of the personal or the collective unconscious. According to Jung (1953-1971), on the personal level the compensatory material consists of such things as "the not consciously recognized personal motives which appear in dreams, or the meanings of daily situations which we have overlooked, . . . or affects we have not permitted, or criticisms we have spared ourselves (v. 7, p. 176)." As the individual becomes aware of these counter-tendencies and acts accordingly, his consciousness is widened. He becomes less concerned with the personal wishes, fears, hopes, and ambitions which have to be compensated or corrected by unconscious counter-tendencies and participates more freely in the wider world of objective interests. As a function of relationship to this wider world, the individual's consciousness now brings him into contact with complications and difficulties that concern others as much as himself. These collective problems activate the collective unconscious "because they require collective rather than personal compensation (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 7, p. 176)." The imagery of the

unconscious processes now assumes an archetypal quality.

Jung (1953-1971) wrote extensively of the archetypal compensations which appear in dreams and fantasies, but he also gave this warning:

> There is what one might call a legitimate and an illegitimate interest in impersonal problems. Excursions of this kind are legitimate only when they arise from the deepest and truest needs of the individual; illegitimate when they are either mere intellectual curiosity or a flight from unpleasant reality. In the latter case the unconscious produces all too human and purely personal compensations, whose manifest aim is to bring the conscious mind back to ordinary reality. People who go illegitimately mooning after the infinite often have absurdly banal dreams which endeavor to damp down their ebbullience. Thus, from the nature of the compensation, we can at once draw conclusions as to the seriousness and rightness of the conscious strivings (v. 7, p. 180).

But when the unconscious compensations are archetypal in nature the individual is legitimately in the throes of a collective problem and it would be illegitimate to reduce his struggle to the personal level.

The Theory of the Individuation Process

According to Jung, if we are to interpret such matters nonreductively we must understand the prospective tendencies inherent in the archetypal compensations. He maintained that when such a nonreductive or constructive method is employed a process occurs in which the meanings of the archetypal manifestations are assimilated with the conscious orientation and the personality develops toward a greater wholeness. He referred to this development as

the individuation process and generally described as something which does not begin until the second half of life:

> As soon as we speak of the collective unconscious we find ourselves in a sphere, and concerned with a problem, which is altogether precluded in the practical analysis of young people or those who have remained infantile too long. Wherever the father or mother images have still to be overcome, wherever there is a little bit of life still to be conquered, which is the natural possession of the average man, then we had better make no mention of the collective unconscious. . . . But once the parental transferences and the youthful illusions have been mastered, or are at least ripe for mastery, then we must speak of those things. We are here outside the range of Freudian and Adlerian reductions; we are no longer concerned with how to remove the obstacles to a man's profession, or to his marriage, or to anything that means a widening of his life, but are confronted with the task of finding a meaning that will enable him to continue living at all. . . .
>
> Man has two aims: the first is the natural aim, the begetting of children and the business of protecting the brood; to this belongs the acquisition of money and social position. When this aim has been reached a new phase begins. . . . It is a sort of second puberty, another "storm and stress" period, not infrequently accompanied by tempests of passion--the "dangerous age." But the problems that crop up at this age are no longer to be solved by the old recipes: the hand of this clock cannot be put back. What youth found and must find outside, the man of life's afternoon must find withim himself (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 7, pp. 72-74).

What the individual finds within himself are the manifestations of archetypal processes. If these processes are understood and assimilated it will lead to a profound integration of the conscious and unconscious psyche. This integration of perviously unconscious, archetypal processes transforms the psyche into a modality of psychological

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wholeness which Jung termed the Self. He considered it the fulfillment of the individuation process. Perhaps it would be wise at this point to define certain key concepts in his theory of individuation.

Psyche was the term used by Jung (1953-1971) to indicate "the totality of all psychic processes, conscious as well as unconscious (v. 6, p. 463)."

By ego he meant "a complex of ideas which constitutes the centre of my field of consciousness and appears to possess a high degree of continuity and identity (Jung, 1953-1971, p. 425)."

The unconscious, for Jung (1953-1971), was "a psychological borderline concept, which covers all psychic contents or processes that are not conscious, i.e., not related to the ego in any perceptible way (v. 6, p. 483)." It is a borderline concept in that its referent is not observable or knowable. It is a hypothetical construct which seems justifiable by certain observable phenomena. For example, "in a case of hysterical amnesia . . . the ego knows nothing of the existence of numerous psychic complexes, and the next moment a simple hypnotic procedure is sufficient to bring the lost contents back to memory (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 6, p. 483)." There are, then, contents of the psyche which are unconscious (not related to the ego in a perceptible way) but which are capable of becoming conscious (perceptibly related to the ego). It

is, therefore, justifiable to postulate a part of the psyche which exists even when we are not conscious of its contents.

The term, complex, is very important in Jung's psychology. A complex, according to Jung, is an emotionally-charged cluster of psychic components which seems to possess a high degree of autonomy. As examples, Jung cites the "Oedipus complex" described by Freud and the "superiority-inferiority complex" described by Adler. Such complexes are autonomous in the sense that they are capable of resisting and interfering with conscious intentions. They seem to be "psychic entities which are outside the control of the conscious mind . . . being at all times ready to hinder or reinforce the conscious functioning (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 6, p. 528)." According to Jung (1953-1971):

> The complex consists of a nuclear element and a large number of secondarily constellated associations. The nuclear element consists of two components: first, a factor determined by experience and causally related to the environment; second, a factor innate in the individual's character and determined by his disposition (v. 8, p. 11).

The core of a complex is, therefore, both personal and archetypal. On the personal level, it "arises from the clash between a demand of adaptation and the individual's constitutional inability to meet the challenge," therefore representing "the unresolved problems in the individual, the places where he as suffered a defeat, at least

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for the time being, and where there is something he cannot evade or overcome (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 6, p. 529)." But the nuclear element of a complex is also composed of an innate factor. For example, an archetype of the collective unconscious may be activated in association with the crisis which constitutes the personal aspect of the complex. But, however personally acquired or archetypal it may be, the nuclear element "produces a specific constellation of psychic contents, thus giving rise to the complex (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 8, p. 12)." This formation of complexes may take place independently of the conscious ego, which itself may be described as a complex:

> The ego-complex forms the centre characteristic of our psyche. But it is only one among several complexes. The others are more often than not associated with the ego-complex and in this way become conscious, but they can also exist for some time without being associated with it (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 8, p. 307).

A change in the relationship of these complexes to the ego-complex is a change in the psyche. Such a change may be described as a transformation and, in some cases, as a development towards individuation.

Individuation Jung (1953-1971) defined as "the process by which individual beings are formed and differentiated; in particular it is the development of the psychological individual as a being distinct from the general, collective psychology (v. 6, p. 448).

Jung (1953-1971) uses the term collective to

designate "all psychic contents that belong not to one individual but to many, i.e., to a society, a people, or to mankind in general (v. 6, p. 417)." Such collective psychic contents include all the conventional attitudes, ideas, feelings, standards of behavior, and so forth, characteristic of a given collectivity. In addition to this "collective consciousness," there is the collective unconscious, containing all those psychic processes which are common to many individuals but generally not perceptibly related to their egos.

The psychological individual, according to Jung (1953-1971) "is characterized by a peculiar and in some respects unique psychology (v. 6, p. 44)," which appears not in the elements of his psyche but in the peculiar and unique grouping and combination of psychic elements common to many human beings. This individuality

> . . . has an a priori unconscious existence but exists consciously only so far as a consciousness of his peculiar nature is present, i.e., so far as there exists a conscious distinction from other individuals. The psychic individuality is given a priori as a correlate of the physical individuality, although, as observed, it is at first unconscious (v. 6, p. 447).

Therefore: "A conscious process of differentiation or individuation is needed to bring the individuality to consciousness (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 6, pp. 447-448)." Perhaps Jung's statements could be paraphrased as follows: although the potential for developing one's individuality is innate, it can only be actualized or realized through

a conscious process of individuation.

Jung's term for the goal of individuation was the Self: "the self is our life's goal, for it is the most complete expression of that fateful combination we call individuality (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 7, p. 238)." This term "expresses the unity of the personality as a whole," and "designates the whole range of psychic phenomena in man (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 6, p. 460)." This definition is virtually identical with his definition of the psyche--but with the added dimension of a unique, unifying system of relationships between the various parts of the whole. It should be apparent that the Self is not to be confused with the ego-complex. Jung (1953-1971) speculated that:

> Since ego-consciousness does not embrace all psychic activities and phenomena . . . the question naturally arises whether there may not be a cohesion of all psychic activities similar to that of ego-consciousness in which the ego would be seen as an objective content. . . . Our ego-consciousness might well be enclosed within a more complete consciousness like a smaller circle within a larger (v. 8, pp. 324-325).

This idea is echoed in his description of the state of being consciously aware of the Self:

> Sensing the self as something irrational, as an indefinable existent, to which the ego is neither opposed nor subjected, but merely attached, and about which it revolves very much as the earth revolves around the sun--thus we come to the goal of individuation. I use the word "sensing" in order to indicate the apperceptive character of the relation between ego and self. In this relation nothing is knowable, because we can say nothing about the contents of the self. The ego is the only content of the self that we do know. The individual ego senses itself as the object of

> an unknown and superordinate subject. It seems to me that our psychological inquiry must come to a stop here, for the idea of a self is itself a transcendental postulate which, although justifiable psychologically, does not allow of scientific proof. This step beyond science is an unconditional requirement of the psychological development I have sought to depict, because without this postulate I could give no adequate formulation of the psychic processes that occur empirically. At the very least, therefore, the self can claim the value of an hypothesis analogous to that of the structure of the atom (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 7, p. 238).

An important concept in Jung's theory of Self-realization, or individuation, is the persona. According to Jung, through the processes of education and socialization we develop those collective qualities and traits which are important to the functioning of society. These qualities constitute a personality which enables us to adapt to our society. Jung termed this complex of socially useful qualities the persona. It is "a compromise between individual and society as to what a man should appear to be (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 7, p. 156)." It is constituted partially by the demands of society and partially by what one would like to be or appear to be. As such it keeps unconscious all those potentials which do not fit the mold. Under certain circumstances, however, a dissolution of the persona occurs. Then we are beset by influences from those aspects of ourselves which have remained unconscious. We may attempt to cope with this phenomenon by regressing to an earlier stage of development and endeavoring to restore the persona. Or we may suffer a reversal in our person-

ality by identifying with the previously undeveloped qualities. In neither case is their a creative interaction between the individual consciousness and the influences coming from the previously unconscious psychic processes. The process of individuation is a middle way between these two extremes, in which the individual maintains his conscious point of view but attempts to understand what has previously been unconscious. This precipitates an enlargement of the personality which is not without its dangers but which may lead to that wholeness of the psyche which Jung termed the Self.

Here it may be wise to present Jung's conceptualization of some psychological processes involved in these alternative developments. He contrasts two general responses: assimilation and dissimilation. Assimilation "is the approximation of a new content of consciousness to already constellated subjective material (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 6, p. 413)." Whereas assimilation indicates "the approximation of object to subject in general," dissimilation indicates "the approximation of subject to object, and a consequent alienation of the subject from himself in favour of the object, whether it be an external object or a 'psychological' object . . . (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 6, pp. 413-414)." Dissimilation is characterized by projection and identification while assimilation is characterized by introjection.

Projection, for Jung (1953-1971), "means the expulsion of a subjective content into an object . . . it is a process of dissimilation, by which a subjective content becomes alienated from the subject and is, so to speak, embodied in the object (v. 6, p. 457)."

Identification is also "a psychological process in which the personality is partially or totally dissimilated," it is "an alienation of the subject from himself for the sake of the object, in which he is, so to speak, disguised (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 6, p. 440)." Jung uses the example of a son who unconsciously adopts all his father's ways of behaving as though he were the same as his father and not a separate individuality. He adds that identification "does not always apply to persons but also to things (e.g., a movement of some kind, a business, etc.) and to psychological functions (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 6, p. 44)." A person may identify himself with only one function or with only one aspect of his psyche. Or he may identify one aspect of his psyche with another. For example, he may identify his ego with an archetype of the collective unconscious, thereby "dissimilating" the ego--or alienating the ego from itself so that it becomes disguised in the archetype.

Assimilation, on the other hand, is characterized by introjection. It is "an indrawing of the object into the subjective field of interest," an "assimilation of

object to subject (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 6, p. 452)." As examples, Jung cites the transference phenomenon (a sort of passive introjection in which the personality of the therapist is assimilated to the subjective associations of the patient) and the phenomenon of empathy (a more active form of introjection in which the experience of another is assimilated on one's subjective experience). Whereas projection and identification alienate us from ourselves, it would seem that introjection, by assimilating the object to our subectivity, keeps us from recognizing the differences of the object from ourselves.

Differentiation is a process which can be distinguished from either dissimilation or assimilation. For Jung (1953-1971) it meant simply "the development of differences, the separation of parts from a whole (v. 6, p. 424)." As indicated above, differentiation is essential to the individuation process. As previously unconscious material emerges and is not projected or identified with, the ego may begin to assimilate it. But as this material is in some cases other than the ego, it cannot be introjected without a reduction of its meaning. It must be differentiated from the ego in order for the ego to integrate it meaningfully. As the previously unconscious material becomes differentiated, an individuation

process occurs in which the personality develops towards an integration of psychic elements which includes, but is greater than, the ego.

In his efforts to understand this process, Jung classified the previously unconscious material which commonly manifests itself into certain groups of typically occurring phenomena. I will mention three groups of phenomena which seem central: the "shadow," the "anima/animus," and the "transcendent function."

The shadow is a complex of psychic qualities which we will not allow ourselves to express and which we may not even recognize. Jung (1953-1971) describes it as the opposite, or shadow, of our persona: "By shadow I mean the 'negative' side of the personality, the sum of all those unpleasant qualities we like to hide, together with the insufficiently developed functions and the contents of the personal unconscious (v. 7, p. 65n5)." As we begin to encounter previously unconscious material, we become aware of these opposite and undeveloped traits and thus encounter the shadow. The apparent function of this complex, therefore, is to bring us into relationship with aspects of ourselves we have previously repressed and thereby to compensate for the incompleteness of the persona complex and/or the conscious orientation.

The anima/animus represents another kind of functional opposite to the persona. Whereas the persona

constitutes our conscious function of relationship to society, the anima/animus constitutes our function of relationship to our own psychic processes. It is that which assimilates or dissimilates psychic processes. Jung sometimes refers to it as the "projection-making factor." As we become aware of this complex we become aware of the kind of attitude which has characterized our relationship to unconscious processes. As this functional complex is often represented in dreams as a contrasexual personality, Jung refers to its presence in men as the anima and in women as the animus.

Jung (1953-1971) said that the character of this complex is by and large, complementary to the character of the persona:

> The tyrant tormented by bad dreams, gloomy forebodings, and inner fears is a typical figure. Outwardly ruthless, harsh, and unapproachable, he jumps inwardly at every shadow, is at the mercy of every mood, as though he were the feeblest and most impressionable of men. Thus his anima contains all those fallible human qualities his persona lacks (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 6, p. 468).

He has actualized certain qualities in his relationships to society and left other qualities undeveloped, which constitute an inferior relationship to his psychic processes. As a rule "the character of the anima can be deduced from that of the persona. Everything that should normally be in the outer attitude, but is conspicuously absent, will invariably be found in the inner attitude

(Jung, 1953-1971, v. 6, p. 469)." Hence, a compensatory relationship exists between the anima or animus and the persona.

Individuation requires an awareness of the tension between the persona and the unconscious complexes. In Jung's words, individuation means "nothing less than to divest the self of the false wrappings of the persona on the one hand, and the suggestive power of the primordial images on the other (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 7, p. 172)." We must recognize these functional complexes as not identical with our egos but as constituting two poles of that psychological opposition which energizes the life process of human beings:

> Just as, for the purpose of individuation, or self-realization, it is essential for a man to distinguish between what he is and how he appears to himself and to others, so it is also necessary for the same purpose that he should become conscious of his invisible system of relations to the unconscious, and especially of the anima, so as to be able to distinguish himself from her . . . since the unconscious factors act as determinants no less than the factors that regulate the life of society, and are no less collective, I might just as well learn to distinguish between what I want and what the unconscious thrusts upon me, as to see what my office demands of me and what I myself desire. At first the only thing that is at all clear is the incompatibility of the demands coming from without and from within, with the ego standing between them, as between hammer and anvil. But over against this ego, tossed like a shuttlecock between the outer and inner demands, there stands some scarcely definable arbiter (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 7, pp. 193-194).

This "scarcely definable arbiter" of the conflict between internal and external demands, Jung termed the transcendent

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function.

The transcendent function represents the capacity of the psyche to mediate between the opposites and achieve a higher synthesis. It finds expression in consciousness through symbol formation. As we become aware of the conflict between our conscious orientation and previously unconscious material, symbols which unite these opposites may emerge. They represent the capacity of the psyche to transcent its internal conflicts and develop a new orientation. This capacity, when actualized, constitutes a "mid-point of the personality":

> It may not be immediately apparent what is meant by a "mid-point of the personality." I will therefore try to outline this problem in a few words. If we picture the conscious mind, with the ego as its centre, as being opposed to the unconscious, and if we now add to our mental picture the process of assimilating the unconscious, we can think of this assimilation as a kind of approximation of conscious and unconscious, where the centre of the total personality no longer coincides with the ego, but with a point midway between the conscious and the unconscious. This would be the point of new equilibrium, a new centering of the total personality, a virtual centre which , on account of its focal position between conscious and unconscious, ensures for the personality a new and more solid foundation (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 7, p. 219).

II. CRITICISMS AND EXTENSIONS OF JUNG'S CONCEPT

> Theories in psychology are the very devil. It is true that we need certain points of view for their orienting and heuristic value; but they should always be regarded as mere auxiliary concepts that can be laid aside at any time.
>
> --C. J. Jung
> (1953-1971, v. 17, p. 176)

> We need to realize that Jung left a gap which needs to be filled in by us. . . . We urgently need a Jungian genetic psychology.
>
> --Michael Fordham
> (1965, p. 35)

The Need for a Developmental Perspective

I hope that this review of phenomena which accompany the individuation process will be sufficient to outline the fundamental concepts in Jung's theoretical model. It was his ambition to develop a model which was not reductionistic--a model which did not try to explain the phenomena of the individuation process by reducing them to their origins in ontogenetic development. But critics have found a methodological inadequacy in Jung's tendency to separate individuation from ontogenetic factors and from the socio-cultural context in which it occurs. It is a criticism which has led to the charge that Jung's own theory is a kind of reductionism.

Munroe (1955) interprets Jung's theory as reductionistic in that it turns important dynamic systems into universals which are described as if they were static entities. She maintains that his psychology, with its emphasis on the action and interaction of systems whose major outlines have already taken form, lacks the fluidity characteristic of a developmental psychology. Her criterion for a nonreductionistic psychology is worth quoting:

> My own point of view . . . insists upon a genetic orientation toward the development of significant psychological systems, in creative interaction with systems constellated around other, nonpsychological foci--i.e., events in the natural universe and in organized society (Munroe, 1955, p. 567).
>
> One should not ask of any theory of systems lying deep in the organism that it be directly applicable to the transient systems of daily living in diverse societies, under the special conditions every individual encounters in his moment of time. But one should ask that the psychological theory be oriented toward understanding the creative interaction of systems at all levels (Munroe, 1955, p. 568).

On the basis of this criterion, Jung's theory is found to be "more analytic, deductive, and static than Freud's":

> Jung formulates many significantly operating systems in the adult psyche more vividly than Freud--for some purposes more usefully. But he tends to envisage them as primal entities rather than emergent dynamic systems. And he seems even less interested than Freudians in studying the ways in which they are modified and altered.
>
> The danger of Jung's position is reification of developmental and adaptive systems to such an extent that they become a pluralism of universals, which are then considered as interacting along complex but essentially mechanistic lines. The various subdivisions of the psyche . . . become quite stable "things" . . . which are then studied in relation to one another and to their own intrinsic antithesis.

> . . . Since the psychic entities Jung proposes are systems of profound importance, since he is sensitively alert to their interaction, and since he calls upon intuition to penetrate the disguises they assume, it sounds like a foolish paradox to say that his theory leads toward a static intellectualism. Nevertheless, I think that this is the ultimate fate of any theory that does not find its psychological roots in the genetic process (Munroe, 1955, pp. 568-569).

Munroe's criticism, then, is that Jungian psychology lacks a developmental perspective.

Since her criticism, the Jungian school has endeavored to bring such a perspective more clearly into its theoretical model. But this criticism, nevertheless, continues to be made. For example, Wyss (1966) finds Jung's model of the psyche to be like a closed system:

> . . . there is no direct connection between the system and the outside world that could in any way exercise a decisive influence on the internal pressures. The system is a closed one and it is self-regulating (p. 324).

Consequently, individuation "might well be compared to a process in a test-tube, since the psyche is only required to come to terms with itself in its quest for maturity (Wyss, 1966, p. 431)." Similarly, Friedman (1967) maintains that Jung's descriptions of individuation seem "to imply that the task of authenticating one's concrete existence in the world is merely secondary and instrumental to realizing our inner wholeness (pp. 161-162)." Rieff (1966) accuses Jung of "recommending an essentially private religiosity without institutional reference or

communal membership," in which "every man would live grandly with his Unconscious, himself an entire church, complete with grace given and received," constituting a "socially and politically inconsequential symbolic universe (pp. 134-139)." According to Rieff (1966), Jung's private religiosity "denies, in principle any significant social responsibility," for "Jung seeks less to transform the modern world than to avoid it (p. 139)."

While Rieff's attack may be overstated, it nevertheless reflects the fact that, in striving to develop a model of individuation which does not reduce this process to its origins in psychosocial development, Jung left unanswered the question of how individuation is related to psycho-social development. There are at least two aspects of this question. First, does the theory of individuation have any application to the dynamics of psychosocial development in young people? Second, what bearing does a person's ontogenetic or psychosocial development have upon the process of individuation, or what role could a causal-reductive analysis have in facilitating the process of individuation? These issues have been objects of discussion within Analytical Psychology.

The need to formulate a Jungian developmental model was expressed by Erich Neumann at the First International Congress for Analytical Psychology in 1958. He

begins by saying that Jung's discovery of the crucial importance of transpersonal factors or archetypes in determining man's psychic development "led him to turn away more and more from the personalistic genetic aspect of psychoanalysis with its emphasis on childhood as the real source of human development (Neumann, 1961, p. 38)." According to Neumann (1961), while this change of emphasis enabled Jung to develop his conception of the unique psychology of adulthood and of the nongenetic or transpersonal aspects of the psyche, the task for those analytical psychologists who wish to develop his theory "must surely be to combine the aspects of the personal and the transpersonal, the temporal-genetic and the timeless, which have grown too far apart (p. 38)." To do so, he says, is a necessity not only in theory but even more so in practice for otherwise analytical psychologists could remain unconscious of their theoretical preconceptions about the interconnection between genetic and archetypal factors.

Such preconceptions have undoubtedly influenced the work of analytical psychologists. In the past two decades there have been important efforts to work through the theoretical implications of the connection between these factors. A focal issue seems to be whether individuation is a concept which ought to be limited to developments occurring in the second half of life or whether it

can be applied to processes which begin in childhood and continue throughout life. Of the Jungians who have extended the theory of individuation to cover the entire life cycle, the most thorough treatment of the subject is to be found in the work of Jolanda Jacobi and Michael Fordham.

Individuation as a Life-long Process

Jacobi (1958, 1967), describes individuation as the task of lifetime but divides life into two main phases. The second phase is synonymous with the process that Jung described as individuation. The first phase is comprised of those developmental processes (the stabilizing of the ego and the strengthening of consciousness) which are prerequisites for the full realization of the process in the second half of life. Jacobi (1967) thereby maintains Jung's distinction between individuation and childhood development, but incorporates into this model the fact that the individuation process is continuous with, and based upon, earlier developmental achievements:

> No phase of the individuation process can be exchanged for another or skipped. If the demands of the first phase have been insufficiently considered in youth, they have to be caught up with later before the process can go ahead. . . (p. 95).
>
> Jung constantly emphasizes that the overcoming of the tasks of youth is a prerequisite for psychic development during the second half. Only then is a person capable of submitting himself to the far-reaching process which the second half of life requires of him. The validity of this is apparent when a man

> who already stands on the threshold of the change of life has, with respect to his conscious personality, only reached the degree of development of an adolescent... . . In this case . . . the first requisite for maturation is the stability of the ego and the strengthening of consciousness, a typical task for the first half of life. Only then are the preconditions met for the venture which the second phase of the individuation process entails. This means that an eventual analysis must work with the viewpoints that apply to the first half of life even though the analysand is fifty years old. . . (p. 27).

Some of Jung's own statements imply such a concept of individuation as a continuous, life-long process. For example, Jung (1953-1971) states that "individuation is an expression of that biological process . . . by which every living thing becomes what it was destined to become from the beginning(p. 307)." Elsewhere he writes that "Individuation is practically the same as the development of consciousness out of the original state of identity (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 6, p. 449)." While such statements would seem to contradict other statements describing individuation as a process occurring only in maturity, Jacobi's model of a continuous process with two distinct but connected phases would seem to reconcile them.

Unfortunately, her model sometimes seems to imply that a person lives two separate lives, connected only in the transition between them. This tendency is particularly apparent in her contention that the differences between the two phases necessitate fundamentally different principles of interpretation for processes which belong

to one phase or the other:

> In general, if there are difficulties in the first half of life an analysis of the repressed "ontogenetic" contents . . . is sufficient. They correspond roughly to the problems of childhood and youth considered by Freud. . . . With younger people one can usually manage with Freudian and Adlerian aims and help them to adapt to the circumstances of their lives. But with people over forty this is no longer true in the majority of cases (Jacobi, 1967, p. 41).

Her statement implies that specifically Jungian principles have little application to the developmental processes occurring in the first half of life. Yet she feels it is unjustified to say that Jung's psychology has nothing to say to young people (Jacobi, 1967, p. 27). She points to his various writings on childhood and youth, to his application of the archetype theory to childhood, and to the principle that earlier developmental achievements are indispensable to the individuation process in later life. But she does not provide a theoretical foundation for applying Jung's concept of individuation to the processes of the first half of life. By terming these developments a part of individuation only insofar as they are the prerequisites for a separate and later process, she perpetuates the concept of individuation as a process realized only in the second half of life.

She does not consider the developmental processes of the two phases as homologous phenomena. Jacobi (1967) says that the operative factor behind both phases is the same--the Self, which she describes as:

> . . . that transconscious, central authority of the psyche, which seems from the beginning to be in a priori possession of the goal, and, with a kind of foreknowledge, aims at the entelechy, the unity and wholeness of the human personality. It is the organizing centre upon which all psychic phenomena depend, including the psychic course of life. . . (p. 31).

Yet she describes the first half of life as "a growing of the ego out of the Self" and the second half of life as "a re-rooting in it (Jacobi, 1967, p. 42)." Therefore, in interpreting the dreams and fantasies of people there is an important distinction: "In the first half of life the material of the collective unconscious is neglected in favour of that from the personal unconscious; in the second it is the other way around (Jacobi, 1967, p. 48)." This distinction is disrupted only when, as indicated above, an older person is still struggling with personal issues unresolved in the first half of life.

Jacobi's manner of extending the thesis has been contested by Michael Fordham (1958). While Jacobi was publishing a conceptual overview of individuation as a life-long process, Fordham was presenting a critique of this extension of the theory:

> In 1958 two articles on individuation appeared in The Journal of Analytical Psychology, one by Mrs. Jacobi, the other by myself. Mrs. Jacobi put forward the idea that individuation is the task of a lifetime and she worked forward somewhat further than heretofore a thesis to which others--Baynes, Harding, and Perry--have contributed. In my essay I discussed views on individuation showing they could be grouped under two headings. One view I termed classical; it defined individuation as

> a development with definable characteristics occurring in the second phase of life; the other, which I termed "the extended thesis" because it held that individuation began in childhood and continued throughout life, has been expounded by Baynes, Harding and Perry. I criticized the latter because of its tendency to by-pass a number of the features in the classical thesis to which Jung had laid rather clear emphasis, because it lacked data to support, wrongly evoked instinct theory and used a primitive form of teleology in its support. The formulation of it was thus vulnerable to theoretical objection and no indubitable data were put forward to support it (Fordham, 1968, p. 54).

Fordham's theoretical objections are worth mentioning in more detail. By describing individuation as a process which may develop prior to, or independently of, ego development, Fordham felt that the extended thesis gave less place to the ego than the concept of individuation required. Jung had described it as a process of interaction between ego consciousness and the collective unconscious. Neglecting this crucial point, the extended thesis tended to describe the individuation process as an instinct. Harding had referred to it as "the instinct of self-preservation on a higher plane" and Baynes had said "individuation must be recognized as a primary instinct (quoted in Fordham, 1958, p. 120)." Fordham considered this an inappropriate instinct theory. It implied a teleological model of organismic development which had been dispensed with in biology and which Jung had said was not implied in his theory.

Because it underscores the difficulties

implied in any attempt to describe the individuation process apart from the contingencies of a person's ego development, and comes from within the Jungian school, Fordham's critique is worth quoting at length:

> The extended conception would indeed appear to necessitate a regression to rather old-fashioned teleology. The idea that the end is already contained in the unconscious would, if it is to have any scientific relevance, involve an enormous advance in the knowledge of hereditary potentialities; furthermore it involves the extraordinary complex technical problem of disentangling the acquired elements from those which are innate. But more important is the general trend in psychology towards finding the type of prediction here implied, i.e., that there is an inherent aim to differentiate "specific potentialities," more and more difficult. Unconscious aims are recognized as an essential feature of instinctive life whose manifestations can be extended in range by various means. One of them is the interaction between the ego and the instincts in the unconscious. When this happens the rigidity of the instinctual aims becomes modified and transformed in ways that diminish rather than increase the predictability of their manifestations. Indeed the range of possible solutions to any particular problem progressively increases. Thus any specific inherited pattern which is conceived to unfold is subject to unpredictable modification.
>
> There would, I think, be less theoretical difficulty if it were not for the implication that the specific potentialities seem to be allied to the notion of their differentiation, as if there were a one-to-one correspondence between the potentialities and their ultimate manifestations in consciousness. All that we know of the psyche does not warrant such an assumption. If we assume, as seems inevitable, that genes determine potentialities, they must differentiate along a scale of possibilities for which we have evidence that many images refer to each archetype (Fordham, 1958, pp. 121-122).

Although he raised these objections to the manner in which the theory had previously been extended, Fordham (1965) reached the conclusion that "the essentials of the

individuation process start in infancy and continue through life (p. 55)." He reached this conclusion because of an abundance of data showing symbols of the Self in the dreams and fantasies of children. Early in his career as a Jungian child analyst he was somewhat shocked to find that what Jung had described as the goal of maturity was taking symbolic form in the dreams and fantasies of children. But in his correspondence with Jung, Fordham discovered that Jung himself had come to the same conclusion from studying children's dreams. This confirmation led Fordham to develop certain theoretical modifications of the concept of the Self which later provided the basis for his own extension and modification of the individuation concept.

As the consummation of the individuation process, the Self represents a final integration of the ego and the unconscious. It is not surprising, therefore, that Fordham (1970) observed a tendency among analytical psychologists "to conceive of the self as a stabilizing, centralizing, and even closed system (p. 98)." But its symbolic appearance in the dreams and fantasies of children gave Fordham doubts about conceiving of the Self in this way. Early childhood is a changing and developing period. In addition to integration, there is differentiation. Consequently, Fordham was led to the idea that the Self might be a more unstable system than previously thought.

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He developed the theory "that the system which the self representations, or symbols indicated is primary, and . . . that the infant or foetus might be looked on as a unity, the self, out of which the archetypes and the ego derived (Fordham, 1970, p. 99)."

This conception of the Self as a primary entity, the sum of part systems which emerge from it, implies the idea that the part systems deintegrate out of the Self and then integrate again. These processes of deintegration and reintegration occur at various times throughout the life cycle. They are unstable periods in which the orientation of the person undergoes change. In the beginning, the stabilizing entity is the Self only, but

> . . . the ego contributes and ensures that the dynamic sequences in the self do not prove unproductive and circular, but are changed by ego activity. . . . Thus the structuring of the psyche is brought about to a significant extent by the ego. Without it only repetitive archetypal deintegrative reactions would exist, and these, though adaptive, would not lead to permanent interacting structures (Fordham, 1970, p. 100).
>
> By two years it may be said that ego growth has gone far enough for integrative processes to be stabilized over against primitive integrative-deintegrative sequences (Fordham, 1970, p. 127).

One may properly speak of a completed individuation process which occurs repeatedly throughout the life cycle:

> . . . the primary or original self of the infant is radically disrupted by birth in which the psyche-soma is flooded by stimuli which give rise to prototypic anxiety. Following this, a steady state re-establishes itself and the first clear sequence of disturbance followed by resting or steady states

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> has been completed. The sequence repeats again and again during maturation and the motive forces behind them are called deintegrative and integrative. At first the sequences are rapid, but as psychic organization proceeds, they become spread over longer periods till relative stability is attained for most of the time. It is now possible to define a number of periods at which one or other or both of these processes can be studied: birth, the approach to mother centering round breast feeding, with particular references to changes occurring round about three months, seven months and weaning; the separation-individuation phase; the crisis created by the birth of a sibling; and oedipal developments. Following this the stable latency period leads to the disturbances of adolescence and to a relatively stable maturity, which continues till the transition to later life when deintegration-integration sequences repeat and the individuation processes, which Jung specifically investigated, begin . . . (Fordham, 1970, p. 103).

Fordham considers the experiences of the Self in the earlier periods, whether in adolescence, childhood, or even infancy, to be just as valid as they are in later life. He maintains that the dynamic processes at any period are not essentially different (Fordham, 1970, p. 127). A first individuation process is described as occurring as early as the age of two. It is therefore his theory "that individuating processes are active in infancy and childhood, and that they are an essential feature of maturation (Fordham, 1970, p. 27)."

Fordham's conception differs from Jacobi's in that his model is cyclical while hers is linear. Whereas Jacobi distinguishes between two main phases of a continuing life-long process of individuation, Fordham describes individuation as a process which repeats itself many times in the life of an individual. Nevertheless, Jacobi

has developed a concept which parallels Fordham's model. To portray the concept of individuation as a life-long or continuous process of development, Jacobi uses the phrase, "the archetype of the individuation process." The symbolism of birth, life, death, and rebirth constitues the pattern of this archetype. According to Jacobi (1967), the fact that men in all times and places have spoken of rebirth demonstrates Jung's belief that "a store of psychic experiences designated by that term must actually exist (p. 61)." Applied to the psychology of the individual, rebirth "means psychic rebirth within the lifetime of the individual, a renewal of personality in the sense of its growing completion, its tendency towards wholeness (Jacobi, 1967, p. 61)." Within the course of a lifetime there will be many little "rebirth moments" and "rebirth events" on the way to the ultimate aim of "the rebirth of the whole personality." Nevertheless, although every rebirth is a transformation, not every transformation will be a development towards individuation. Only if the transformation becomes a new integration of the psyche will it lead towards individuation. This integration may occur "naturally," by means of participation in collective rites, or through an individual effort of consciousness.

An individual, then, may be reborn again and again until full psychic development is reached. The first

phase of the life-long process

> . . . aims at the crystallization of a stable ego, and the second at the achievement of a permanent relationship between the ego and the Self. Accordingly, each phase is characterized by a more or less marked variation of the archetypal ground-plan (Jacobi, 1967, p. 64).

Jabobi (1967) points out that for Jung the archetypal ground-pattern, or symbolic model, of the process of individuation is the "night sea journey (pp. 68-70)." This archetypal ground-pattern finds expression in the ubiquitous myth of a hero who is swallowed by a water-monster, travels in its belly through the sea, and re-emerges later with a new strength. Jacobi summarizes Jung's interpretation of this archetypal pattern as symbolizing a process of submerging oneself in the unconscious, realizing the meaning of the previously unconscious contents, and re-emerging as a more integrated person. This pattern, in other words, symbolizes the basic stages of an individuation process. Jacobi (1967) discusses the ramifications of the fact that, for Jung, this ground-pattern, like her conception of the archetypal pattern of rebirth, was valid for the individuation process as a whole as well as for each of its stages:

> The fact that Jung often used the "night sea journey" as a model for the individuation process even in the first half of life has repeatedly given rise to misunderstandings. Because individuation extends through the whole of life, many people overlooked the fact that its first half stands under a different sign from the second and therefore expresses itself in different symbols. They assumed that only

> a person in the second half of life can individuate, and they regarded the process always as an analogy of the "descent into the underworld." But on closer examination this model is to some extent applicable to all stages of the process of individuation. It can be said with some justification that every act of conscious realization is a plunging into the darkness of the underworld and a re-emergence from it, such as we experience every day in our sleep and dreams, and that the "night sea journey" therefore retains its validity for every kind of "rebirth," i.e., conscious realization, whether it belong to the first or to the second phase of individuation. Even so we must, if we wish to reduce the archetypal material to some kind of order, try to distinguish in principle between its two specific forms (p. 70).

Therefore individuation can with some legitimacy be viewed as a continuous or a cyclic process.

Recently, Edinger sketchingly suggested a developmental model, patterned after the work of Neumann, which manages to be both cyclical and linear. Like Fordham, Edinger conceives of the Self as a primal entity from which the ego separates and to which it later forms a relationship. Following Neumann, he terms this relationship the "ego-Self axis," and conceives of the human life cycle as a process of alternation between ego-Self union and ego-Self separation. It can be thought of as a cyclic, spiralling process with each cycle going through certain stages. But:

> As this cycle repeats itself again and again throughout psychic development it brings about a progressive differentiation of the ego and the Self. In the early phases, representing approximately the first half of life, the cycle is experienced as an alternation between two states of being, namely inflation and alienation.

> Later a third state appears when the ego-Self axis reaches consciousness which is characterized by a conscious dialectic relationship between ego and Self. This state is individuation (Edinger, 1973, p. 7).
>
> The cycle is then replaced by a more or less conscious dialogue between ego and Self (Edinger, 1973, p. 42).

Thus Edinger is able to discuss individuation and childhood development within the same rubric, demonstrating their connection while at the same time maintaining the classical distinction between them.

As I indicated, he utilizes the model originally developed by Neumann. Neumann (1964, pp. 397-418) uses the word "centroversion" to characterize the commonality of the processes occurring in the first and second halves of life. He says that centroversion occurs throughout life, but assumes different forms in the first and second halves. In the first half of life the activity of centroversion passes from the psychic totality of the unconscious Self and moves towards the ego. This happens by means of differentiation or division of the psyche into two systems. Centroversion expresses itself as a compensatory relation between the conscious and unconscious systems. But it remains unconscious--i.e., the ego, which during this first phase of life is the central organ of centroversion, has no knowledge of its dependence upon the whole. The individual moves from the instinct-centeredness of infancy to ego-centeredness. The central position of the ego does not allow the workings of

centroversion to come to consciousness. It is a period of deflation of the unconscious, differentiation, and the formation of an outward gradient to the social collective. In puberty, the ego becomes the carrier of individuality. The detachment from the unconscious becomes complete. Puberty initiations are an expression of the activated collective unconscious, which is now linked to the community so that the neophyte is led to a new experience of his position within the collective and becomes a responsible member of the society. The significance of the ego and the individual is from now on built into a collective culture and the collective morality. From puberty to the climacteric the outward dialectic is conducted between individual and collective.

But centroversion balances this one-sidedness of the first half of life by a compensatory development during the second half. While the first phase led to the development of the ego and the differentiation of the two psychic systems, this second phase of centroversion brings the development of the Self and the integration of the two systems. Although the unconscious activity of the Self dominates the whole of life, it is only in this second phase that its activity becomes conscious. The outward dialectic between individual and social collective is replaced by the task of individuation: mastering the inner dialectic between the ego and the collective

unconscious, so that a new wholeness may be constellated between the hitherto diametrically opposed systems of conscious and unconscious. In this transformation process the ego reaches consciousness of the Self. The Self evolves out of its unconscious activity and arrives at the stage of conscious activity. This reverses the previous direction of centroversion. There is now a deflation of the world, psychic integration, and the formation of an inward gradient to the Self. There is now in the ego a growing awareness of centroversion. In the process there is a "sublimation" of the ego as it realizes its connection with the Self.

With regard to my original question of the relation between individuation and psychosocial development, there is a difference between the models of Jacobi, Edinger, and Neumann, on the one hand, and Fordham, on the other. Jacobi, Edinger, and Neumann maintain that the individuation process, as traditionally conceived, is different from, but dependent upon, processes which occur earlier in the life cycle. These earlier processes, then, may or may not be described as part of the individuation process. Fordham, on the other hand, describes individuation as a process which occurs repeatedly during these earlier phases of development and throughout the life cycle. However it conceives of this relationship, any model which brings the theory of individuation into

relationship with psychosocial development must show how it is related to the particular dynamics of specific stages of psychosocial development. As Fordham puts it, "if change is to be made in the classical concept the alternative must clearly formulate the steps in the individuation process which are envisaged. . . (Fordham, 1968, p. 54)." Fulfilling such a requirement would mean showing how archetypes, and the Self, are involved in the stages of ego, or psycho-social development. Principles for doing this have been sketched by Neumann (1961).

The Application of Jungian Concepts to Developmental Processes

Neumann's ontogenetic model differs from Fordham's in that he does not extend the concept of individuation to earlier stages of development. He nevertheless does relate the theory of the archetypes to these earlier stages. In reviewing his model, I shall quote Neumann at length, as his presentation is highly condensed. I will organize his presentation according to the principles which seem most important and discuss the points of agreement or disagreement between Neumann and Fordham.

A first principle is that the human psyche develops according to archetypal stages:

> When we speak of the archetypal stages of conscious development, we mean the autonomous unfolding of the archetypal structure of the psyche, within which and through which the development of the ego and of consciousness proceeds. Just as the organism develops in a transpersonal way laid down from the start with

> the central nervous system built into this development, so also we have an archetypal structure of the psyche that unfolds by itself. In it the dominance of one archetype is superseded by that of another and an hierarchical archetypal structure is built up: the unfolding of one archetype. . . follows of necessity that of another. . . . This means that the transpersonal and timeless, which every archetype is and remains, enters into temporal succession and consequently acquires a genetic and historical aspect (Neumann, 1961, p. 39).

Another important principle that can be extracted from Neumann's presentation is that the developing human being, in following these archetypal stages, is a unity of biological, psychological, and sociological processes. When this unity is disturbed the development is aborted or becomes pathological:

> We know that in man the organism undergoes a transpersonal development that manifests itself as birth, puberty, middle age, climacteric, and death. The same thing happens in the psyche, and since man is a bio-psychic unity, these phases of organic development correspond to phases of archetypal dominance within the psyche. Jung was able to demonstrate this in the psychology of the critical phase of middle life and the psychology of individuation. We can ascertain a transpersonal development of psychic structure, the sequence of which in time . . . is determined transpersonally and fixed as a specific pattern. Thus we speak of a retarded or a precocious, a prolonged or a shortened, puberty. There is, in other words, a transpersonal, self-unfolding bio-psychic structure with which the individual lives in harmony when he fulfills it, or with which he does not live in harmony so that he becomes ill. . . .
>
> Not only is the unfolding of the psychic structure as a whole determined archetypally, but also that of consciousness, of the ego, and of the ego's relation to the whole of the psyche and of the world. The fact that the phases of conscious development are transpersonal and archetypal means that the development of consciousness and of the ego must likewise be regarded as a specific unfolding of a pre-existent psychic structure. But whereas the psychic structure

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> that determines the unfolding of the stages of life rests clearly on bio-psychic foundations peculiar to the species and largely independent of the environment, in the archetypal stages of conscious development we have to do with a more complicated phenomenon. Not only is there a temporal succession of psychic dominants unfolding autonomously, but this entire process, whose predisposed course is ingrained in the species, is at the same time dependent on the influence of a specific environment. The human child, with his development of an ego and consciousness, is by nature not only a psychobiological being, but from the very beginning a social being conditioned by culture. As the history of the wolf children shows, in a non-human milieu in which the personal mother is lacking, the mother archetype is not activated by the compensatory unconscious, so that the child does not develop into a specifically human creature (Neumann, 1961, pp. 39-40).

The idea that the developing human being is already a social being is shared by Fordham; but Fordham (1970) sees it in relation to the socially determined traditional customs of child-care:

> An adolescent comes into direct contact with the culture pattern and the collective unconscious. In a very different way and right from the beginning as an infant he has been influenced indirectly by the society in which his family lives. It was expressed in collective attitudes to infants and infancy, in the methods used to care for him and the provisions made for education later on. Then he did not grapple with them directly as he does now, and will in later life but much depends on the outcome whether early influences are related to how he is expected to behave now . . . .
>
> Studies made of primitive tribes by social anthropologists show . . . how the customs of infant management relate to the culture in which the infant will one day live . . . .
>
> A prominent feature of all these researches is that varying methods of infant care are intimately related to behaviour that will be required of the child, adolescent and adult in society (pp. 147-149).

A third principle is that each stage of development is not only founded on the previous stage but also is evoked by the experiences of the child in interaction with its environment, a process which Neumann (1961) refers to as the "personal evocation of the archetype":

> As this sequence cannot be reversed, any more than it would be possible to begin building a house from the roof downwards, we speak of the hierarchical structure of the psyche. The one phase is, by structural necessity, the foundation of the next. The sequence of archetypal stages and layers constitutes the transpersonal time element, in accordance with which a sequence of psychic events characteristic of the species is built up into an equally characteristic psychic structure. Thus among the mammals, to which class we belong, containment in the maternal uroboros always comes at the beginning, and this is always followed by the primary relationship of child to mother. In the uroboric phase the determining factor is the anonymously containing intra-uterine situation, in which the ego consciousness of the child is not yet awakened; in the primary relationship it is the development of an ego and consciousness in dependence of the mother archetype and the mother. We say emphatically "mother archetype and mother," because in the case of those archetypes which possess a human form the more complicated constellation I mentioned above becomes operative. I call this the "personal evocation of the archetype." That is to say the transpersonal and timeless structure of the archetype, ingrained in the specifically human psyche of the child and ready for development, must first be released and activated by the personal encounter with a human being (p. 41).

There are also archetypes which do not assume a human form and represent a situation rather than a relationship (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 9i, p. 38). In such cases it might be justifiable to expand Neumann's concept and speak of the situational or existential evocation of the archetype. I will have more to say about this idea later.

Here, I would like to supplement Neumann's principle with a rather traditional Jungian concept and restate it as follows: the environment not only "evokes" but also "gives form" to the archetype. This concept of the environmental formation of archetypal representations is well-stated by Fordham (1962):

> It is because of the interaction between inner and outer experience that the archetypal image is to be distinguished from the archetype itself: the image is a psychical structure, made from the interaction between the unconscious archetype and environmental (perceptual) components and build into the ego and the inner world through projection, introjection, and identification (pp. 50-51).

A fourth principle of Neumann's is that if the person who evokes the archetype is inadequate to fill the needs of the child for mothering or fathering the archetypal structure, once evoked, continues to exist as a factor capable of compensating for the developmental deficiency and moving the person toward further growth:

> This encounter of the child with the mother in the primary relationship is also specifically human, and will always take place under normal human conditions. But the evocation of the archetype is a personal event in the individual's history and therefore subject to possible disturbance. Between the archetype to be released in the child's psyche and the human "releaser" figure a lock-and-key phenomenon comes into force: each must fit the other perfectly. This is comparable to the animal world in which the innate releasing mechanisms seem to function like clockwork at precise points of formative readiness for imprinting. But in the human realm the personal release of the archetype, though it must be fulfilled, is not, so far as we know, bound to any precise moment in time. It is just the openness of the psychic structure of the child which is intensified by the embryonic period

> outside the uterus. Then it no longer follows an autonomous development practically cut off from all external influences, but is open and exposed at once in the primary relationship.
>
> In this way the human environment--experienced as the mother and later as both parents--becomes a culture-conditioned and culture-conditioning influence appearing alongside the specifically human structure of the child's psyche, so that from the very beginning fate proves to be a synthesis of timeless archetypal and personal historical factors. It is only the specifically human influence of the personal mother in the phase when the mother archetype is dominant, and of the personal father in the phase when the father archetype has to replace it, that guarantees normal development of the child's psychic structure. But just as a key unlocks not only the door but a whole room, so the personal evocation of the archetype discloses a whole world and activates a unitary layer in the psychic structure. In other words, the personal evocation is necessitated by fate so that infinitely more happens than what the mother or father does or intends. Their activity releases the ingrained propensities of the transpersonal archetype in the child's psyche, which cannot be derived in any sense from the personal figure though it is specifically dependent on personal evocation.
>
> . . . Thus we know that the loss of the mother (without adequate substitute) during the first year of the child's life can lead to death, sever deterioration, and psychotic disturbances, whereas if the loss occurs after a normal primary relationship in the earliest developmental period the chances of the child's healthy development are much more promising even if he becomes ill. For in the meantime the mother archetype in the psychic structure of the child has been evoked and can function independently of the mother's reality, for instance as a compensating psychic factor (Neumann, 1961, pp. 41-43).

So the archetypal structure, though dependent for its activation upon the contingencies of psychosocial development, is prior to these factors and constitutes the capacity of the human psyche to overcome fixation at a certain developmental stage.

Incidentally, Neumann (1961) hypothesizes that the

evocation of the mother archetype, in the primary mother-child relationship, is the point at which the ego-Self axis becomes constellated:

> The compensatory relationshp between ego consciousness and the psychic totality seems to be constellated by the experience of the primary relationship in which the mother represents the self and the child the ego. The security of the ego-self relationship achieved in a successful primary relationship can now survive even the loss of the mother as a person, whether it be that the mother archetype can now be projected or, functioning as the creative unconscious, compensate the plight of the individual in some other way (p. 43).

Fordham (1966) contests this conception of the mother as the original carrier of the Self-image on the grounds that his conception of the Self as a primal entity fits the empirical data more closely:

> The Uroboros-like systems which children develop are . . . most unlikely to be primary, and not only my own work but also a considerable number of independent studies in the United States and Great Britain have shown that the self is best conceived as the basic unity of the infant himself which becomes conscious during separation from his mother, especially at the toddler stage. Neumann has arrived near this concept but his idea of the mother as carrier of the self, which has gained currency, seems a rather crude combination of a projection back into infancy of myths of the divine mother goddesses (developed by adults) and the fact that a mother carries the baby in her womb and holds him in her arms (p. 76).

Fordham's primary critique of Neumann is that, in describing such specific stages in the archetypal developmental sequence, he relies more upon comparative mythological data than upon empirical studies of childhood development. Fordham concludes that, although Neumann may have grasped

the need for a Jungian genetic psychology, his work does not do justice to the empirical data of genetic development.

But I would like to emphasize that, whatever their differences, Fordham and Neumann both make clear the necessity of interpreting individuation, or archetypal human development, in the light of critical life stages. In Fordham's scheme, individuation--as a deintegration and reintegration of the Self--always occurs in the context of a specific critical life period. Neumann's idea is that there are critical "transition phases" between the archetypal stages of development:

> The transition from the dominancy of one archetype to that of another is . . . a critical point. . . . Childhood now appears to us as a crucial segment of human development, not only because the psyche then unfolds in fixed, archetypal stages and becomes structured, but because this structure includes at the same time the child's relation to the environment and his general attitude to the world, which may be specifically determined or else disturbed. . . .
>
> . . . centres of disturbance are all "the transition phases" of archetypal dominance. Puberty, middle life, and the climacteric are by no means the only critical points. These points accumulate in childhood because the building up of a specifically human psychic structure involves passing through a sequence of archetypal phases. The archetypal points of transition, whose objective dating in ontogeny would be important, are the critical places of development (Neumann, 1961, pp. 49, 50-51).

Understanding the transition point at which a disturbance occurred may, therefore, be vital to understanding the forms of psychic illness in adulthood.

This conclusion points up <u>a final principle</u>, which

Neumann shares with Fordham, that ontongenetic analysis can have a definite value in assisting the individuation process. Fordham sees one implication of his model to be a more positive view of "reductive analysis":

> It is sometimes felt that to refer material produced by adult people to infancy is to depreciate and devalue their creative life and their personal status. It all depends upon how the life of infants is estimated. If it is true that the prototype of individuation in later life occurs in the first two years of life then surely no depreciation can occur (Fordham, 1967, p. 62).
>
> . . . by the analysis of the childhood and infancy of adult persons we can reach to the roots of symbol formation . . . and to the elementary structures from which the more complex ones are derived. In doing so we work backwards through defenses and through later identifications with collective (social) forms and parental images which get brought under review and individualized in the process. . . reductive analysis is no depreciation of the personality; rather it is in the nature of a work or opus through which the despised and rejected parts of the Self can be integrated (Fordham, 1968, p. 59).

Neumann (1961) uses his concept of the personal evocation of the archetype to establish the significance of genetic analysis for Analytical Psychology:

> If this view of the personal evocation of archetypes is correct, then we would have found a position midway between a personalistic, genetic orientation and a transpersonal archetypal one. Neither ferreting out personal data during the anamnesis nor amplifying only the archetypal material leaving childhood unconsidered could be appropriate. We have to turn our attention more particularly to those critical places where the personal factors in the individual's history have to be in harmony with the transpersonal stages of archetypal development, characteristic of the species, or where their disharmony has a pathogenic effect (Neumann, 1961, p. 42).
>
> In general we have made our understanding of the

> symbol dependent on its amplification, i.e., on the drawing up of a horizontal series of analogous symbols whose explanation of one another acts as an enrichment. Thus the mustering of symbols of the great mother "from all over the place" enables us to see the unity and scope of this archetype.
>
> But amplification is not sufficient for diagnosing the psychic situation of a person and for therapy. It must be supplemented by the positional value of the symbol, its vertical orientation in psycho-history, and this means discovering to what phase of development the symbol belongs. It is only this positional value, together with amplification, that enables us to undertake the actual interpretation of the symbol, and to find out whether it has a progressive or a regressive significance, and what the prognosis of the situation is. Whether the great mother, appearing as a witch, facilitates progression to the father archetype in the child's development by frightening the childish ego away from the mother and fixation to her, or whether, in her encounter with the adolescent ego of the young man or young girl, she must be sought out and conquered, or served as in the individuation process during the second half of life . . . none of this can be ascertained by amplification, but only by orientation about the position of the individual in the psycho-history of the stages of human development.
>
> Only when we see the unity of the archetypally timeless with its psycho-historical place in human development can we grasp its significance for the fate of the individual. But this is perhaps a banal statement, for unconsciously we have always connected the symbol with a place in our psychic development. I have merely endeavored to show what place the genetic aspect must therefore occupy in our theory. For it is only the continual broadening of theory that enables us to understand what we do in practice (pp. 62-63).

But it is just this vertical dimension which Fordham finds lacking in the methods used by Neumann and those who have followed him. What seems called for is a work which illustrates and clarifies the interaction between vertical and horizontal, or genetic and archetypal, dimensions, throughout the stages of life.

III. ERIKSON AND JUNG

> Each human life begins at a given evolutionary stage and level of tradition, bringing to its environment a capital of patterns and energies; these are used to grow on, and to grow into the social process with, and also as contributions to this process.
>
> --Erik Erikson
> (1962, pp. 253-254)

In the context of a chapter on "the psychology of ego-development in adolescence," Henderson (1967) compares Jungian views of development with those of Erik Erikson. A number of correspondences are noted but a distinction is maintained between Erikson's emphasis on cultural conditioning factors and the Jungian emphasis on innate, or archetypal, factors. Although Henderson does not develop this comparison, it suggests a method of formulating the developmental implications of Jungian theory. Erikson emphasizes the psychosocial dimensions of critical developmental stages but his model, as the following discussion demonstrates, seems compatible with the Jungian orientation.

Erikson's anti-reductionism. Like Jung, Erikson was critical of psychoanalytic reductionism:

> In its determination to be sparing with teleological assumption, psychoanalysis has gone to the opposite extreme and developed a kind of

> originology--I mean by it a habit of thinking which reduces every human situation to an analogy with an earlier one, and most of all to that earliest, simplest, and most infantile precursor which is assumed to be its "origin" (Erikson, 1962, p. 18).

Erikson sought to overcome this reductionism by developing a theoretical model of the human life cycle in which successive stages are described in terms of the developmental tasks unique to them and the human personality is described as an ever-changing totality, rooted in the genetic process but not reducible to it. The similarities of this model and the Jungian model, especially as developed by Neumann and Fordham, will become apparent as I discuss some of the principles upon which Erikson's theory is based.

The epigenetic principle. Erikson (1968) describes the underlying principle of his model as analagous with the epigenetic principle, utilized in embryology:

> . . . this principle states that anything that grows has a ground plan, and that out of this ground plan the parts arise, each part having its time of special ascendency, until all parts have arisen to form a functioning whole (p. 92).

Following this principle, Erikson describes the healthy human organism as progressing through successive developmental stages in which particular psychosocial potentialities become actualized. Each stage is marked by a particular crisis, made possible by the growth of the organism but provoked and given form by the tasks imposed

upon the individual by society. The predominant crisis of each stage must be met by the development of an appropriate psychosocial capacity. Each of these capacities constitutes a psychosocial strength which becomes the basis for successful development at other stages. In other words, each new life task presents a crisis, the outcome of which will effect further crises--providing a resource or foundation for meeting subsequent crises or leaving unresolved problems which will be re-activated in such a way as to aggravate these later crises. The comparability of this principle to Neumann's concept of successive archetypal stages of development and to Fordham's concept of repeated phases of individuation seems readily apparent.

Regression as potentially constructive. According to Erikson (1962, 1963, 1964, 1968), with the emergence of each successive crisis the growing individual has a tendency to "regress" to earlier stages, either to revitalize old strengths or to relive the unresolved conflicts of earlier stages. A similar principle is expressed by Fordham (1970) in the context of his theory of repeated individuation processes:

> In early childhood, access to the non-ego is easy, but later on, as the ego becomes stronger and self-representations get more firmly established, defense systems are built up and it is only possible to contact them through controlled regression. In periods of crisis, such as occur frequently in infancy, acutely at adolescence and

> subsequently in the later-life crises studied by Jung, regression is required to maintain continuity of being. In this process a deintegrating-integrating sequence is at the same time reached which creates the conditions for ongoing change (p. 153).

Because it serves a developmental purpose, Erikson distinguishes this kind of "regression" from "true" regression--in the pathological sense. In recognizing the progressive potential of "regressive" developments Erikson is in sympathy with Jung's constructive or synthetic method.

Identity and individuation. As individuation is the central concept of Jung's psychology, so identity is the central concept of Erikson's. While the identity crisis predominates during adolescence, the need to maintain a sense of identity is the theme which unites the tasks of all developmental stages. The development of a sense of identity is the goal of the pre-adolescent stages; its maintenance is the task of the post-adolescent stages:

> All through childhood tentative crystallizations of identity take place which make the individual feel and believe . . . as if he approximately knew who he was--only to find that such self-certainty ever again falls prey to the discontinuities of development itself (Erikson, 1968, p. 160).
>
> . . . in puberty and adolescence all samenesses and continuities relied on earlier are more or less questioned again, because of a rapidity of body growth which equals that of early childhood and because of the new addition of genital maturity. The growing and developing youths, faced with this physiological revolution within them, and with

> tangible adult tasks ahead of them are now primarily concerned with what they appear to be in the eyes of others as compared with what they feel they are, and with the question of how to connect the roles and skills cultivated earlier with the occupational prototypes of the day. In their search for a new sense of continuity and sameness, adolescents have to refight many of the battles of earlier years. . . .
>
> The integration now taking place in the form of ego identity is . . . more than the sum of childhood identifications. It is the accrued experience of the ego's ability to integrate all identifications with the vicissitudes of the libido, with the aptitudes developed out of endowment, and with the opportunities offered in social roles. The sense of ego identity, then, is the accrued confidence that the inner sameness and continuity prepared in the past are matched by the sameness and continuity of one's meaning for others, as evidenced in the tangible promise of a "career" (Erikson, 1963, pp. 261-262).

This description of identity-formation seems comparable with Fordham's concept of the cyclical deintegration and reintegration of the Self. The important difference, of course, is that whereas Erikson sees the ego as the focus of identity-formation, Fordham focuses upon a more comprehensive integration of the personality: the Self. Perhaps the ego's sense of psychosocial identity could be described as an essential aspect of Self-realization.

Inborn "patterns and energies." The formation of an identity, as Erikson (1968) describes it, is something which an individual derives from, but also contributes to, the social tradition:

> . . . only in a crisis . . . does it become obvious what a sensitive combination of interrelated factors the human personality is--a combination of

> capacities created in the distant past and of opportunities divined in the present; a combination of totally unconscious preconditions developed in individual growth and of social conditions created and recreated in the precarious interplay of generations (p. 14).
>
> Each human life begins at a given evolutionary stage and level of tradition, bringing to its environment a capital of patterns and energies; these are used to grow on, and to grow into the social process with, and also as contributions to this process. Each new being is received into a style of life prepared by tradition and held together by traditions, and at the same time disintegrating because of the very nature of tradition. We say that tradition "molds" the individual, "channels" his drives. But the social process does not mold a new being merely to housebreak him; it molds generations in order to be remolded, to be reinvigorated, by them. Therefore, society can never afford merely to suppress drives or to guide their sublimation. It must also support the primary function of every individual ego, which is to transform instinctual energy into patterns of action, into character, into style--in short, into an identity with a core of integrity which is to be derived from and also contributed to the tradition (pp. 253-254).

The idea of an inborn "capital of patterns and energies" seems comparable to Neumann's concept of archetypes as inborn factors which are evoked by developmental situations. In his theoretical speculations, Erikson does not concentrate on the nature of these "patterns and energies" as inborn. His work focuses on the psychosocial form of their actualization. He describes the inborn processes as instinctual and has a tendency to describe instinctual energies, social processes, and ego functions as separate from each other.

The need for multi-dimensional models. This tendency

seems contrary to his own desire for a more unitary understanding of human development:

> We are speaking of three processes, the somatic process, the ego process, and the societal process. In the history of science these three processes have belonged to three different scientific disciplines--biology, psychology, and the social sciences--each of which studied what it could isolate, count, and dissect: single organisms, individual minds, and social aggregates. The knowledge thus derived is knowledge of facts and figures, of location and causation; and it has resulted in argument over an item's allocation to one process or another. Our thinking is dominated by this trichotomy because only through the inventive methodologies of these disciplines do we have knowledge at all. Unfortunately, however, this knowledge is tied to the conditions under which it was secured: the organism undergoing dissection or examination; the mind surrendered to experiment or interrogation; social aggregates spread out on statistical tables. In all of these cases, then, a scientific discipline prejudiced the matter under observation by actively dissolving its total living situation in order to be able to make an isolated section of it amenable to a set of instruments or concepts.
>
> Our clinical problem, and our bias, are different. We study individual human crises by becoming therapeutically involved in them. In doing so, we find that the three processes mentioned are three aspects of one process--i.e., human life, both words being equally emphasized. Somatic tension, individual anxiety, and group panic, then, are only different ways in which human anxiety presents itself to different methods of investigation. Clinical training should include all three methods, an ideal to which the studies in this book are gropingly dedicated. As we review each relevant item in a given case, we cannot escape the conviction that the meaning of an item which may be "located" in one of the three processes is co-determined by its meaning in the other two. An item in one process gains relevance by giving significance to and receiving significance from items in the others. Gradually, I hope, we may find better words for such relativity in human existence (Erikson, 1963, pp. 36-37).

Within the Jungian framework there are models for

describing the stages of development in such terms--as unitary processes with various dimensions. Fordham's concept of the Self as a cyclical integration of multi-dimensional processes may be characterized as such a model. The following description, in Neumann (1961), of archetypes as multi-dimensional structures also suggests such a model:

> It is important to realize that the dominance of an archetype . . . should not be understood as though it were merely the dominance of a definite archetype in the human psyche, which prescribes a definite pattern of behaviour. The archetype as the reflection of a structure, is much more than that. It contains within itself the laws regulating a course of development on three levels: within the psyche, between man and man, and between man and world. . . .
>
> The intrapsychic structure of the archetype . . . becomes immediately apparent when we realize that in the primary relationship the mother as the directing, protecting, and nourishing source represents the unconscious and, in the first phase, also the self, and that the dependent child represents the childish ego and consciousness. Here again a specifically human process of intrapsychic development is evident: interdependence of ego and self, growth of ego and consciousness out of the unconscious, conflict between ego consciousness and the unconscious as a result of increasing independence.
>
> The archetype of the primary relationship, however, determines not only an intrapsychic but also an interhuman development. It is just the personal evocation of the archetype that makes the interweaving of the intrapsychic and the interhuman apparent. As an interhuman phenomenon, the archetype determines not only the behavioural developments. Ambvialence of the mother and ambivalence of the child's relationship to her, conflicts caused by growing independence, and the consequent transition from the positive, sustaining, nourishing mother to the clutching and devouring mother--all these modulations of interhuman development are by nature implicit in the archetypal image of the primary relationship.

> But the archetype always contains an aspect of the world as well. That is why we speak of a "matriarchal world," a world of the youthful lover, a patriarchal world, and so on. At the same time the archetypal image--of the primary relationship, for example--is not merely, as we previously supposed, a reaction of the psyche to the world, it is just as much the image of a world constituting the psyche.
>
> When we say that it is the expression of a "matriarchal" constellation we mean that the world and nature confront man in the same maternal guise as that in which the mother confronts the child and the unconscious the ego. All this is contained in the structure of the archetype, so that in the archetype of the primary relationship the unity of man's relationships to the world, to other men, and to his own psyche, has become a concrete image. That is why, whenever this archetype appears, we can say something simultaneously about the ego's relation to the unconscious and the self, to the mother and all her representatives, and to the world as nature (pp. 48-49).

Erikson's model has the advantage of describing the psychosocial dimension more clearly. But the archetypal model promises to provide an hermeneutical principle that is capable of interpreting developmental processes more clearly as phenomena occurring on several levels at once.

Together, the two perspectives should at least correct the criticism to which the Jungian model has been most vulnerable--that it has no developmental or psychosocial dimension. In the next chapter I will present my conception of a Jungian model of psychosocial development. It is an attempt to develop the work of Jung, Jacobi, Neumann, and Fordham by incorporating aspects of Erikson's model into the Jungian framework. In formulating this model I will draw upon Jung's own theoretical work, hoping thereby to demonstrate its foundation in his psychology.

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IV. PRINCIPLES FOR A JUNGIAN MODEL OF PSYCHOSOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

> It is not a question of . . . asserting anything, but of constructing a model which opens up a promising and useful field of inquiry. A model does not assert that something is so, it simply illustrates a particular mode of observation.
>
> --C. G. Jung
> (1953-1971, v. 8, p. 184)

Before presenting this Jungian model I should indicate my view of Jung's system. Jung (1953-1971) maintained that psychology is a "field of experience and not a philosophical theory" and that theory "still plays far too great a role, instead of being included in phenomenology as it should (v. 9i, p. 54)." In the following passage he attempts to distinguish the phenomenological method from the experimental method and its delimitation by theory:

> Even Freud, whose empirical attitude is beyond doubt, coupled his theory as a sine qua non with his method as if psychic phenomena had to be viewed in a certain light in order to mean something. All the same, it was Freud who cleared the ground for the investigation of complex phenomena at least in the field of neurosis. But the ground he cleared extended only so far as certain basic physiological concepts permitted, so that it looked almost as if psychology were an offshoot of the physiology of instincts. This limitation of psychology was very welcome to the materialistic outlook of that time, nearly fifty years ago,

> and, despite our altered view of the world, it still is in large measure today. It gives us not only the advantage of a "delimited field of work," but also an excellent excuse not to bother with what goes on in a wider world.
>
> Thus it was overlooked by the whole of medical psychology that a psychology of the neuroses, such as Freud's, is left hanging in mid air if it lacks knowledge of a general phenomenology. . . . I myself did experimental work for several years, but, through my intensive studies of the neuroses and psychoses, I had to admit that, however desirable quantitative definitions may be, it is impossible to do without qualitatively descriptive methods. Medical psychology has recognized that the salient facts are extraordinarily complex and can be grasped only through descriptions based on case material. But this method presupposes freedom from theoretical prejudice. Every science is descriptive at the point where it can no longer proceed experimentally, without on that account ceasing to be scientific. . . . But an experimental science makes itself impossible when it delimits its field of work in accordance with theoretical concepts. The psyche does not come to an end where some physiological assumption or other stops. . . .
>
> These reflections are essential when discussing an empirical concept like that of the anima. As against the constantly reiterated prejudice that this is a theoretical invention or--worse still--sheer mythology, I must emphasize that the concept of the anima is a purely empirical concept, whose sole purpose is to give a name to a group of related or analogous psychic phenomena. The concept does no more and means no more than , shall we say, the concept "anthropods," which includes all animals with articulated body and limbs and so gives a name to this phenomenological group (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 9i, pp. 54-46).

Jung's conceptual system accordingly does not claim to be a philosophy but a description of certain groups of phenomena which appear to be fundamental in human psychology and which cannot be investigated by experimental methods or reduced to their assumed physiological foundations.

Nor do his classifications of phenomena claim to be more than flexible heuristic principles. Consider, for example, this discussion of his delineation of archetypes:

> . . . an archetype in its quiescent, unprojected state has no exactly determinable form but is in itself an indefinite structure which can assume definite forms only in projection.
>
> This seems to contradict the concept of a "type." If I am not mistaken, it not only seems but actually is a contradiction. Empirically speaking, we are dealing all the time with "types," definite forms that can be named and distinguished. But as soon as you divest these types of the phenomenology presented by the case material, and try to examine them in relation to other archetypal forms, they branch out into such far-reaching ramifications in the history of symbols that one comes to the conclusion that the basic psychic elements are infinitely varied and ever-changing, so as utterly to defy our powers of imagination. The empiricist must therefore content himself with a theoretical "as if." In this respect he is no worse off than the atomic physicist, even though his method is not based on quantitiative measurement but is a morphologically descriptive one (Jung , 1953-1971, v. 9i, p. 70).

In my opinion, Jung's work is best understood in the light of such statements. His conceptual system is best understood as a model, which, as he says, "simply illustrates a particular mode of observation (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 8, p. 184)." It is Jung's method of describing certain psychological phenomena. I will attempt to apply this model to the description of psychsocial development. The theoretical discussions which follow are to be taken in the same spirit as Jung's work--as attempts to construct and define a particular mode of

observation for describing psychosocial development, and not as an explanation of psychosocial development.

This model is constructed around two principles. The first is that certain structures of becoming may be described in terms of the compensatory interaction between psychosocial factors and instinctual factors. The second is that the dynamics of psychosocial development may be described in terms of the cyclical process of Self-realization which manifests itself at various stages of life. I will begin by discussing the concept of archetypal, psychosocial structures of becoming.

The Structures of Becoming: Archetypes and Psychosocial Stages

Instincts, Archetypes, and Situations

Archetypes and instincts. As he developed his use of the term, archetypes, Jung related it both to instincts and to typical life situations. Jung (1953-1971) wrote that whenever he used the term, instinct, he meant "what is commonly understood by this word, namely an impulsion towards certain activities (v. 6, p. 451)." In his model of the psyche, archetypes and instincts are counterparts which, taken together, constitute the contents of the collective unconscious (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 8, pp. 131-132, 138). As I have indicated, Jung describes the psychological individual as a somewhat unique combination of

collective psychic processes. This individual Self is inborn as a potential and can be realized consciously through the process of individuation. Instinct and archetype represent the two fundamental modalities of the collective unconscious, and therefore of the "inborn" nature of the individual Self:

> The individual self is a portion or segment or representative of something present in all living creatures, an exponent of the specific mode of psychological behavior, which varies from species to species and is inborn in each of its members. The inborn mode of acting has long been known as instinct, and for the inborn mode of psychic apprehension I have proposed the term archetype (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 6, p. 376).

To illustrate the interrelationship between instincts and archetypes, Jung (1953-1971) chooses an example from the insect world:

> Let us take as an example the incredibly refined instinct of propagation in the yucca moth (Pronuba yuccasella). The flowers of the yucca plant open for one night only. The moth takes the pollen from one of the flowers and kneads it into a little pellet. Then it visits a second flower, cuts open the pistil, lays its eggs between the ovules and then stuffs the pellet into the funnel-shaped opening of the pistil. Only once in its life does the moth carry out this complicated operation (v. 8, p. 132).
>
> Just as conscious apprehension gives our actions form and direction, so unconscious apprehension through the archetype determines the form and direction of instinct. If we call instinct "refined," then the "intuition" which brings the instinct into play, in other words apprehension by means of the archetype, must be something incredibly precise. Thus the yucca moth must carry within it an image, as it were, of the situation that "triggers off" its instinct. This image enables it to "recognize" the yucca flower and its structure (v. 8, p. 137).

Jung (1953-1971) terms archetypes "typical modes of apprehension (v. 8, p. 137)" which release the "typical modes of action" referred to as instincts (v. 8, p. 135). He suggests "that both are aspects of the same vital activity, which we have to think of as two distinct processes simply for the purpose of better understanding (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 8, p. 138)." Therefore, "the question of instinct cannot be dealt with psychologically without considering the archetypes, because at bottom they determine one another (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 8, p. 134)." The archetype, or "primordial image," is

> . . . the necessary counterpart of instinct, which is a purposive mode of action presupposing an equally purposive and meaningful grasp of the momentary situation. This apprehension is guaranteed by the pre-existent primordial image. It represents the practical formula without which the apprehension of a new situation would be impossible (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 6, p. 447).

The archetype may even be described as "the instinct's perception of itself (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 8, p. 136)." For:

> There are,in fact, no amorphous instincts, as every instinct bears in itself the pattern of its situation. Always it fulfills an image, and the image has fixed qualities. The instinct of the leaf-cutting ant fulfills the image of ant, tree, leaf, cutting, transport, and the little ant-garden of fungi. If any one of these conditions is lacking, the instinct does not function, because it cannot exist without its total pattern, without its image. Such an image is an a priori type. It is inborn in the ant prior to any activity, for there can be no activity at all unless an instinct of corresponding pattern initiates and makes it possible. This schema holds true of all instincts and is found in identical form in all individuals of the same

> species. The same is true also of man: he has in him these a priori instinct-types which provide the occasion and the pattern for his activities, in so far as he functions instinctively (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 8, p. 201).

These "instinct-types" or archetypes act like the instincts in that they "intervene in the shaping of conscious contents by regulating, modifying, and motivating them (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 8, p. 205)." Jung therefore suggests that the typical situational patterns that the archetypes represent are ultimately identical with the instinctual patterns of behavior. In other words, Jung conceives of instincts and archetypes as different aspects of typical human situations. His understanding of these situations is dynamic. A typical situation is a process in which a typical state is perceived by means of an archetype and responded to instinctually so that the process reaches its goal (or the situation is fulfilled and thereby changed).

Archetypes as distinct from archetypal representations. But this instinctual-archetypal process does not occur automatically in humans, as it does in insects. We must be careful to differentiate archetypal representations from the archetype as such. The images which appear are not the archetypes themselves. They are quite varied structures, groups of which seem to represent a set of variations on a ground theme. This ground theme can be discerned by comparing the various images with each other.

It then appears that they "all point back to one essentially 'irrepresentable' basic form (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 8, p. 213)." This basic form is the archetype. It is not the images themselves but the psychic predisposition to form these types of images. Furthermore, the archetypal representations are only partially the product of the instinct-types themselves. Their specific form is conditioned by the consciousness in which they appear:

> The archetype is essentially an unconscious content that is altered by becoming conscious and by being perceived, and it takes its colour from the individual consciousness in which it happens to appear (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 9i, p. 5).

The human being is born with the innate capacity and predisposition to have certain types of experiences and to respond to them in certain kinds of ways, but the specific content of his experiences and behavior is unique. Each individual lives in a unique social and cultural environment and, within this particular historical context, each individual has experiences which are unique to himself. These unique factors give to the archetypal representations their specific content and meaning. Jung stressed the innate and universal nature of archetypal experiences but his model assumes the coequal role of unique existential factors in constituting the phenomenology of such experiences which, of course, always appear in a particular and unique context. In this light, the concept of the archetype might be stated as follows:

an archetype is the capacity to experience and to represent psychologically the structure of a situation which is constituted equally by innate and existential factors.

Archetypes and archetypal situations. For Jung (1953-1971) a fantasy image, whether it be archetypal or not, may be described as "a condensed expression of the psychic situation as a whole (v. 6, p. 442)." An image is archetypal when it possesses an archaic character--i.e., "when the image is in striking accord with familiar mythological motifs (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 6, p. 443)." In such cases the image represents the presence of a situation with a transpersonal significance:

> It then expresses material primarily derived from the collective unconscious and indicates at the same time that the factors influencing the conscious situation of the moment are collective rather than personal (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 6, p. 443).

The collective situations represented by archetypes are "at least common to entire peoples or epochs" and the most important are probably "common to all times and races (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 6, p. 443)." Jung (1953-1971) therefore characterizes archetypes as psychic deposits "of the constantly repeated experiences of humanity (v. 7, p. 68)," and as precipitates "of certain ever-recurring psychic experiences (v. 6, p. 444)." They act as inborn psychic factors which predispose the human being to experience his existence in certain typical ways, to perceive or formulate this experience in typical imagery,

and to respond to this perception with typical patterns of behavior. So, although "the archetypes may be regarded as the effect and deposit of experiences that have already taken place. . . equally they appear as the factors which cause such experiences (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 7, p. 93n3)." Archetypes, then, are innate predispositions to produce over and over again the structure of typical human situations.

Archetypes and compensation. These predisposing factors, however, do not operate automatically. For the human mode of being is characterized by consciousness:

> I would . . . remind the reader that . . . all unconscious functioning has the automatic character of an instinct, and that the instincts are always coming into collision or, because of their compulsiveness, pursuing their courses unaltered by any influence even under conditions that may positively endanger the life of the individual. As against this, consciousness enables him to adapt in an orderly way and to check the instincts, and consequently it cannot be dispensed with. Man's capacity for consciousness alone makes him man (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 8, p. 210).

Unfortunately, this capacity also enables man to set himself in opposition to his instinctual-archetypal foundations, thereby generating a psychic tension or disequilibrium. As I indicated above, for Jung consciousness is characterized by a one-sidedness which is compensated for by unconscious psychic processes. One might say that there is a compensatory relationship between conscious functioning and archetypal processes. Since archetypal imagery represents the structure of archetypal

situations, the irruption of archetypal imagery into consciousness might be described as a compensatory reaction to an incomplete realization of the archetypal dimensions of the person's existential situation. This compensation may lead to a more complete realization; but not necessarily, for archetypal processes operate with a kind of blind autonomy which is ignorant of the complexities of the person's existential problems. In order to make proper use of the compensatory activity, a conscious process of integration is necessary.

Archetypes and Developmental Stages

On the basis of the preceding discussion, I wish to propose the following principle as an element of a Jungian model of psychosocial development: during each typical phase of psychosocial development, an archetypal situation is constellated, the compensatory behavior of the corresponding instinct-type is activated, and this activity effects the growth of the individual depending upon his reaction to it. This principle assumes a number of concepts which I will now discuss.

First, psychosocial development occurs in archetypal stages. Erikson's work classifies stages of development into regularly occurring psychosocial situations. The thesis of this study is that these stages correspond to archetypes--a conceptual model which seems justified,

on the one hand, by Jung's description of the archetype as a whole situation and, on the other hand, by Erikson's description of the psychosocial stages as cross-cultural or universal phenomena. I do not mean to imply that Erikson and Jung have exhausted the possible number of archetypal developmental situations which could be described and defined. Both Erikson and Jung wanted their classifications of human development to be taken as flexible descriptions of observable phenomena rather than as rigid postulates. My concern is not to erect upon a synthesis of their viewpoints a final classification of developmental stages. My aim is rather to illustrate the interrelationship between "archetypal" and "epigenetic" dynamics in those stages which Erikson has defined and which correspond to archetypes described in Jungian work.

Another concept upon which this interrelationship is based is that the archetypes which correspond to various stages of development have become partially integrated in the particular institutions of child-care which a given society practices. As archetypal situations have repeated themselves throughout the history of a culture, institutions have emerged which give form to the society's understanding of these situations. They are the forms in which arthetypal processes have been collectively actualized. Fordham points out that the child is already a social being in that his mother practices the customs of child-

care prevalent in her culture. Some of these customs represent a social integration of archetypes--an incorporation of these archetypes into the society's practices of child-rearing, education, and socialization. Consequently, the archetypes are innate in the developing individual but also meet him from without in child-rearing institutions. Perhaps it is best to think of the archetypes as inherent in psychosocial situations. They are partially realized in the social customs for managing these situations and partially realized in the archetypal-instinctual reactions of the individual to these situations. What is innate in the individual is the capacity to assume certain archetypal developmental situations and to respond to them. What is embodied in the social institutions is that particular culture's formation and practice of its understanding of these situations.

A third concept concerns the existential evocation of archetypal compensations. This concept describes how a particular and unique existential situation becomes transformed into an archetypal process. To use the example which Neumann chose to illustrate his concept of the "personal evocation of the archetype," let us consider the early mother-child relationship. The mother's presence evokes in the child his innate predisposition to be in such a relationship. The child's presence evokes in her the innate capacity for mothering. But her attentions

to the child are also governed by the beliefs concerning child-care which she has acquired from her socio-cultural environment. Her customary behavior is more or less in harmony with the innate processes which have been activated in her and in the child. Compensatory reactions begin to influence her behavior as well as her child's. Their behaviors mutually influence each other and their relationship thereby tends towards a realization of the structure of the archetypal situation of mother and child. If the activated archetypes for some reason are not actualized in the relationship their compensatory behavior may interrupt the relationship with "disturbing" symptoms. But these symptoms, if understood, could be the keys to overcoming inadequacies in the relationsip. In any case, a particular existential situation has been transformed by archetypal factors and tends towards its "collective" or universal structure. It is at once a completely unique relationship and a repetition of a timeless structure. The process as a whole may be characterized as a dialectic between existential evocation and archetypal compensation. The way in which this dialectical process becomes actualized is unique and constitutes a unique mother-child relationship, which nevertheless has archetypal dimensions. Other archetypal situations are evoked and constellated in similar ways.

Perhaps the way in which an archetypal situation

is constellated co-equally by inherited factors and social institutions can best be seen in the structure of initiation. Initiation is an archetypal process which clearly is codetermined by innate and social factors. Jung describes it as "an instinctive striving" which attempts to free the person of his unconscious tie to the parents. This instinctive striving has been given social form throughout history in the institution or rite of initiation to which youths are subjected at puberty. The latest, and specifically Western, form of this archetype is in the church with its rite of baptism and its institutions of catechism and confirmation. But the church is not effective for many young people. Nevertheless, the instinctive striving for, and the archetype of, initiation subsist. In some cases a compensatory reaction to the inadequacy of this socially actualized form of the archetype can be discerned in the symptoms of young people.

Jung (1953-1971) cites the case of a young man whose instinctive striving for initiation apparently achieved archetypal representation in his dreams (v. 7, pp. 100-107). The young man had not yet managed to break his tie with his mother and enter the world of the adult male. In his dreams there appeared images of initiatory rites and motifs. Jung maintains that these dreams clearly reveal their compensatory function and can be interpreted

as a striving for progression on the part of the unconscious psychic processes. In a sense this activity may even be described as an "educator" of the conscious orientation. Jung (1953-1971) draws this conclusion about the instinctual-archetypal foundation of initiation:

> The dream symbolism corroborates what I said before, namely, that it is not the prerogative of the Christian Church to bring about such transitions and psychic transformations, but that behind the Church there is a living primordial image which in certain conditions is capable of enforcing them (v. 7, p. 105).

When the church or some other institutionalized form of this "living primordial image" proves ineffective in initiating a person, the individual's innate striving will react compensatorily. If it is understood and integrated, he will be helped to achieve the goals of initiation. The compensatory expression of the innate structure is relative to the social formulation of the situation. Taken together they comprise the formative elements of a unique and particular, though collectively influenced, dynamic situation or stage of development.

The Dynamics of Becoming: Individuation as the Cyclical Becoming of the Self

As I have indicated, my aim in this study is to illustrate an interpretive model which describes the interaction between psychosocial and instinctual-archetypal factors in the stages of human development. In calling

for such a model, Neumann (1961) referred to these two dimensions as the "vertical" and the "horizontal." A "vertical" interpretation identifies the significance of a psychological phenomenon vis-a-vis its position in an individual's psychosocial development. A "horizontal" interpretation identifies its archetypal structure by means of the comparative method. Neumann's and Fordham's work represent two somewhat different models for relating these types of interpretation.

In Neumann's model each stage of development corresponds to a certain archetype; in Fordham's model each stage of development is an instance of the process of Self-realization. Neumann describes the timeless, or horizontal, dimension as a certain archetypal structure; Fordham describes it as the process of individuation. Neumann focuses on the structure of development; Fordham stresses the common goal of each stage, thereby clarifying the purposive nature of the archetypal processes occurring at these stages. While there is no necessary contradiction between these two approaches, they have their points of disagreement. Fordham's criticism of Neumann's model is that in its focus upon archetypal structures, it tends to overlook the empirical factors in developmental stages. Neumann, on the other hand, did not accept the principle of Fordham's model that individuation processes can be described at all critical stages of development.

In formulating this principle Fordham (1963; 1970, pp. 98-103) was careful to define his use of the Self concept and his conception of Self-realization. He differentiated two major meanings which the term seemed to assume in Jung's work: the Self as the totality of the psyche and the Self as an archetype. In Fordham's view, these definitions are contradictory. Something cannot be both the whole and one of its parts. Therefore there needs to be a redefinition of the concept.

Fordham (1963) reduces the totality definition to the following formula: "self=ego+archetypes, which easily equates with the more usual formula: union or combination of the conscious with the unconscious (p. 11)." He then points out that statements implying that the Self is an archetype are inconsistent with this formula. For instance: "If the self is the whole psyche then it cannot be observed as such, since the ego is contained in it as a part and there is therefore no observer (Fordham, 1963, p. 11)." Yet certain images and symbols are described by Jungians as experiences of the Self by the ego. Fordham (1963) considers this to be confused thinking:

> The images, Jung often makes it clear, can not be the actual self; at best they are representatives of it. They are approximations representing states of relative wholeness which alone are possible while bits of ego are split off and function as observers. When therefore the images are referred to as the self this is not a theoretical but a metaphorical statement--or hypostatized thinking (p. 12).

Other inconsistencies emerge from this tendency to describe such experiences as representing the totality of the psyche:

> (a) the ego is stated to be an entity separate from the self conceived as the totality of the psyche. So long as it is clearly kept in mind that the ego is part of the self it is justifiable to distinguish the two, but it can be confusing to refer to the ego and the self as though they were or could be separate entities. . . .
> (b) Arising out of (a) the two (ego and self) are treated as if they could be in conflict each with the other, or as if there could be a self-ego axis (cf. Neumann), or that the self could inflate the ego by becoming identical with it, producing "dissociation of the personality" . . . .
> (c) It is stated that in infancy mother (or father) is the carrier of the self while the infant is the ego (cf. Neumann). What this means is not at all evident, but the statement clearly involves treating ego and self as two different entities. . . .
> (d) It is stated that the self can be projected; introjected; that it can assimilate the ego or the unconscious. . . .
> (e) It is stated that the self can be integrated. . . .
> (f) It is stated that the self is an archetype or is the totality of the archetypes, the organizing archetype or the archetype of order, etc. . . .
>
> All these statements, and it would be possible to collect more, mean that the self is not the whole psyche-soma since the ego is no part of it. The quandary could be resolved by, and seems to demand, changes in theory. . . (Fordham, 1963, p. 13).

Fordham (1963) agrees that "there is a place for thinking of the ego and the Self as separate though interrelated entities (p. 17)." The description of the Self as an archetype would allow for such a conception. Fordham concludes that when such statements as the above appear in the literature the term, "Self," is being used to refer to an archetype. He cites passages in the writings of Jung and others in which the Self is explicitly

defined as the central archetype of order--the organizing principle of the unconscious. The problem, in his view, is that the two contradictory definitions--of the Self as the totality of the psyche and as an archetype--are used without being distinguished from each other. He suggests a change in terminology. The term, "Self," should be restricted to the totality of the psyche and the archetype of the Self should be described as "the central archetype of order."

Fordham's description of the Self as the totality of all psychic functioning, in distinction to the central archetype of order, enabled him to describe the Self as a phenomenon which not only becomes actualized in the second half of life but is a primal entity deintegrating and reintegrating at various points in the first half as well. This enabled him to describe the formation and maintenance of the ego-Self axis (described by Neumann and Edinger) as individuation. The Self <u>is</u> the "ego-Self axis." The Self is both the axis between the ego and the central-archetype-of-order and their totality. The differences between their models therefore seem to resolve themselves into semantics, but Fordham attributes this process to a much earlier stage of development and conceives of the Self as a primal entity rather than as something which is constellated at a particular moment in the person's history. The Self is a dynamic, unstable cohesion

of part systems deintegrating and reintegrating throughout life. This dynamic conception of Fordham's contrasts with his static description of it as the "sum of part systems (Fordham, 1970, p. 100),"an inconsistency which distorts his own discussion of the theoretical model.

As Fordham (1963) himself points out, the Self is not just the sum of all psychic contents, but "the whole personality in a state of integration (p. 4; italics mine)" or "the organized wholeness of the personality (p. 11)." The simple totality of all psychic contents, as I indicated above, is the psyche. The psyche in a state of integration is the Self. Because he confuses the conception of the psyche with that of the Self, Fordham (1963) is unable to see the necessity of paradox in formulating theoretically the relationship between the Self and the ego or between the Self as organized totality and the Self as central-archetype-of-order.

> It is commonly held that theoretical contradiction is no disadvantage when formulating ideas about the self, and that if we want abstract concepts of it to reflect the affective experience it is necessary to include the opposites in them. This is supposed to leave room for paradox--a false issue since the whole is not an opposite of its parts in any important sense. The point here is as follows: since the self contains opposites, formulations about its contents can be stated paradoxically . . . neither the totality theory nor the archetype concept refers to the contents of the self but to its place in the theoretical model of the psyche (p. 18).

But the "false issue" which Fordham rejects is misrepresented by him. It is not simply a question of conceiving

the relationship between the whole and its parts.

The Jungian model does assume a whole, the psyche, and it is the relationship between the psyche and its parts, whether the ego-complex or the central-archetype-of-order, which is not paradoxical. But the Jungian model also describes this whole psyche in a state of integration, which it terms the Self. It not only differentiates the whole from the whole-in-an-organized-state, but also differentiates the organized whole (the Self) from that which makes it organized (the archetype of the Self). Furthermore, this model distinguishes the conscious organizer (the ego) from the unconscious organizing process and describes a dialectical tension between these two organizing activites (the ego-Self axis) which may become synthesized or integrated (Self-realization, or individuation). The relationships between these phenomena are complex and descriptions of them are of necessity paradoxical. What follows is my own construction of this model.

Self-Realization Through Psychosocial Development

Individuation as a multi-dimensional process. As a total phenomenon, the human psyche integrates, deintegrates, and reintegrates throughout a person's life. A particular, more or less temporary, integration of instinctual, archetypal, ego, and psychosocial processes

manifests itself at various times. This dynamic unity of processes may be described as the Self. Just as archetypal images are indicative of the entire multi-dimensional structure of a situation, so the phenomenology of the Self can be described in terms of several interacting processes. These processes may be separated for theoretical purposes, but are in reality inseparable aspects of a total phenomenon.

As an instinctual process the Self is an innate striving for integration. As an archetypal process, it is an innate capacity or predisposition to form images of psychic wholeness which parallel the instinctual striving. This innate capacity predisposes man to perceive his world and himself as a unity and, when evoked by his existential situation, it "triggers" the instinctual behaviors of striving for wholeness. As archetypal -instinctual, the Self is an innate potential for integration. The realization of this possiblility may be termed Self-realization, Self-actualization, or individuation. It is partially an intrapsychic process of becoming conscious of the Self. As this occurs, the psychic center of consciousness, the ego, becomes aware of the influence of the instinctual tendency towards wholeness. The ego may experience dream and fantasy images of the innate structure of wholeness. The ego may then integrate its awareness of these instinctual-archetypal manifestations and realize its relation to that process of which it is a part. This

intrapsychic process may be termed Self-realization or the formation of an ego-Self axis. But this process always occurs within an interpersonal and psychosocial context, so that the Self, in becoming realized, assumes a psychosocial modality. In sum, we may describe the Self, the Self-instinct, the Self-archetype, Self-realization, the ego-Self axis, and the actualized Self--the psychosocial modality of the Self. But these processes always occur simultaneously. In reality they are inseparable. Therefore descriptions of them as separate and of their relationships to each other will be somewhat misleading, if not paradoxical.

Nevertheless, for the purposes of analytic description, it is useful to differentiate aspects of the phenomenology of the Self. For example, the imagery of Self-realization may be differentiated from the process as a whole and be described in terms of the Self-archetype. In this way, the imagery and the innate capacity to form such imagery may become objects of interpretation in themselves. Likewise, in describing the Self-instinct one differentiates the innate striving for wholeness, which the archetype forms into images, from the process as a whole. By describing the phenomenology of the ego-Self axis, one isolates the process of consciously realizing the Self from its instinctual foundations and psychosocial context. The concept of the actualized Self

differentiates the psychosocial and interpersonal modalities of the Self from the instinctual, archetypal, and intrapsychic factors. In reality they are four inseparable aspects of one process. A description of any one of these processes assumes the whole process.

The aim of this whole process is the Self--a particular integration of the totality at a given moment. It represents a dynamic cohesion or integration of the multi-dimensional totality which is a human being living in a given time and place. As the human being moves through the archetypal stages of psychosocial development, the Self deintegrates and reintegrates--repeatedly changing its modes of realization and actualization. These modalities of the Self--its particular manifestations--are relative to the developmental crises for which individuation compensates. Each different phase in which the Self deintegrates and reintegrates has a different structure. Each new Self-constellation is unique. People who are sensitive to these changes begin to realize that they are not now the person (or Self) they were and yet they are somehow the same.

The dialectics of individuation. These changes are activated by opposite tendencies--deintegration and integration. The striving for deintegration might be interpreted, in light of its apparent goal, as an instinct for growth--or progression to the next stage of development.

The opposite tendency might be interpreted as an instinct for homeostasis or maintenance of the already existing stage. There is an inherent conflict in every critical period of development between the urge to resist change and the urge to grow forward. The dialectical tension between these opposite tendencies represents the dynamics of individuation. Both tendencies, however, can be understood as different manifestatations of the underlying inborn urge towards Self-realization. Incorporating Erikson's model into the Jungian framework it is possible to describe how deintegration might be interpreted as an expression of the inborn urge towards Self-realization. The growing human Self has a ground plan, and out of this ground plan the parts have arisen to form a functioning whole, the mature Self. The emergence of each new part is a disruption or deintegration of the Self but this deintegration is necessary for the new aspect of the Self to be realized. Its full realization, however, requires that it become integrated. After the deintegrative tendency has led to the emergence of the new aspect of the Self, the integrative tendency becomes dominant and seeks to reintegrate the Self on a new level. As an example, the emergence of the ego can be understood as a deintegration of the Self. It is the emergence of a new principle of order characterized by consciousness and will in distinction to the instinctual unconsciousness

of previous modalities of the Self. The Self now has two ordering principles (the ego and the unconscious processes) which must be integrated to form that modality of the Self which Neumann termed the ego-Self axis.

Naturally, the deintegrative-integrative poles of the urge for Self-realization do not always balance one another harmoniously. A certain amount of conflict or tension is inherent in the cyclical becoming of the Self. In addition to this polarity inherent in the urge towards Self-realization, there are all the conflicts specific to the stages of psychosocial development, the inevitable tension between the ego (as the center of consciousness and will) and the unconscious processes (which are instinctual and archetypal in nature), and the conflict between the persona and those unconscious processes which represent its opposite. In fact, as Jacobi (1962, p. 52) points out, a fundamental principle of Jungs's psychodynamic model is psychic opposition. The psyche tends to form itself into opposites. We are energized by the tension between these opposites and our tendency to reconcile them. The Self is a modality of the psyche in which the opposites are balanced by some form of dialectical interaction or synthesis which allows psychic energy to be expressed. When the Self is not integrated, the psyche is beset by internal conflicts which obstruct its energy.

The Formation, Functioning, and Integration of Complexes

As the Self integrates, deintegrates, and reintegrates, complexes are formed. As I indicated earlier, for Jung (1953-1971) complexes "point to the unresolved problems in the individual" because they arise "from the clash between a demand of adaptation and the individual's constitutional inability to meet the challenge (v. 6, p. 529)." This concept of the formation of complexes fits well with Erikson's epigenetic model of psychosocial development. Each stage of development is constellated by a certain psychosocial task which represents a crisis of development. If that task is not achieved satisfactorily, the crisis remains unresolved and the individual's progress through other stages will be impeded. As each new task emerges, the individual relives the earlier crises which have remained problematic for him. In Jungian terms, the Self is deintegrated by a developmental crisis and must reintegrate by integrating the new capacities evoked by that crisis. When these crises are only partially resolved, the Self is only partially integrated. The psychic factors which are not integrated become complexes. The psyche is, then, "not an indivisible unity, but a divisible and more or less divided whole (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 8, p. 307)." We may be able to differentiate, for example, an unresolved Oedipal complex along with the

ego complex and the persona complex. As I indicated above, such non-integrated complexes may oppose each other. The ego complex possesses consciousness and will and yet we find ourselves doing things of which we are not conscious or which are contrary to our will. In Jungian terms, these things indicate the activity of complexes which apparently have become somewhat autonomous, or independent of the ego.

The formation of complexes may be understood as co-determined by psychosocial and archetypal factors. Erikson's model stresses the dimension of conflict which is inherent in these psychosocial stages or situations. Complexes arise from efforts to avoid these conflicts. One pole of the conflict is repressed, becomes unconscious, and gains thereby a degree of autonomy. As Jung (1953-1971) puts it, such complexes may be understood as the result of an apparent inability to affirm the whole of one's nature (v. 8, p. 98). The non-affirmed aspects of one's nature by becoming separated from the ego become associated with the instinctual and archetypal dimensions of the developmental crisis. For when these situations are constellated psychosocially, the corresponding instinct-types are evoked. If the situation is only partially realized psychosocially, these innate factors react compensatorily and give expression to the unresolved, unrealized, unconscious, non-integrated aspects of the

situation and of the person's psyche. Throughout later stages of development, the individual remains "in" these prior situations in the sense that he is still plagued by the conflicts which characterized it. As Jung (1953-1971) puts it, a complex "is the image of a certain psychic situation (v. 8, p. 96)." The individual remains in this situation until he can recognize the split-off parts of his psyche and integrate them consciously.

This characteristic explains how the activity of complexes, while regressive in the sense that they indicate a problem constellated by an earlier stage of development, may be understood as potentially progressive. Their compensatory activity could lead towards individuation. In discussing this conception, Jung (1953-1971) says: "The unconscious processes that compensate the conscious ego contain all those elements that are necessary for self-regulation of the psyche as a whole (v. 7, pp. 175-176)." Therefore, the existence of complexes is not necessarily negative. Their presence only means that something incompatible, unassimilated, and conflicting exists--perhaps as an obstacle, but also as a stimulus to further growth through their integration (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 6, pp. 528-529). In reliving these unresolved conflicts, the person may become aware of unrecognized and alienated aspects of himself which may then be integrated in a new modality of the Self.

From this perspective, the urge towards Self-realization appears to underlie the compensatory activity of the archetypes and complexes associated with particular developmental phases. Each instinct-type or complex realizes itself fully only in a process of Self-realization. Therefore, each archetypal image may be understood as a potential symbol of the Self or as a prefiguration of Self-realization. Archetypal complexes accordingly are to be understood not only in terms of the developmental crisis which evokes them and for which they compensate, but also as parts of the Self striving for realization and integration. Although the Self exists only when realized, as an inborn potential it is a pre-existent reality, an unconscious structure which strives for conscious realization through the activity of instinct-types and complexes.

PART II: ILLUSTRATION

A COMMENTARY ON JUNG'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY

> . . . my scientific work . . . is the expression of my inner development.
>
> --C. G. Jung
> (1965, p. 222)

INTRODUCTION

Jung (1953-1971) maintained that every psychology has the character of a subjective confession:

> Our psychology is the more or less successfully formulated confession of a few individuals, and so far as each of them conforms more or less to a type, his confession can be accepted as a fairly valid description of a large number of people (v. 4, p. 334).

As examples of this observation, he cites the work of Freud and Adler:

> What Freud has to say about sexuality, infantile pleasure, and their conflict with the "reality principle," as well as what he says about incest and the like, can be taken as the truest expression of his personal psychology. It is the successful formulation of what he himself subjectively observed. . . . No experienced psychiatrist can deny having met with dozens of cases whose psychology answers in all essentials to that of Freud. By his own subjective confession, Freud has assisted at the birth of a great truth about man. He has devoted his life and strength to the construction of a psychology which is a formulation of his own being.
>
> Our way of looking at things is conditioned by what we are. And since other people have a different psychology, they see things differently and express themselves differently. Adler, one of Freud's earliest pupils, is a case in point. Working with the same empirical material as Freud, he approached it from a totally different standpoint. His way of looking at things is at least as convincing as Freud's, because he too represents a psychology of a well-known type (Jung, 1953-1971, v. 4, pp. 334-335).

Jung perceived his own work in the same light: "I know well

enough that every word I utter carries with it something of myself--of my special and unique self with its particular history and its own particular world (v. 4, p. 336)."

This idea, that Jung's theories express his personal history, is the basis for the commentary on his autobiography which occupies Part II of this dissertation. If his theories are a reflection of his personal history, then their developmental implications may come into focus if they are illustrated in terms of his own development. In the following chapters I will illustrate the Jungian model of psychosocial development which I formulated in Part I by applying it to Jung's autobiography. I will discuss those developments in his life which correspond to Erikson's epigenetic stages. Those developments will be described both as archetypal processes of Self-realization and in terms of their psychosocial significance. The first three chapters deal with developments in Jung's childhood and youth. The fourth chapter deals with a period in Jung's adulthood which Ellenberger (1970, pp. 889-891) has characterized as a "creative illness." A few words about Ellenberger's term and some preliminary remarks about this period in Jung's life are in order here.

Ellenberger suggests that the systems of both Freud and Jung originated mostly from their respective "creative illnesses" and not primarily from clinical

research. According to Ellenberger, such an "illness" emerges after a long period of restless intellectual work and preoccupation. Plagued by depression, exhaustion, irritability, sleeplessness, and headaches the stricken person remains obsessed by a prevailing idea or the pursuit of some difficult aim. The illness may last for three or more years until a sudden, spontaneous, and rapid recovery occurs. The recovery is followed by a transformation of the personality and the conviction that one has attained a new spiritual truth to reveal to the world.

This conception of a "creative illness" is similar to Erikson's idea of a "moratorium" in psychosocial development. Erikson (1962, pp. 43-44, 99-104) describes a moratorium as a period of withdrawal which follows a period of intense commitment. The precipitating factor may be described as an "identity crisis." The person realizes that he has been over-committed to an identity which somehow is not really himself. This realization leads to a withdrawal from previous activities as if to rid oneself of the false identity. A period of "identity diffusion" ensues which may be characterized by regressive and pathological symptoms. It persists until the individual can find within himself or in his environment something he can affirm wholeheartedly as the basis for a new, more genuine, sense of identity.

As primary examples of "creative illness" Ellenberger (1970) cites the initiatory experience of Siberian and Alaskan shamans. He emphasizes that there is a sharp distinction between the illness of the primordial shaman, the first to have the experience, and that of the generations of shamans who model their initiations after him. In order to have followers, the initial shaman should not only teach the theory but also provide a practical guide for others to follow that theory. That is why the shaman-apprentice must see an old shaman regularly and put his instruction to practice step by step as he goes through an initiatory ordeal. In a similar fashion Freud and Jung both underwent a "creative illness" in a spontaneous and original form and both of them made it a model to be followed by their disciples, under the name of the training analysis.

Ellenberger points out that because of this experiential approach these schools do not rely upon experimentation, quantification, and measurement to test their hypotheses. And yet, precisely because of this experiental approach, these psychologists refer to psychic realities of whose existence they have no doubt. They have experienced them in their own "creative illnesses" and continue to encounter them in the "illnesses" of their patients (or apprentices). This certainty poses a difficult question: "What is the heuristic value of a creative illness? Is the

attitude of having discovered a universal truth sufficient proof of the validity of that discovery? (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 891)." This question of its validity as a model for others is particularly crucial when one bears in mind the specific character of the creative illness:

> It is a strictly personal experience for its pathfinder, but it sets a model for the follower, and this conformity of pattern will tend to be transmitted from one initiated to the other within the same school. The shaman apprentice will never come to the Nirvana experience of a Tibetan monk, nor will the yogi travel in the land of the spirits like the shaman. . . . Persons analyzed by a psychoanalyst will have "Freudian" dreams and become conscious of their Oedipus complex, while those analyzed by Jungians will have archetypal dreams and be confronted with their anima (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 891).

Ellenberger's view that Jung's theories emerged from the experience of a "creative illness" is substantiated by Jung's autobiography. In the chapter titled "Confrontation with the Unconscious" he recalls what may be described as his "creative illness." He concludes the chapter with these comments on its significance for his work:

> As a young man my goal had been to accomplish something in my science. But then, I hit upon this stream of lava, and the heat of its fires reshaped my life. That was the primal stuff which compelled me to work upon it, and my works are a more or less successful endeavor to incorporate this incandescent matter into the contemporary picture of the world.
>
> The years when I was pursuing my inner images were the most important in my life--in them everything essential was decided. It all began then; the later details are only supplements and clarifications of the material that burst forth

> from the unconscious, and at first swamped me. It was the prima materia for a lifetime's work (Jung, 1965, p. 199).

Jung's "creative illness" covered roughly the years from 1913-1920. It was initiated by a disruption of his professional life. In 1911-1912 he published his Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido, a book which put forward theories at variance with Freud's and caused a parting of the ways. Jung had sacrificed his position as the designated successor to Freud. Now he was alone and disoriented. He withdrew into the familiar, supportive world of his family and his patients to concentrate on developing a new orientation.

Jung found this orientation introspectively. He allowed himself to experience fully the emotions and fantasies which accompanied his sense of disorientation, without knowing in advance where that would lead him. He writes: "I felt totally suspended in mid-air, for I had not yet found my own footing (Jung, 1965, p. 170)" and "I lived as if under constant inner pressure. At times this became so strong that I suspected there was some psychic disturbance in myself (Jung, 1965, p. 173)." He reviewed his life, particularly his childhood memories, in search of some clue to an inner disturbance but found nothing. Frustrated in his efforts to understand his situation, he resolved: "Since I know nothing at all, I shall simply do whatever occurs to me (Jung, 1965, p. 173)."

The first thing that came to his mind was a childhood memory "of playing passionately with building blocks (Jung, 1965, p. 173)." Jung decided to take up his childhood building game again. Every day he spent some time building mud and stones into an imaginary village. Jung (1965) recalls that this activity "released a stream of fantasies which I later carefully wrote down (p. 175)." It was by understanding these fantasies that Jung found his new orientation. Through the commentary which follows I hope to demonstrate the developmental significance of these fantasies and of the theory which emerged from them.

V. EARLY CHILDHOOD

A Precocious Child

Reviewing his autobiographical reflections, we are led to the conclusion that Jung was a man such as Erikson describes in the following passage:

> . . . the integrity crisis, last in the lives of ordinary men, is a life-long and chronic crisis in a homo religiosus. He is always older, or in early years suddenly becomes older, than his playmates or even his parents and teachers, and focuses in a precocious way on what it takes others a lifetime to gain a mere inkling of . . .(Erikson, 1962, p. 261).

As a child, Jung experienced problems which Erikson takes as indicative of such a precocious maturity. Jung's orientation to human existence never underwent a really basic change. Looking back over his more than eighty years, Jung (1965) remarked: "Knowledge of processes in the background early shaped my relationship to the world. Basically, that relationship was the same in my childhood as it is to this day (p. 356)."

The Man-Eater Dream

Jung's autobiographical reflections reveal that this "knowledge of processes in the background" had already made its presence known in his early childhood. Between the ages of three and four little Carl had the following

dream:

> The vicarage stood quite alone near Laufen castle, and there was a big meadow stretching back from the sexton's farm. In the dream I was in this meadow. Suddenly I discovered a dark, rectangular, stone-lined hole in the ground. I had never seen it before. I ran forward curiously and peered down into it. Then I saw a stone stairway leading down. Hesitantly and fearfully, I descended. At the bottom was a doorway with a round arch, closed off by a green curtain. It was a big, heavy curtain of worked stuff like brocade, and it looked very sumptuous. Curious to see what might be hidden behind, I pushed it aside. I saw before me in the dim light a rectangular chamber about thirty feet long. The ceiling was arched and of hewn stone. The floor was laid with flagstones, and in the center a red carpet ran from the entrance to a low platform. On this platform stood a wonderfully rich golden throne. I am not certain, but perhaps a red cushion lay on the seat. It was a magnificent throne, a real king's throne in a fairy tale. Something was standing on it which I thought at first was a tree trunk twelve to fifteen feet high and about one and a half to two feet thick. It was a huge thing, reaching almost to the ceiling. But it was of a curious composition: it was made up of skin and naked flesh, and on top there was something like a rounded head with no face and no hair. On the very top of the head was a single eye, gazing motionlessly upward.
>
> It was fairly light in the room, although there were no windows and no apparent source of light. Above the head, however, was an aura of brightness. The thing did not move, yet I had the feeling that it might at any moment crawl off the throne like a worm and creep towards me. I was paralyzed with terror. At that moment I heard from outside and above my mother's voice. She called out, "Yes, just look at him. That is the man-eater!" That intensified my terror still more, and I awoke sweating and scared to death. For many nights afterwards I was afraid to go to sleep, because I feared I might have another dream like that (Jung, 1965, pp. 11-12).

This dream had a profound effect on the child. Jung (1965) says it haunted him for years. Throughout his youth, the image he had seen remained a subterranean

god, not to be named. Whenever anyone spoke too emphatically about Lord Jesus, the image would reappear. Consequently:

> Lord Jesus never became quite real for me, never quite acceptable, never quite lovable, for again and again I would think of his underground counterpart, a frightful revelation which had been accorded me without my seeking it (Jung, 1965, p. 13).

Jung's interpretation of the dream. As an old man Jung described how he came to understand this dream on the basis of his researches in mythology and religious symbolism. What he had seen was a ritual phallus, an image of the dark, "underground" side of God. The experience amounted to an initiation:

> . . . the important thing in the dream was its remarkable symbolic setting and the astounding interpretation: "That is the man-eater." Not the child's ogre of a man-eater, but the fact that this was the man-eater, and that it was sitting on a golden throne beneath the earth. For my childish imagination it was first of all the king who sat on a golden throne; then, on a much more beautiful and much higher and much more golden throne far, far away in the blue sky, sat God and Lord Jesus, with golden crowns and white robes. Yet . . . in the dream I went down into a hole in the earth and found something very different on a golden throne, something non-human and underworldly, which gazed fixedly upward and fed on human flesh. It was only fifty years later that a passage in a study of religious ritual burned into my eyes, concerning the motif of cannibalism that underlies the symbolism of the Mass. Only then did it become clear to me how exceedingly unchildlike, how sophisticated and oversophisticated was the thought that had begun to break through into consciousness in those two experiences. Who was it speaking in me? Whose mind had devised them? What kind of superior intelligence was at work? . . . .

> Through this childhood dream I was initiated into the secrets of the earth. What happened then was a kind of burial in the earth, and many years were to pass before I came out again. Today I know that it happened in order to bring the greatest possible amount of light into the darkness. It was an initiation into the realm of darkness (Jung, 1965, pp. 14-15).

Here Jung is attributing the dream to the workings of the collective unconscious and is describing its effects upon the child he was. It was his earliest experience of that dark realm of the psyche he was later to describe as the collective unconscious. In this way the dream prefigured his future development.

The background of the dream. The experiences which preceded the dream shed some light on his mother's "astounding interpretation." Jung recalls this period of his life as being filled with anxiety. Since his family lived near the Rhine Falls and his father was a parson, the little boy witnessed many burials:

> People drowned, bodies were swept over the rocks. In the cemetery nearby, the sexton would dig a hole--heaps of brown, upturned earth. Black, solemn men in long frock coats with unusually tall hats and shiny black boots would bring a black box. My father would be there in his clerical gown, speaking in a resounding voice. Women wept. I was told that someone was being buried in this hole in the ground. Certain persons who had been around previously would suddenly no longer be there. Then I would hear that they had been buried, and that Lord Jesus had taken them to himself (Jung, 1965, p. 9).

At about the same time the little boy had learned a prayer in which Lord Jesus also took little children to himself:

Spread out thy wings, Lord Jesus mild,
And take to thee thy chick, thy child.
"If Satan would devour it,
No harm shall overpower it,"
So let the angels sing!
(Jung, 1975, p. 10).

Jung reports:

> . . . I understood at once that Satan liked chicks and had to be prevented from eating them. So, although Lord Jesus did not like the taste, he ate them anyway, so that Satan would not get them. As far as that went, my argument was comforting. But now I was hearing that Lord Jesus "took" other people to himself as well, and that this "taking" was the same as putting them in a hole in the ground.
>
> This sinister analogy had unfortunate consequences. I began to distrust Lord Jesus. He lost the aspect of a big, comforting, benevolent bird and became associated with the gloomy black men in frock coats, top hats, and shiny black boots who busied themselves with the black box (Jung, 1965, p. 10).

The little boy's reflections on these things led to a traumatic experience involving one of these men in black:

> One hot summer day I was sitting alone, as usual, on the road in front of the house, playing in the sand. . . . Looking up, I saw a figure in a strangely broad hat and a long black garment coming down from the wood. . . . At the sight of him I was overcome with fear, which rapidly grew into deadly terror as the frightful recognition shot through my mind: "That is a Jesuit." Shortly, before, I had overheard a conversation between my father and a visiting colleague concerning the nefarious activities of the Jesuits. From the half-irritated, half-fearful tone of my father's remarks I gathered that "Jesuits" meant something specially dangerous, even for my father. Actually I had no idea what Jesuits were, but I was familiar with the word "Jesus" from my little prayer. . . . Terrified, I ran helter-skelter into the house, rushed up the stairs, and hid under a beam in the darkest corner of the attic. . . . For days afterwards the hellish fright clung to my limbs and kept me

> in the house. And even when I began to play in the road again, the wooded hilltop was still the object of my uneasy vigilance (Jung, 1965, pp. 10-11).

All of these images constituted a complex of anxieties about an "underside" of Lord Jesus, having to do with death, burial, and devouring. And this complex apparently was expressed vividly in his dream of the giant, underground, man-eating, enthroned phallus. In this dream, the little boy's mother tells him "That is the man-eater!" Jung (1965) comments,

> I could never make out whether my mother meant, "That is the man-eater?"or, "That is the man-eater." In the first case she would have meant that not Lord Jesus or the Jesuit was the devourer of little children, but the phallus; in the second case that the man-eater in general was symbolized by the phallus, so that the dark Lord Jesus, the Jesuit, and the phallus were identical (p. 12).

A Jungian interpretation of the dream. Aniela Jaffe, with whom Jung collaborated in writing his memoirs, interprets this warning as a sort of temptation which reflects the ambiguity of the mother-son relationship. For Jaffe (1972) the underground phallus has not only a terrifying but also a positive aspect:

> . . . the shape of the daimon, as also the light radiating from it and the upward-gazing eye, characterize it as a living, creative, and perceiving spirit dwelling in the dark recesses of the psyche (p. 163).

The mother's warning is a temptation to avoid this living creativity. She therefore seems to have an ambivalent character:

> The dream image of the mother is equally ambivalent. She herself remains invisible; only her voice is heard, inviting the boy to observe the creature more closely. But she takes back the invitation, as though mockingly by pointing out its murderous qualities, and actually tempts the boy to flee. Her call seems to have the secret design of preventing her son's fateful encounter with the daimon. Were the boy to yield to this maternal temptation, a perilous venture would not be undertaken, a destiny go unfulfilled. Thus the kind, understanding, and adored mother presents as deadly a danger as her hostile counterpart (Jaffe, 1972, pp. 163-164).

Perhaps this ambiguous situation can be described in terms of the principles outlined in the preceding chapter. The archetype, or structure of becoming, actualized in the maternal relationship was giving way to a new archetypal phase of development. The integration of the Self achieved in the maternal relationship was being disrupted by this new development. A certain resistance to this disruption emerges as if to keep the child within the prior structure. This resistance may be represented by the mother's warning in the dream. Little Carl appears to have been caught in a conflict between inertia and growth. To describe this conflict in terms of its specific developmental and psychosocial context, I will consider the dream from the Eriksonian perspective.

The Dream in Its Developmental Context

The Oedipal phase. The dream can be described as a product of that psychosocial crisis defined by Freud as the Oedipal situation and incorporated by Erikson into

his schematization of development as the psychosocial stage when there is an intense struggle between a sense of initiative and a sense of guilt. During this stage, the child's emerging energies come into conflict with restrictions imposed upon them from without. Erikson describes it as a stage of curiosity and expanded imagination, of increased locomotor powers, of genital excitability and preoccupation with sexual matters. All of this activity leads to "secret fantasies of gigantic and terrifying proportions (Erikson, 1968, p. 118)." The result is a deep sense of guilt: "a strange sense, for it seems forever to imply that the individual has committed crimes and deeds that were, after all, not only not committed but would have been biologically quite impossible (Erikson, 1968, p. 118)." Erikson accounts for this unrealistic guilt by explaining that this active stage, which creates so much initiative, also brings with it anticipatory rivalry with those who were there first. In imagination the boy strives with his father for a favored position with the mother. His failure to accomplish this in real life is inevitable and necessary but leads to guilt and anxiety. The child is hounded by fears of being punished for secret fantasies and deeds.

According to Erikson, these anxieties and fears govern the child's new-found initiative, becoming the rudiments of a conscience. The achievement of a healthy

foundation for one's conscience is the task of this developmental stage. A healthy conscience gives direction to one's initiative without being overly restrictive. A severe conscience can obstruct growth:

> For the conscience of the child can be primitive, cruel, and uncompromising, as may be observed in instances where children learn to constrict themselves to the point of over-all inhibition. . . or where they develop deep regressions. . . (Erikson, 1968, p. 119).

An overly restrictive conscience might precipitate a regression to prior stages of development. Little Carl's dream may indicate a resistance to his new energies which would tend to keep him at the stage of development actualized in his maternal relationship and possibly enclose him within it. Some of the family dynamics which Jung recalls from his childhood suggest how such a crisis might have developed.

A basic sense of mistrust. Jung remembers trouble in his parents' marriage. Shortly after Carl's birth, the family moved to a church in the country. Perhaps his mother, who was well educated, was not satisfied with her life as a country parson's wife. At any rate, when Carl was about three his parents were temporarily separated when his mother spent several months in a hospital. Jung assumes that this illness had something to do with the difficulty in their marriage. He reports that as a child he was deeply troubled by his mother's absence. It established a sense of mistrust:

> From then on, I always felt mistrustful when the word "love" was spoken. The feeling I associated

> with "woman" was for a long time that of innate unreliability. "Father" on the other hand, meant reliability and powerlessness. That is the handicap I started off with (Jung, 1965, p. 8).

A sense of trust is the first step on Erikson's ladder of psychosocial development and the foundation of all other steps. During the first year of life the infant is entirely dependent upon the attentions of his mother or whatever adult is caring for him. The predictability, consistency, and manner of her activities are the child's first experience of the reliability of things. This period of life begins with a sort of paradise: the unity of baby and mother in nursing. This paradise is something from which the infant is separated. This separation, according to Erikson (1968) seems to leave us all with "a sense of division and a dim but universal nostalgia for a lost paradise (p. 101)." Erikson (1968) describes the developmental task which arises from this crisis:

> It is against the combination of these impressions of having been deprived, of having been divided, and of having been abandoned, all of which leave a residue of basic mistrust, that basic trust must establish and maintain itself (pp. 101-102).

Erikson stresses that it is the quality of the maternal relationship that matters here. It is not sufficient that there is enough food or many demonstrations of love. What matters most is that the mother cares and that she trusts herself. If the mother trusts her-

self and believes in the system of child care she follows the infant will most likely develop a basic, almost bodily, sense of "rightness,""trust," or "meaningfulness" in regard to his relations with significant others. And this primordial sense will serve him well as he faces the life crises ahead.

Jung describes his relationship with his mother as one which fostered a sense of mistrust. His separation from her at an early age left him with a relatively permanent sense of insecurity. Consequently the very foundation of his epigenetic development may have been unstable. His needs for a sense of basic trust unsatisfied, it is understandable that little Carl should be frightened by the eruption within him of powerful new forces and that there should appear in his dreams such a terrifying image of genital potency. But his anxiety was probably aggravated by the "inflated" position he had assumed within the family.

An "inflated" child. Little Carl was virtually an only child. Prior to his birth, two older brothers had died in their infancy. His only other sibling, a sister, was not born until he was nine (Bennet, 1962, p. 9). He was often caught in the middle of the conflicts between his parents and fell into the role of judging one parent against the other. Looking back, Jung (1965) felt that this taking of sides had been necessary as a

means of liberating himself from the conflict but that it had put him in the role of a superior arbitrator, above the conflict, which caused a certain "inflatedness," or unstable self-assurance (p. 25). As he grew older, Carl's mother tended to reinforce this inflatedness by treating her child as if he were mentally far beyond his years and confiding her marital problems to him. Perhaps this inflatedness was expressed already in the early dream of the giant phallus. Little Carl was horrified by the dream. He may have been terrified by the sense of power within him--a power too big for a child to handle, but which he had assumed within his family. This inflatedness would undoubtedly have added to the difficulties of the Oedipal stage. Perhaps his mother's warning was also for little Carl to beware of his emerging genitality. The terrifying giant may represent his own potentially destructive and rapidly emerging sexuality. He is warned of its "man-eating" nature. But the giant phallus, on the other hand, may represent the hidden, dark side of his father. His mother knows this side of the man and warns her child to be wary of it--not to get too inflated for he could be destroyed by a bigger and more potent being. In either case, the dream would be a warning for the child to take heed, and to restrict himself.

The dream as compensatory. The fact that such a warning came from his dreaming would be an example of

the compensatory function of unconscious processes. Insecure, and sometimes more of an arbiter than a child being trained by his parents, little Carl may not have been receiving or accepting enough guidance to channel his energies safely and to find those limits for his behavior which would protect him from undue anxiety. His dream may be described as a compensatory reaction to this situation. Perhaps the dangers inherent in this archetypal stage of development were manifested in the dream because they had not been realized consciously. The dream could be described as a response to certain factors in his family. This response is not simply a product of those factors, for it suggests an inborn capacity to transform one's experience of archetypal situations that have not been fully realized. Insofar as this transformation leads toward the fuller realization of a stage of psychosocial development (or archetypal structure of becoming), it may be described as an expression of the individual's inborn urge towards growth (or Self-realization). But everything depends upon the individual's reaction to these experiences. Little Carl's reaction to the dream of the underground phallus not only became his mode of adaptation to the Oedipal crisis but also prefigured an important aspect of his future development.

A Secret Realm

The child's sphere of unquestioned privilege. Little Carl had been exposed to an overwhelming private

experience which, it might be expected, would drive the ordinary child into the arms of his parents. But this child did not tell anyone of his dream. It was a secret which he kept until he was an old man. And it was just the first in a whole series of childhood experiences which the boy kept to himself. He developed a private realm of experience which gave him the sense of possessing a great secret. In his tenth year, this feeling reached a climax when young Carl found a way of giving it form:

> I had in those days a yellow, varnished pencil case of the kind commonly used by primary-school pupils, with a lock and the customary ruler. At the end of this ruler I now carved a little manikin, about two inches long, with frock coat, top hat, and shiny black boots. I colored him black with ink, sawed him off the ruler, and put him in the pencil case, where I made him a little bed. I even made a coat for him out of a bit of wool. In the case I also placed a smooth, oblong blackish stone from the Rhine, which I had painted with water colors to look as though it were divided into an upper and lower half, and had long carried around in my trouser pocket. This was his stone. All this was a great secret. Secretly I took the case to the forbidden attic at the top of the house (forbidden because the floorboards were worm-eaten and rotten) and hid it with great satisfaction on one of the beams under the roof--for no one must ever see it! I knew that not a soul would ever find it there. No one could discover my secret and destroy it. I felt safe, and the tormenting sense of being at odds with myself was gone. In all difficult situations, whenever I had done something wrong or my feelings had been hurt, or when my father's irritability or my mother's invalidism oppressed me, I thought of my carefully bedded-down and wrapped-up manikin and his smooth, prettily colored stone. From time to time--often at intervals of weeks--I secretly stole up to the attic when I could be certain that no one would see me. Then I clambered up on the beam, opened the case, and looked at my manikin and his stone. Each time I did this I placed in the case a little scroll of paper on which I

> had written something during school hours in a secret language of my own invention. The addition of a new scroll always had the character of a solemn ceremonial act. Unfortunately I cannot remember what I wanted to communicate to the manikin. I only know that my "letters" constituted a kind of library for him. I fancy, though I cannot be certain, that they may have consisted of sayings that particularly pleased me. . . .
>
> This possession of a secret had a very powerful formative influence on my character; I consider it the essential factor of my boyhood. Similarly, I never told anyone about the dream of the phallus; and the Jesuit, too, belonged to that mysterious realm which I knew I must not talk about. The little wooden figure with the stone was a first attempt, still unconscious and childish, to give shape to the secret (Jung, 1965, pp. 21-22).

The developmental significance of his possession of a secret may be described by considering what might have happened if he had revealed the dream and his other experiences to his parents.

One aspect of the Oedipal stage of development is the real or imagined rivalry between the growing boy and his father. Erikson (1968) describes the dilemma which this presents for the child:

> . . . initiative brings with it anticipatory rivalry with those who were there first and who may therefore occupy with their superior equipment the field toward which one's initiative is at first directed. Jealousy and rivalry, those often embittered and yet essentially futile attempts at demarcating a sphere of unquestioned privilige, now come to a climax in a final contest for a favored position with one of the parents: the inevitable and necessary failure leads to guilt and anxiety. The child indulges in fantasies of being a giant or a tiger, but in his dreams he runs in terror for dear life (pp. 118-119).

Perhaps little Carl's secrecy can be understood as a relatively successful attempt to establish a different

sphere of unquestioned privilege. Little Carl kept his inner experiences from encroaching upon his parents, but that also kept them from encroaching upon his private sphere. This reaction to the dream of the phallus suggests that it stimulated the development of his conscience in both of the aspects defined by Erikson. In terms of guilt, it gave him a sense of fear which set limits to the expression of his energies. In terms of initiative, it introduced him to a private sphere where these energies could be liberated and given form. But it was necessary for him to isolate his experiences from his parents. This aspect of his development will be described in terms of his relationship with each of them.

Jung's childhood memories of his father. Pastor Paul Jung has been described by his famous son as a kind and gentle man. He presented a much more dependable personality to his son than did his wife. Jung (1965) recalls vividly this warm memory of his father tending to him:

> I am restive, feverish, unable to sleep. My father carries me in his arms, paces up and down, singing his old student songs. . . . To this day I can remember my father's voice, singing over me in the stillness of the night (p. 8).

And yet the little boy did not take his dream of the terrifying phallus to this kindly father. Jung implies that as a boy he sensed the threat which such an image would represent to his father.

He had overheard his father's conversations with another minister about "Jesuits." He did not know what they were but he was familiar with the word, "Jesus," from his prayer. The half-irritated, half-fearful tone of his father's voice communicated a sense of danger to the child : "'Jesuits' meant something specially dangerous, even for my father (Jung, 1965, p. 11)." And so when the little boy saw the ominous black-robed figure, he was overcome with fear and the recognition: "That is a Jesuit." It was the same kind of moment when he saw the phallus and heard the voice saying "That is the man-eater." These were dreadful things which would greatly upset his father.

Jung (1965) also attributes to the child a premature realization that his father's beliefs would not be able to help him with these things. These beliefs later seemed like a masquerade (Jung, 1965, p. 13) behind which his father and other believers could not or would not gaze. If they had seen through the oft-praised loving kindness of the Lord Jesus they would have seen the other Lord Jesus: "a god of death, helpful, it is true, in that he scared away the terrors of the night, but himself uncanny . . . (Jung, 1965, p. 13)." This was the god which the adults did not talk about. So the child, for whom this god was a real presence, did not speak of him to the adults. Later he doubted whether the adults, his father in

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particular, even knew of such a god. Then, at best, his father's beliefs seemed inadequate. He surely would not understand the boy's experiences.

Protecting, escaping from, and overcoming his father. Jung's account makes it appear that he was protecting his father by withholding his dream. But it should not be overlooked that he was also protecting himself from his father's reaction. Since such things were feared or rejected by Pastor Paul, he would be likely to express negative feelings about them. If little Carl spoke about his private experiences he might be told that they were evil. The mere act of telling would have surrendered his privileged sphere to his father's sphere. By maintaining the privacy of his experiences, the boy was in effect developing a basis for overcoming his father's authority. As he grew older, his father's pious beliefs collapsed under the weight of what young Carl knew in the privacy of his inner experiences:

> I was religious in the Christian sense, though always with the reservation: "But it is not so certain as all that!" or, "What about that thing under the ground?" And when religious teachings were pumped into me and I was told, "This is beautiful and this is good," I would think to myself: "Yes, but there is something else, something very secret that people don't know about" (Jung, 1965, p. 22).

The growing boy was to feel ashamed and guilty about some of his inner experiences. Perhaps he was subliminally aware that he was undercutting his father. But he had to

protect his own sphere and the integrity of his experience. Young Carl was to resolve this conflict only by attributing his private experience to a higher authority than his father--to God Himself.

Separating from mother. The little boy's secrecy may also be described in terms of his relationship with his mother. As Jaffe suggests, his mother's warning in the dream can be understood as a temptation to avoid the power of his emerging energies and the growth they would generate. This temptation, if heeded, would have kept the boy within the maternal relationship and the stage of development it represents. Telling the dream to his mother would, in a sense, have been succumbing to the temptation. He would have been depending upon her instead of developing his own initiative. But the temptation was largely overcome by his mistrust of her. Besides the basic sense of mistrust which had emerged from her absences, the boy also feared her opinions. Before he could read, his mother read to him from the Orbis Pictus, an illustrated children's book containing accounts of exotic religions, especially Hinduism. The child was especially interested in the illustrations of Brahma, Vishnu, and Shiva for he sensed their affinity with his dream. But he never spoke to his mother of this:

> . . . for the faint tone of contempt with which she spoke of heathens did not escape me. I

> knew that she would reject my "revelations" with horror, and I did not want to expose myself to any such injury (Jung, 1965, p. 17).

The "other side" of mother. Nevertheless, Jung (1965) writes that he might have been able to share his secret experiences with his mother, who "seemed to think along somewhat similar lines as myself (p. 48)," but she admired him too much and was not dependable. Emile Jung treated her young son as if he were mentally far beyond his years. As Jung (1965) recalls it, "she would talk to me as to a grown-up. It was plain that she was telling me everything she could not say to my father, for she early made me her confidant and confided her trouble to me (p. 52)." Being treated this way undoubtedly added to the inflatedness which grew out of his arbiter role in the family. Jung (1965) remembers that "her attitude toward me was above all one of admiration, and that was not good for me. And so I remained alone with my thoughts (p. 48)."

But little Carl's mother was unpredictable. At times she would suddenly assume an uncanny "second" personality which expressed itself with great authority:

> This other emerged only now and then, but each time it was unexpected and frightening. She would then speak as if talking to herself, but what she said was aimed at me and usually struck to the core of my being, so that I was stunned into silence (Jung, 1965, p. 49).

The enormous difference between the two personalities of

his mother gave young Carl frequent anxiety dreams about her (Jung, 1965, p. 50). But Jung (1965) reports that what she said on the occasions when her second personality burst forth "was so true and to the point that I trembled before it (p. 52)." He says: "If my mother could then have pinned down, I would have had a wonderful interlocutor (Jung, 1965, p. 52)."

Since he was unable to find a dependable interlocutor in his mother, young Carl was left to his own devices in coming to terms with his private experiences. He constructed walls of secrecy around his private realm and it became the basis for a much-needed sense of security. Commenting on the significance of the carved manikin for his childhood, Jung (1965) writes:

> The meaning of these actions . . . never worried me. I contented myself with the feeling of newly won security, and was satisfied to possess something that no one knew and no one could get at. It was an inviolable secret which must never be betrayed, for the safety of my life depended on it. Why this was so I did not ask myself. It simply was so (p. 22).

This boy was in such dire need of security that he felt his very life depended upon the secrecy of his private world. Although this world had at times been terrifying, he had learned to feel safe in it and now he must not reveal it to anyone. His mother's unreliability had left him with a basic sense of mistrust. He had now found something in which to trust--his private realm of inner experiences. By meeting his needs for security in this

way the young boy left unresolved the sense of mistrust he felt for experiences outside this realm. That sense of mistrust emerged out of his experience of the untrustworthiness of his first interpersonal relationship. As a mistrust of interpersonal experiences it could only be overcome interpersonally. His prevailing sense of mistrust made it difficult for young Carl to separate from his private realm and enter the public world of school. This difficulty will be discussed in the following chapter.

VI. SCHOOL AGE

Play: Private and Public

An important part of little Carl's secret world was play. As an only child his play was solitary:

> I played alone and in my own way. Unfortunately I cannot remember what I played; I recall only that I did not want to be disturbed. I was deeply absorbed in my games and could not endure being watched or judged while I played them. My first concrete memory of games dates from my seventh or eighth year. I was passionately fond of playing with bricks, and built towers which I then rapturously destroyed by an "earthquake" (Jung, 1965, pp. 17-18).

Erikson (1963, ch. 6) describes such play activities as crucial for ego development. A growing child becomes painfully aware of his inability to master himself:

> A growing boy has trouble in mastering his gangling body as well as his divided mind. He wants to be good, if only out of expediency, and always finds that almost against his will he has given in. As his time perspective permits a glimpse of approaching adulthood he finds himself acting like a child (Erikson, 1963, p. 211).

As if to compensate for these defeats, the child begins to play at games in which he is the master of the outcome and in which can pretend to be a competent adult in some important social role.

As one example of this compensatory function of play, Erikson cites the kind of play that absorbed Jung

as a child: the activity of building and destroying a tower. Erikson (1963) maintains that this activity

> . . . arises from the not so distant experience of sudden falls at the very time when standing upright on wobbly legs afforded a new and fascinating perspective on existence. The child who consequently learns to make a tower "stand up" enjoys causing the same tower to waver and collapse: in addition to the active mastery over a previously passive event, it makes one feel stronger to know that there is somebody weaker. . . . But since it is the child's still precarious mastery over space which is thus to be demonstrated, it is understandable that watching somebody else kick one's tower may make the child see himself in the tower rather than in the kicker; all fun evaporates (pp. 219-220).

The phrase, "active mastery over a previously passive event," refers to the Freudian concept which is the foundation for Erikson's understanding of play. Erikson (1963, pp. 215-217) explains how Freud demonstrated that children often play at doing things that were in reality done to them. The classic case was observed by Freud when he was staying for a time with some people who had an eighteen-month-old boy who had found a way to compensate for being left alone at times. He had a wooden reel with a piece of string wound round it and would play at throwing the reel onto a cot and then retrieving it with the string. As the reel would disappear into the cot the boy would utter a sound meaning "gone." As he retrieved it, he would say "there." In this way he was mastering the disappearance and reappearance of something. Whereas the goings and comings of his mother were experiences which merely happened to him, this game was something

he could control. Another game played by the boy seemed to be concerned with the same issue. In fact, the child had discovered a way of causing his own disappearance. He would stand in front of a mirror and then crouch down. When his mother came home he excitedly said "Baby o-o-oh" (the expression for gone).

Whereas Freud thought of this activity in terms of the "repetition compulsion" (i.e. the compulsion to repeat painful experiences which one has not learned to overcome or live with), Erikson (1963) broadens the interpretation by emphasizing the positive developmental consequences of such activity:

> . . . the emphasis, I think, should be on the ego's need to master the various areas of life, and especially those in which the individual finds his self, his body, and his social role wanting and trailing. To hallucinate ego mastery and yet also practice it in an intermediate reality between phantasy and actuality is the purpose of play . . . (pp. 211-212).

From the Jungian perspective such compensatory play might be described as an instinctual behavior which is evoked by certain developmental crises. Since it mediates between fantasy and actuality, such play might be described as an early manifestation of the transcendent function and understood as facilitating not only a sense of ego mastery but also an integration of the Self.

Erikson makes a further extension of Freud's theory of play which is particularly important for this

study of Jung. Erikson makes a point of the fact that the child observed by Freud had told his mother of his mirror games. For otherwise, "the game alone . . . could have become the beginning of an increasing tendency on the child's part to take life experiences into a solitary corner and to rectify them in fantasy, and only in fantasy (Erikson, 1963, p. 218)." It was young Carl's tendency to keep his fantasies and games to himself. He might be contrasted to the boy observed by Freud who told his mother of his play. Erikson (1963) assumes that she would have shown interest and pride in his game and that the consequences for the child would have been triply positive: "He had adjusted to a difficult situation, he had learned to manipulate new objects, and he had received living recognition for his method (p. 218)."

Jung, on the contrary, had begun a pattern which was to isolate him in certain respects from that sort of recognition and closeness. But the young boy did not wish to be isolated. Immediately after discussing his lonely play activites, Jung (1965) comments: "One of my reasons for liking school was that there I found at last the playmates I had lacked for so long (p. 18)." Nevertheless, his mode of adaptation to life had become established. He had developed his ego apart from his interactions with others. His sense of himself was rooted in his private play. Now his public play with his young

schoolmates alienated him from himself:

> When I was with them I became different from the way I was at home. I joined in their pranks, or invented ones which at home would never have occurred to me, so it seemed; although, as I knew only too well, I could hatch up all sorts of things when I was alone. It seemed to me that the change in myself was due to the influence of my schoolfellows, who somehow misled me or compelled me to be different from what I thought I was (Jung, 1965, p. 19).

Two Separate Personalities

The inferiority crisis. This sense of estrangement from himself reflects the developmental crisis of the pre-pubertal school age. According to Erikson, in all cultures when children reach a certain age they receive some systematic instruction, whether or not it is in a classroom. They must learn certain skills and tasks which will be required later for their participation in, and contribution to, the society. They must be willing to set aside the familial world and the solitary world of make-believe and day-dreams so as to apply themselves to these tasks and adjust to the larger social world. If the child is successful at this, and recognized by his teachers and peers for it, he will develop a sense of industry. The danger is that he might develop "an estrangement from himself and from his tasks--the well-known sense of inferiority (Erikson, 1968, p. 124)."

At school there were embarrassments and defeats which were to provoke feelings of inferiority in young

Carl. He had "a downright fear of the mathematics class (Jung, 1965, p. 27)." Although he could not understand or accept the principles of algebra, "thanks to my good visual memory, I contrived for a long while to swindle my way through mathematics (Jung, 1965, p. 29)." A more definite failure came when he was "exempted from drawing classes on grounds of utter incapacity (Jung, 1965, p. 29)." Jung recalls these experiences as "defeats." The gymnastic classes, which aroused his persisting sense of mistrust, were another of these defeats:

> I had a certain physical timidity which I was not able to overcome until much later on. This timidity was in turn linked with a distrust of the world and its potentialities. To be sure, the world seemed to me beautiful and desirable, but it was also filled with vague and incomprehensible perils. Therefore, I always wanted to know at the start to what and to whom I was entrusting myself. Was this perhaps connected with my mother, who had abandoned me for several months? When . . . my neurotic fainting spells began, the doctor forbade me to engage in gymnastics, much to my satisfaction. I was rid of that burden--and had swallowed another defeat (Jung, 1965, pp. 29-30).

The sense of being two separate persons as a compensation for this crisis. As a result of such experiences, young Carl acquired a sense of two realities: the dubious and untrustworthy social world in which he felt uncomfortable, and the private world in which he felt secure. He writes "It was as if I sensed a splitting of myself and feared it. My inner security was threatened (Jung, 1965, p. 19)." This splitting of himself evolved into a sense of being two persons. Whenever he felt

inferior as a person in the public world he would remember his private world and think of himself as having a personality independent of the defeats and failures he suffered:

> It occurred to me that I was actually two different persons. One of them was the schoolboy who could not grasp algebra and was far from sure of himself; the other was important, a high authority, a man not to be trifled with (Jung, 1965, pp. 33-34).

Young Carl's sense of having an "other" personality, independent of his "defeats" in the social world, developed through a series of experiences which made powerful impressions upon him. One day he saw an antique green carriage, looking exactly as if it had come straight out of the eighteenth century, driving past his house:

> When I saw it, I felt with great excitement: "That's it! Sure enough, that comes from my times . . . ." Then came a curious sentiment ecouerant, as though someone had stolen something from me, or as though I had been cheated--cheated out of my beloved past. . . . I cannot describe what was happening in me or what it was that affected me so strongly: a longing, a nostalgia. . . (Jung, 1965, p. 34).

Another experience which gave the young boy a sense of belonging to the past was his identification with a statuette, belonging to one of his aunts, of an eighteenth century doctor:

> The statuette of the old doctor had buckled shoes which in a strange way I recognized as my own. I was convinced that these were shoes I had worn. The conviction drove me wild with excitement. "Why, those must be my shoes!" I could still feel those shoes on my feet, and yet I could not explain where this crazy feeling came from (Jung, 1965, pp. 34-35).

Nevertheless, he was able to put this feeling to use. Once, when he was being scolded by an adult for some reckless behavior on a boat, he reacted as follows:

> I was thoroughtly crestfallen but had to admit that I had done exactly what he had said not to, and that his lecture was quite justified. At the same time I was siezed with rage that this fat, ignorant boor should dare to insult ME. This ME was not only grown up, but important, an authority, a person with office and dignity, an old man, an object of respect and awe. Yet the contrast with reality was so grotesque that in the midst of my fury I suddenly stopped myself, for the question rose to my lips: "Who in the world are you anyway? You are reacting as though you were the devil only knows how important! And yet you know he is perfectly right. You are barely twelve years old, a schoolboy, and he is a father and a rich, powerful man besides . . ."(Jung, 1965, p. 33).

At this moment there occurred to him the idea that he was actually two persons--one, an insecure boy; the other, a high authority. Jung refers to the schoolboy as "personality No. 1" and to the "other" as "personality No. 2." Young Carl had a clear picture of this second personality: "This 'other' was an old man who lived in the eighteenth century, wore buckled shoes and a white wig and went driving [in an antique carriage] . . . (Jung, 1965, p. 34)."

The development of this image of a transcendent personality could be described as a compensatory archetypal process. Young Carl was at a stage of development when a new psychosocial strength, characterized by Erikson as a sense of industry, has to be produced and integrated. But this new aspect of his growing ego was

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not actualized psychosocially or realized consciously. Instead it was projected onto the image of a higher authority. A spontaneous, unconscious process of identification had occurred. His feelings of inferiority were thereby compensated by the sense of a transcendent identity and the consequent feelings of superiority. This development might be characterized as the formation of an inferiority-superiority complex. It might also be described as a projection of, and identification with, an archetypal image of the Self. The innate capacity for the realization of one's whole personality was not being actualized by young Carl's ego and an image of this potential was projected onto an "other" which he also was.

At any rate, this sense of a superior identity gave him an escape from the feelings of inferiority which plagued him in the present. Gradually, Jung (1965) recalls:

> These isolated impressions coalesced into a coherent picture: of myself living in two ages simultaneously, and being two different persons (p. 35).
>
> One was the son of my parents, who went to school and was less intelligent, attentive, hard-working, decent, and clean than many other boys. The other was grown-up--old, in fact--skeptical, mistrustful, remote from the world of men, but close to nature, the earth, the sun, the moon, the weather, all living creatures, and above all close to the night, to dreams, and to whatever "God" worked directly in him (pp. 44-45).

One personality suffered all the problems involved in psychosocial development while the other stood outside of

time. Jung (1965) recalls that he often "sought the peace and solitude of this 'other,' personality No. 2 (p. 45)."

The inadequacy of this compensation. However, this sense of a split was to make school an increasingly painful experience for the child. The depth of the boy's resistance to the public realm manifested itself clearly when at the age of twelve, he developed "neurotic fainting spells":

> My twelfth year was indeed a fateful one for me. One day in the early summer of 1887 I was standing in the cathedral square, waiting for a classmate who went home by the same route as myself. It was twelve o'clock, and the morning classes were over. Suddenly another boy gave me a shove that knocked me off my feet. I fell, striking my head against the curbstone so hard that I almost lost consciousness. For about half an hour afterward I was a little dazed. At the moment I felt the blow the thought flashed through my mind "Now you won't have to go to school any more." I was only half unconscious, but I remained lying there a few moments longer than was strictly necessary, chiefly in order to avenge myself on my assailant. Then people picked me up and took me to a house nearby, where two elderly spinster aunts lived.
>
> From then on I began to have fainting spells whenever I had to return to school, and whenever my parents set me to doing my homework. For more than six months I stayed away from school, and for me that was a picnic. I was free, could dream for hours, be anywhere I liked, in the woods or by the water, or draw. I resumed my battle pictures and furious scenes of war, of old castles that were being assaulted or burned, or drew page upon page of caricatures. . . .
>
> Above all I was able to plunge into the world of the mysterious. To that realm belonged trees, a pool, the swamp, stones and animals, and my father's library. But I was growing more and more away from the world, and had all the while faint pangs of conscience. I frittered away my time with loafing,

collecting, reading, and playing. But I did not feel any happier for it; I had the obscure feeling that I was fleeing from myself (Jung, 1965, pp. 30-31).

He was "fleeing" from the tasks which would be required of him as a schoolboy and therefore from the requirements of his psychosocial development.

A victory for the ego. It was only by a tremendous exertion of his will that young Carl was able to overcome his resistance to school:

> I forgot completely how all this had come about, but I pitied my parents' worries. They consulted various doctors, who scratched their heads and packed me off to spend the holidays with relatives in Winterthur. This city had a railroad station that proved a source of endless delight to me. But when I returned home everything was as before. One doctor thought I had epilepsy. I knew what epileptic fits were like and I inwardly laughed at such nonsense. My parents became more worried than ever. Then one day a friend called on my father. They were sitting in the garden and I hid behind a shrub, for I was possessed of an insatiable curiosity. I heard the visitor saying to my father, "And how is your son?" "Ah, that's a sad business," my father replied. "The doctors no longer know what is wrong with him. They think it may be epilepsy. It would be dreadful if he were incurable. I have lost what little I had, and what will become of the boy if he cannot earn his own living?"
>
> I was thunderstruck. This was the collision with reality. "Why, then, I must get to work!" I thought suddenly.
>
> From that moment on I became a serious child. I crept away, went to my father's study, took out my Latin grammar, and began to cram with intense concentration. After ten minutes of this I had the finest of fainting fits. I almost fell off the chair, but after a few minutes I felt better and went on working. "Devil take it, I'm not going to faint," I told myself, and persisted in my purpose. This time it took about fifteen minutes before the second attack came. That, too, passed like the first. "And now you must really get to work!" I stuck it out, and after an

> hour came the third attack. Still I had the feeling that I had overcome the attacks. Suddenly I felt better than I had in all the months before. And in fact the attacks did not recur. From that day on I worked over my grammar and other schoolbooks every day. A few weeks later I returned to school, and never suffered another attack, even there. The whole bag of tricks was over and done with! That was when I learned what a neurosis is.
>
> Gradually the recollection of how it had all come about returned to me, and I saw clearly that I myself had arranged this whole disgraceful situation. That was why I had never been seriously angry with the schoolmate who pushed me over. I knew that he had been put up to it, so to speak, and that the whole affair was a diabolical plot on my part. I knew, too, that this was never going to happen to me again. I had a feeling of rage against myself, and at the same time was ashamed of myself. For I knew that I had wronged myself and made a fool of myself in my own eyes. Nobody else was to blame; I was the cursed renegade! From then on I could no longer endure my parents' worrying about me or speaking of me in a pitying tone.
>
> The neurosis became another of my secrets, but it was a shameful secret, a defeat. Nevertheless, it induced in me a studied punctiliousness and an unusual diligence. Those days saw the beginnings of my conscientiousness, practiced not for the sake of appearances, so that I would amount to something, but for my own sake. Regularly I would get up at five o'clock in order to study and sometimes I worked from three in the morning till seven, before going to school.
>
> What had led me astray during the crisis was my passion for being alone, my delight in solitude . . . (Jung, 1965, pp. 31-32).

Now for the first time young Carl had to accept the inevitability of public life and the necessity of adjusting to it. He made a conscious sacrifice of his privacy and consciously imposed upon himself a discipline. By means of this sacrifice and this discipline young Carl finally forced himself to overcome his resistance to participating in the life outside his private realm.

A lasting conflict: the formation of two complexes.

In this way he was able to overcome his feelings of inferiority and generate a great deal of industry. But the fundamental conflict remained. It had, in fact, become stronger. Each side of the conflict became an autonomous complex, a separate personality. By an exercise of his will, young Carl managed to meet the psychosocial tasks required of his public personality. This triumph of his will could be described as a victory for his ego but it necessitated a disruption of the Self. Young Carl's ego was no longer subservient to the seduction of the private realm, but it had only suppressed the conflict, not reconciled the differences between personalities No. 1 and No. 2.

The conflict continued as the growing young man focused more and more on the tasks of public life--choosing a career and establishing a position for himself. In his late teens, young Carl was frequently asked--by his parents and others--what he wanted to be. He found himself pulled in two directions:

> The older I grew, the more frequently I was asked by my parents and others what I wanted to be. I had no clear notions on that score. My interests drew me in different directions. On the one hand I was powerfully attracted by science, with its truths based on facts; on the other hand I was fascinated by everything to do with comparative religion. In the sciences I was drawn principally to zoology, paleontology, and geology; in the humanities to Greco-Roman, Egyptian, and prehistoric archeology. At the time, of course, I did not realize how very much this choice of the most varied subjects corresponded to the nature of my inner dichotomy. What

> appealed to me in science were the concrete facts and their historical background, and in comparative religion the spiritual problems, into which philosophy also entered. In science I missed the factor of meaning; and in religion, that of empiricism. Science met, to a vary large extent, the needs of No. 1 personality, whereas the humane or historical studies provided beneficial instruction for No. 2.
>
> Torn between these two poles, I was for a long time unable to settle on anything (Jung, 1965, pp. 72-73).

Recalling this period of uncertainty, Jung (1965) remarks that while his No. 1 personality was concerned with the here and now--the question of a profession--No. 2 had a philosophical perspective outside of time:

> I was beginning to realize that No. 2 had no pied-a-terre. In him I was lifted beyond the here and now; in him I felt myself a single eye in a thousand-eyed universe, but incapable of moving so much as a pebble upon the earth. No. 1 rebelled against this passivity; he wanted to be up and doing, but for the present he was caught in an insoluble conflict (p. 75).

It was not just that his No. 1 personality wanted a scentific career while No. 2 wanted to pursue the humanities. No. 2 was not concerned with such questions at all. Jung's here and now personality was drawn in both directions. Although science largely met his needs, this practical personality also felt the humanistic interests which were more suited to the other-worldliness of No. 2. This No. 1 personality was impatient to get moving but unable to decide what direction to take.

Finally, he decided upon medicine. It was a field that could satisfy his scientific interests and was at

the same time very practical. Following this choice Carl evaluated his two conceptions of himself:

> Through No. 1's eyes I saw myself as a rather disagreeable and moderately gifted young man with vaulting ambitions, an undisciplined temperament, and dubious manners, alternating between naive enthusiasm and fits of childish disappointment, in his innermost essence a hermit and obscurantist. On the other hand, No. 2 regarded No. 1 as a difficult and thankless moral task, a lesson that had to be got through somehow, complicated by a variety of faults such as spells of laziness, despondency, depression, inept enthusiams for ideas and things that nobody valued, liable to imaginary friendships, limited, prejudiced, stupid (mathematics!), with a lack of understanding for other people, vague and confused in philosophical matters, neither an honest Christian nor anything else. No. 2 had no definable character at all; he was a vita peracta, born, living, dead, everything in one; a total vision of life. Though pitilessly clear about himself, he was unable to express himself through the dense, dark medium of No. 1, though he longed to do so. When No. 2 predominated, No. 1 was contained and obliterated in him, just as, conversely, No. 1 regarded No. 2 as a region of inner darkness. No. 2 felt that any conceivable expression of himself would be like a stone thrown over the edge of the world, dropping soundlessly into infinite night. But in him (No. 2) light reigned, as in the spacious halls of a royal palace whose high casements open upon a landscape flooded with sunlight. Here were meaning and historical continuity, in strong contrast to the incoherent fortuitousness of No. 1's life, which had no real points of contact with its environment. No. 2, on the other hand, felt himself in secret accord with the Middle Ages (Jung, 1965, pp. 89-90).

Personality No. 1 might be described as young Carl's developing persona. In this personality, his ego was struggling to find a public role and to produce an appropriate social personality. In personality No. 2, on the other hand, his ego was receptive to a primordial vision of wholeness that seemed to transcend the

existential concerns of No. 1. Jung's concept of the Self would seem to fit this personality, but only as an innate potential not yet integrated. In personality No. 2, young Carl's ego was passively aware of the archetypal structure of the Self, the innate capacity for wholeness. But since this potential was not yet realized, young Carl's vision of a total personality was separated from his struggling public personality. The two personalities functioned as somewhat autonomous complexes.

A Temporary Integration

He was able to integrate them with the guidance of a dream image:

> About this time I had a dream which both frightened and encouraged me. It was night in some unknown place, and I was making slow and painful headway against a mighty wind. Dense fog was flying along everywhere. I had my hands cupped around a tiny light which threatened to go out at any moment. Everything depended on my keeping this little light alive. Suddenly I had the feeling that something was coming up behind me. I looked back, and saw a gigantic black figure following me. But at the same moment I was conscious, in spite of my terror, that I must keep my little light going through night and wind, regardless of all dangers. When I awoke I realized at once that the figure was a "specter of the Brocken," my own shadow on the swirling mists, brought into being by the little light I was carrying. I knew, too, that this little light was my consciousness, the only light I have. My own understanding is the sole treasure I possess, and the greatest. Though infinitely small and fragile in comparison with the powers of darkness, it is still a light, my only light.
>
> This dream was a great illumination for me. Now I knew that No. 1 was the bearer of the light, and that No. 2 followed him like a shadow. My task was to shield the light and not look back at the vita

peracta; this was evidently a forbidden realm of light of a different sort. I must go forward against the storm, which sought to thrust me back into the immeasurable darkness of a world where one is aware of nothing except the surfaces of things in the background. In the role of No. 1, I had to go forward--into study, moneymaking, responsibilities, entanglements, confusions, errors, submissions, defeats. The storm pushing against me was time, ceaselessly flowing into the past, which just as ceaselessly dogs our heels. It exerts a mighty suction which greedily draws everything living into itself; we can only escape from it--for a while--by pressing forward. The past is terribly real and present, and it catches everyone who cannot save his skin with a satisfactory answer.

My view of the world spun around another ninety degrees; I recognized clearly that my path led irrevocably outward, into the limitations and darkness of three-dimensionality (Jung, 1965, pp. 87-88).

Carl now identified more with the perspective of No. 1 and committed himself to the tasks of his social and professional life. Although he did not wish to deny the validity of personality No. 2, his concentration on the concerns of No. 1 relegated No. 2 to a position in the background of his development:

> I must leave No. 2 behind me, that was clear. But under no circumstances ought I to deny him to myself or declare him invalid. That would have been a self-mutilation. . . . But I felt myself to be increasingly identical with No. 1 . . . a schism had taken place between me and No. 2, with the result that "I" was assigned to No. 1 and was separated from No. 2 in the same degree, who thereby acquired, as it were, an autonomous personality. . . . He played the role of a factor in the background of my No. 1 existence, never clearly defined but yet definitely present (Jung, 1965, pp. 89-90).

This positioning of his two personalities reconciled the conflict between them and allowed young Carl

to pursue his psychosocial development. It might be described as an integration of the Self. The complexes were recognized and integrated with each other. Since the persona became the bearer of light (the conscious personality), and the vision of a total personality remained a factor in the background, this integration of the Self might be termed the formation of an ego-Self axis. It might also be said that young Carl's ego, in comprehending this symbol of an integration, was forming the ego-Self axis. He was relating consciously to a symbol of Self-integration. But the symbol itself was not produced by his ego. It was a spontaneous product of unconscious processes which compensated for the conflict he was suffering and gave him an image of wholeness or integration. The whole process--the production of this image and his comprehension of it--provides an example of what Jung called the transcendent function. As in this instance, it is a function which brings about a realization of the Self.

Jung's No. 2 personality came to the front again during the period of his "creative illness." But for the next two decades the passive other-worldliness of No. 2 remained in the shadows while the more mundane concerns and activities of No. 1 led the way. Young Carl's resolution of this conflict had freed his energies for the psychosocial tasks ahead of him. Another conflict which he

had to resolve centered around his relationship with his father and the ideological aspects of his quest for a sense of identity. I will discuss these developments in the following chapter.

VII. ADOLESCENCE

A "Shameful" Fantasy

At the age of twelve, young Carl had a fantasy experience which was decisive for his development. Because of its importance, I will quote Jung's recollection of this experience at length:

> One fine summer day that same year I came out of school at noon and went to the cathedral square. The sky was gloriously blue, the day one of radiant sunshine. The roof of the cathedral glittered, the sun sparkling from the new, brightly glazed tiles. I was overwhelmed by the beauty of the sight, and thought: "The world is beautiful and the church is beautiful, and God made all this and sits above it far away in the blue sky on a golden throne and . . ." Here came a great hole in my thoughts, and a choking sensation. I felt numbed and knew only: "Don't go on thinking now! Something terrible is coming, something I do not want to think, something I dare not even approach. Why not? Because I would be committing the most frightful of sins. What is the most terrible sin? Murder? No, it can't be that. The most terrible sin is the sin against the Holy Ghost, which cannot be forgiven. Anyone who commits that sin is damned to hell for all eternity. That would be very sad for my parents, if their only son, to whom they are so attached, should be doomed to eternal damnation. I cannot do that to my parents. All I need do is not go on thinking."
>
> That was easier said than done. On my long walk home I tried to think all sorts of things, but I found my thoughts returning again and again to the beautiful cathedral which I loved so much, and to God sitting on the throne--and then my thoughts would fly off again as if they had received a powerful electric shock. I kept repeating to myself: "Don't think of it, just don't think of it!" I reached home in a pretty worked-up state. My mother noticed that something was wrong, and asked, "What is the matter with you? Has something happened at school?"

I was able to assure her, without lying, that nothing had happened at school. I did have the thought that it might help me if I could confess to my mother the real reason for my turmoil. But to do so I would have to do the very thing that seemed impossible: think my thought right to the end. The poor dear was utterly unsuspecting and could not possibly know that I was in terrible danger of committing the unforgivable sin and plunging myself into hell. I rejected the idea of confessing and tried to efface myself as much as possible.

That night I slept badly; again and again the forbidden thought, which I did not yet know, tried to break out, and I struggled desperately to fend it off. The next two days were sheer torture and my mother was convinced that I was ill. But I resisted the temptation to confess, aided by the thought that it would cause my parents intense sorrow.

On the third night, however, the torment became so unbearable that I no longer knew what to do. I awoke from a restless sleep just in time to catch myself thinking again about the cathedral and God. I had almost continued the thought! I felt my resistance weakening. Sweating with fear, I sat up in bed to shake off sleep. "Now it is coming, now it's serious! I must think. It must be thought out beforehand. Why should I think something I do not know? I don't want to, by God, that's sure. But who wants me to? Who wants to force me to think something I don't know and don't want to know? Where does this terrible will come from? And why should I be the one to be subjected to it? I was thinking praises of the Creator of this beautiful world, I was grateful to him for this immeasurable gift, so why should I have to think something inconceivably wicked? I don't know what it is, I really don't for I cannot and must not come anywhere near this thought, for that would be to risk thinking it at once. I haven't done this or wanted this, it has come on me like a bad dream. Where do such things come from? This has happened to me without my doing. Why? After all, I didn't create myself, I came into the world the way God made me--that is, the way I was shaped by my parents. Or can it have been that my parents wanted something of this sort? But my good parents would never have had any thoughts like that. Nothing so atrocious would ever have occurred to them."

I found this idea utterly absurd. Then I thought of my grandparents, whom I knew only from their portraits. They looked benevolent and dignified

enough to repulse an idea that they might possibly be to blame. I mentally ran through the long procession of unknown ancestors until finally I arrived at Adam and Eve. And with them came the decisive thought: Adam and Eve were the first people; they had no parents, but were created directly by God, who intentionally made them as they were. They had no choice but to be exactly the way God had created them. Therefore they did not know how they could possibly be different. They were perfect creatures of God, for He creates only perfection, and yet they committed the first sin by doing what God did not want them to do. How was that possible? They could not have done it if God had not placed in them the possibility of doing it. That was clear, too, from the serpent, whom God had created before them, obviously so that it could induce Adam and Eve to sin. God in His omniscience had arranged everything so that the first parents would have to sin. Therefore it was God's intention that they should sin.

This thought liberated me instantly from my worst torment, since I know knew that God Himself had placed me in this situation. At first I did not know whether He intended me to commit my sin or not. I no longer thought of praying for illumination, since God had landed me in this fix without my willing it and had left me without any help. I was certain that I must search out His intention myself, and seek the way out alone. At this point another argument began.

"What does God want? To act or not to act? I must find out what God wants with me, and I must find out right away." I was aware, of course, that according to conventional morality there was no question but that sin must be avoided. That was what I had been doing up to now, but I knew I could not go on doing it. My broken sleep and my spiritual distress had worn me out to such a point that fending off the thought was tying me into unbearable knots. This could not go on. At the same time, I could not yield before I understood what God's will was and what He intended. For I was now certain that He was the author of this desperate problem. Oddly enough, I did not think for a moment that the devil might be playing a trick on me. The devil played little part in my mental world at that time, and in any case, I regarded him as powerless compared with God. But from the moment I emerged from the mist and became conscious of myself, the unity, the greatness, and the superhuman majesty of God began to haunt my imagination. Hence there was no question

in my mind but that God Himself was arranging a decisive test for me, and that everything depended on my understanding Him correctly. I knew, beyond a doubt, that I would ultimately be compelled to break down, to give way, but I did not want it to happen without my understanding it, since the salvation of my eternal soul was at stake.

"God knows that I cannot resist much longer, and He does not help me, although I am on the point of having to commit the unforgivable sin. In his omnipotence He could easily lift this compulsion from me, but evidently He is not going to. Can it be that He wishes to test my obedience by imposing on me the unusual task of doing something against my own moral judgment and against the teachings of my religion, and even against His own commandment, something I am resisting with all my strength because I fear eternal damnation? Is it possible that God wishes to see whether I am capable of obeying His will even though my faith and my reason raise before me the specters of death and hell? That might really be the answer! But these are merely my own thoughts. I may be mistaken. I dare not trust my own reasoning as far as that. I must think it all through once more."

I thought it over again and arrived at the same conclusion. "Obviously God also desires me to show courage," I thought. "If that is so and I go through with it, then He will give me His grace and illumination."

I gathered all my courage, as though I were about to leap forthwith into hell-fire, and let the thought come. I saw before me the cathedral, the blue sky. God sits on His golden throne, high above the world--and from under the throne an enormous turd falls upon the sparkling new roof, shatters it, and breaks the walls of the cathedral asunder (Jung, 1965, pp. 36-37).

This illumination was a turning point. The boy knew what his father had not understood.

. . . he had failed to experience the will of God, had opposed it for the best reasons and out of the deepest faith. And that was why he had never experienced the miracle of grace which heals all and makes all comprehensible. He had taken the Bible's commandments as his guide; he believed in God as the Bible prescribed and as his forefathers had taught him. But he did not know the immediate living God

> who stands, omnipotent and free, above His Bible and His Church, who calls upon man to partake of His freedom, and can force him to renounce his own views and convictions in order to fulfill without reserve the command of God. In His trial of human courage God refuses to abide by traditions no matter how sacred. In His omnipotence He will see to it that nothing really evil comes of such tests of courage. If one fulfills the will of God one can be sure of going the right way.
>
> God had also created Adam and Eve in such a way that they had to think what they did not at all want to think. He had done that in order to find out whether they were obedient. And he could also demand something of me that I would have had to reject on traditional religious grounds. It was obedience which brought me grace, and after that experience I knew what God's grace was. One must be utterly abandoned to God; nothing matters but fulfilling His will. Otherwise all is folly and meaninglessness (Jung, 1965, p. 40).

His father's religious attitude was a part of this folly and meaninglessness. Knowing this gave the boy a sense of distinction, but the fantasy also made him feel ashamed:

> I am a devil or a swine, I thought; I am infinitely depraved. . . it was a shaming experience. I had fallen into something bad, something evil and sinister, though at the same time it was a kind of distinction (Jung, 1965, p. 41).

Earlier I commented that little Carl's withdrawal into a private world of fantasy could be described as the development of a sphere of unquestioned privilege which gave him a basis for superseding his father's authority. Now the rebellious consequences of this withdrawal seem clear. In the nine years which had passed since the phallic dream, young Carl's private fantasy life had made him aware of a realm of experience that his father

not only did not know about but apparently would not be able to cope with or understand. But he had never tested his father's reaction. One consequence of his secrecy was that it perpetuated the idea of his superiority. The turd which smashes the cathdral seems a statement of the boy's rejection of his father's authority. Having preserved his secret realm as if it were a higher authority, the child finds this higher authority capable of destroying the cathedral, a fit symbol for his father's domain. Since it was this higher authority, God Himself, who "forced" the event, the boy would not have to assume full responsibility for it--even if it did make him feel rather depraved. In fact, this attribution of the event to the agency of God made the boy feel elect or chosen, witness to the will of God. This sense of being chosen allowed the boy, in spite of his guilt, to choose himself--to follow the instinctual-archetypal process of development emerging within him rather than the sterile religion of his father.

The Anal Imagery

But what is the significance of the anal symbolism? Erikson's principle is that in meeting the crisis of each stage of development we may employ the modalities of earlier stages. We return to the accomplishments of the past so as to fortify our efforts in the present; or we relive old struggles, only partially won, which must be

fought again if progress is to be made. Let us consider Erikson's description of the anal stage and its significance for psychosocial development.

According to Erikson (1963), while the child is learning to control the evacuation of his bowels and bladder he is experimenting with two simultaneous sets of social modalities: "holding on" and "letting go" (p. 251). In the process the child "begins to experience his autonomous will"; the whole stage, in fact, "becomes a battle for autonomy (Erikson, 1968, pp. 107-107)." The child's emerging ability to exercise a choice is conditioned by his parents' efforts to control his exercise of this choice. He must learn when to hold on and when to let go. The firm guidance of his parents will "protect him against the potential anarchy of his as yet untrained sense of discrimination, his inability to hold on and to let go with discretion (Erikson, 1963, p. 252)." Yet if the outer control is too rigid it will rob the child "of his attempt gradually to control his bowels and other functions willingly and by his free choice . . . (Erikson, 1968, p. 109)." Therefore, this stage is decisive, among other things, for the development of a ratio "between self-expression and compulsive self-restraint or meek compliance (Erikson, 1968, p. 109)." At best an individual will emerge from this stage with "a sense of free will"

and with the "will to be oneself" intact. He will have acquired the feeling that he is able to control himself by his own choices. And he will have developed a fundamental confidence in his own organism, which might be expressed as a sense that he can "let go" without losing control.

A lasting propensity for shame is the potential negative result of an inadequate development at this stage. Erikson (1968) defines shame as the feeling of being "completely exposed and conscious of being looked at--in a word, self-conscious. One is visible and not ready to be visible . . . (p. 110)." But shame, Erikson (1963) maintains, is actually

> . . . rage turned against the self. He who is ashamed would like to force the world not to look at him, not to notice his exposure. He would like to destroy the eyes of the world. Instead he must wish for his own invisibility (pp. 252-253).

Such a sense of shame does not result in a sense of propriety but in a secret determination to avoid being seen or to hide shameable activities from significant others (Erikson, 1968, p. 110). The danger of this evasive tendency is that the person may estrange himself from his own sense of what is shameful. This sense may develop into a precocious conscience which is projected onto the eyes of the others. Then:

> While such a young person learns evasion from others, his precocious conscience does not let him really get away with anything, and he goes through his identity crisis habitually ashamed, apologetic, and afraid to

> be seen, or else, in an "overcompensatory" manner, he evinces a defiant kind of autonomy which may find sanction . . . in the shameless defiance of gangs (Erikson, 1968, pp. 111-112).

Since young Carl's shameful activity was the production of shameful fantasies, they were already hidden from others. He was left with a private sense of shame, which he was able to satisfy partially by attributing the fantasies to God. The youth had tried to hold back the fantasy struggling for release. But just as a child's bowels must inevitably be emptied, so it proved impossible for him to suppress the fantasy. He was caught in a dilemma characteristic of the anal stage. He had no control over the fact that there was something within him forcing its way out. And yet to let it come out would be shameful. Since what had to come out was his rejection of his father's authority, it seems appropriate that it should assume an anal form. At the anal stage of development the potential for defiance becomes actualized. The child is able to defy his parents: either by "holding on" when they wish him to produce, or "letting go" when they wish him to restrain himself. There are times when the pressure to let go is great and the child might become frustrated and enraged at the prohibitions. "Letting go" is then a release of both excrement and tension, and, at the same time, a defiant expression of autonomy.

These considerations may shed light on the feeling of grace young Carl had when he finally "let go" of his

fantasy. The tension of the conflict was released and he excused himself by attributing the act to God--an attribution which had the effect of affirming his impulses over against whatever sense of shame they might generate. These impulses might be described as expressions of the innate urge towards Self-realization; the sense of shame, mistrust, or guilt might be described as a resistance to Self-realization which develops out of the growing child's interactions with the external world. The idea that young Carl's fantasy could represent a victory of the Self over such resistances seems consistent with a comment by Erikson (1962) on the symbolic implications of anal imagery:

> During childhood, when man's ego is most of all a body-ego, composed of all pleasures and tensions experienced in major body regions, the alimentary process assumes in phantasy the character of a model of the self, nourished and poisoned, assimilating and eliminating not substances, but also good and bad influences (p. 247).

As an affirmation of his emerging Self-realization, young Carl's anal fantasy is a statement of the inevitability of the psychic alimentary process. Just as it is impossible for the body to assimilate nourishing food without at the same time assimilating some poison which must be eliminated, so it was impossible for young Carl's psyche to assimilate what was nourishing for his Self without being poisoned against his father's church. Perhaps the psyche, just as the body, sorts out what is to be

eliminated from what is to be assimilated. For young Carl's psychic health, what had to be eliminated was the church; what had to be assimilated was the will of God--in other terms "the will to be oneself." As this process received symbolic expression, young Carl experienced a sense of destiny. The stalemate between his inner impulses and the mistrust, shame, and guilt resisting them was transformed by this sense of destiny into a lifelong commitment to realizing the meaning of those impulses and pursuing the personal development which they entailed.

He had had the sense that what was forcing its way out of him was shameful, terrible, and sinful. He could not resist it but he overcame the shame of letting it come by accepting it as his fate or destiny, something which he did not invent or "think up" but which was forced upon him by God:

> The symbolism of my childhood experiences and the violence of the imagery upset me terribly. I asked myself: "Who talks like that? Who has the impudence to exhibit a phallus so nakedly, and in the shrine? Who makes me think that God destroys His Church in this abominable manner?" At last I asked myself whether it was not the devil's doing. For that it must have been God or the devil who spoke and acted in this way was something I never doubted. I felt absolutely sure that it was not myself who had invented these thoughts and images.
>
> These were the crucial experiences of my life. It was then that it dawned on me: I must take the responsibility, it is up to me how my fate turns out. I had been confronted with a problem to which I had to find the answer. And who posed the problem? Nobody ever answered me that. I knew I had to find the answer out of my deepest self, that I was alone

> before God, and that God alone asked me these terrible things.. . . Nobody could rob me of the conviction that it was enjoined upon me to do what God wanted and not what I wanted. That gave me the strength to go my own way (Jung, 1965, pp. 47-48).

"Going his own way" meant not relying on the resources of the extant religious tradition but on himself, on his "inner" or "secret" resources. For him that also meant not relying on his father:

> I would have liked to lay my religious difficulties before him and ask him for advice, but I did not do so because it seemed to me that I knew in advance what he would be obliged to reply out of respect for his office (Jung, 1965, p. 52).

In young Carl's view, his father had adjusted to theological convention rather than to the living God. This idea was confirmed when he encountered some of the social institutions over which his father presided.

An "Identity Crisis"

At twelve, young Carl was at the age when for most boys, in most cultures, there is a process of initiation by means of which they are taught these social customs and beliefs which will guide their continuing development as young men. For this boy, living in the Swiss countryside in the late nineteenth century, the trustee of initiation was the church and the local master of initiation was his own father. For young Carl there was a conflict between the church's initiation and the process of development emerging within him. His confirmation

in the teachings of the church confirmed only his assumption about the futility of discussing his religious difficulties with his father: "My father personally gave me my instruction for confirmation. It bored me to death (Jung, 1965, p. 53)." But the young boy did look forward with eager anticipation to his instruction on the Trinity. This doctrine of a oneness which was simultaneously a threeness fascinated the youth because of its inner contradiction. However, when the moment arrived, his father disappointed him, saying "We now come to the Trinity, but we'll skip that, for I really understand nothing of it myself (Jung 1965, p. 53)." The boy had to admire his father's honesty but he also concluded that it would be useless to talk with his father about his secret experiences.

He reached a similar conclusion when it came time for his first communion. The idea that by eating the bread and drinking the wine the participants were incorporating the Lord Jesus seemed so preposterous that the boy felt there must be some great mystery behind it. Now he was to participate in this great mystery. Waiting his turn and watching his father officiate, the boy could see nothing unusual happening to the participants, who remained emotionless as they went through the ritual. And then:

Suddenly my turn came. I ate the bread; it tasted

> flat, as I had expected. The wine, of which I took only the smallest sip, was thin and rather sour, plainly not of the best. Then came the final prayer, and the people went out, neither depressed nor illumined with joy, but with faces that said, "So that's that (Jung, 1965, p. 54)."

In the following days, the young boy came to realize that, in comparison to his secret experiences, nothing significant had happened in this event to which the church and his father attached such great importance:

> I had reached the pinnacle of religious initiation, had expected something--I knew not what--to happen, and nothing at all had happened. I knew that God could do stupendous things to me, things of fire and unearthly light; but this ceremony contained no trace of God--not for me, at any rate. . . . Slowly I came to understand that this communion had been a fatal experience for me. It had proved hollow; more than that, it had proved to be a total loss. I knew that I would never again be able to participate in this ceremony. "Why, that is not religion at all," I thought. "It is an absence of God; the church is a place I should not go to. It is not life which is there, but death" (Jung, 1965, pp. 54-55).

His earthly father had tried to initiate him through a conventional ritual and had fallen far short of what the Father Above had already wrought. The result:

> I was seized with the most vehement pity for my father. All at once I understood the tragedy of his profession and his life. He was struggling with a death whose existence he could not admit. An abyss had opened between him and me, and I saw no possibility of ever bridging it, for it was infinite in extent (Jung, 1965, p. 55).

The young boy not only felt cut off from his father but from the church and from the human world as well:

> My sense of union with the Church and with the human world, so far as I knew it, was shattered. I had, so it seemed to me, suffered the greatest defeat of my life. The religious outlook which I imagined constituted my sole meaningful relation with the universe had disintegrated; I could no longer participate in the general faith, but found myself involved in something inexpressible, in my secret, which I could share with no one. It was terrible and--this was the worst of it--vulgar and ridiculous also, a diabolical mockery (Jung, 1965, p. 56).

These passages correspond to Erikson's descriptions of the adolescent identity crisis. The adolescent's struggle for identity normally has a guardian in that social institution which Erikson terms "ideology." Erikson (1962) defines ideology:

> . . . an unconscious tendency underlying religious and scientific as well as political thought: the tendency at a given time . . . to create a world image convincing enough to support the collective and the individual sense of identity. . . (p. 22).

This tendency to form a world view becomes institutionalized as an "ideological system": "a coherent body of shared images, ideas, and ideals which . . . provides for the participants a coherent, . . . overall orientation in space and time, in means and ends (Erikson, 1968, p. 190)." Such an ideological system establishes a sort of group identity which offers the young individual something to identify with--a collective structure and support capable of satisfying his need for an identity.

But young Carl was unable to find such collective support in the ideology of the church. Among those functions which Erikson (1968) ascribes to an ideology,

the following seem especially pertinent to the needs of young Carl:

> . . . offering youth. . . some strongly felt correspondence between the inner world of ideals and evils with its goals and dangers; . . . and an inducement to a collective experimentation with roles and techniques which help overcome a sense of inhibition and personal guilt . . . (pp. 187-188).

Unable to find such a correspondence or inducement in the church, and without an alternative ideological institution, young Carl felt cut-off from society. He was able to overcome his sense of inhibition and guilt partially by attributing to God those inner experiences which had caused his alienation from society:

> I had not invented that thought about God and the cathedral, still less the dream that had befallen me at the age of three. A stronger will than mine had imposed both on me. Had nature been responsible? But nature was nothing other than the will of the Creator. Nor did it help to accuse the devil, for he too was a creature of God. God alone was real--an annihilating fire and an indescribable grace.
>
> What about the failure of Communion to affect me? Was that my own failure? I had prepared for it in all earnestness, had hoped for an experience of grace and illumination, and nothing had happened. God had been absent. For God's sake I had found myself cut off from the Church and from my father's and everybody else's faith (Jung, 1965, p. 56).

It seems that he was resolving his guilt feelings by transferring them to the Father Above (and Within).

It was the authority of this Father that Jung feared and respected, and to which he submitted. One of the functions which Erikson attributes to ideological institutions is that of offering youth an opportunity for submission to leaders who are above the ambivalence

of the parent-child relationship. One of the reasons for the failure of young Carl's submission to the church was the fact that the leader of the church was his own father. Unable or unwilling to submit to the authority of this earthly father, he took his powerful inner experiences as the directions of a Higher Father and submitted to Him. This identification with a Higher Father mitigated the guilt he felt for rejecting the authority of his earthly father. After all, he was submitting to God--his father's Father--whose authority transcended that of every earthly father:

> Often I had the feeling that in all decisive matters I was no longer among men, but was alone with God. And when I was "there," where I was no longer alone, I was outside time; I belonged to the centuries; and He who then gave answer was He who had always been, who had been before my birth. He who always is there. These talks with the "Other" were my profoundest experiences: on the one hand a bloody struggle, and on the other supreme ecstasy (Jung, 1965, p. 48).

This choice of an authority, or higher Father, was crucial for Carl's development. Earthly fathers lead their children out into the world and teach them how to become members of the earthly society. A heavenly father within leads one inwards. Young Carl identified with his God, not with his church, and so committed himself to loneliness.

He kept his experiences a secret:

> Sometimes I had an overwhelming urge to speak . . . only to hint that there were some curious things about me which no one knew of. . . . It would never

> have occurred to me to speak of my experience openly, not of my dream of the phallus in the underground temple, not of my carved manikin. . . . My entire youth can be understood in terms of this secret. It induced in me an almost unendurable loneliness. My one great achievement during those years was that I resisted the temptation to talk about it with anyone. Thus the pattern of my relationship to the world was already prefigured: today as then I am a solitary because I know things and must hint at things which other people do not know, and usually do not even want to know (Jung, 1965, p. 42).

Already this child had the sense of being isolated by a special knowledge. This sense was to accompany him throughout his life. At the age of eighty-five Jung wrote:

> As a child I felt myself to be alone, and I am still, because I know things and must hint at things which others apparently know nothing of, and for the most part do not want to know. . . . The loneliness began with the experiences of my early dreams, and reached its climax at the time I was working on the unconscious. If a man knows more than others, he becomes lonely (Jung, 1965, p. 356).

As a youth, Carl Jung had found his sense of identity within himself and not within a human community. The social sense of "belonging" which accompanies a successful initiation was missing in his development and was replaced by his sense of belonging to the centuries.

This was the way in which he overcame his adolescent identity crisis. In Jung's memoirs, his development for the next twenty to twenty-five years seems relatively free of crises. Jung found a social identity, as a psychiatrist, which he could affirm wholeheartedly and became a distinguished researcher as well as a highly successful

practitioner. In 1907 he met Sigmund Freud and in a few years became Freud's chosen successor as the leader of the psychoanalytic movement. But his relationship with Freud was ill-fated. Their separation was the precipitating factor which led to Jung's "creative illness." Therefore, as a preface to my discussion of this moratorium in Jung's development, I will consider certain aspects of their relationship. Jung described their relationship as similar to a father-son relationship. In some ways it was a repetition of the conflicts which characterized his relationship with his own father. In describing these conflicts I will not attempt to do justice to the many-faceted complexity of the historic relationship between Freud and Jung. My intention is only to describe those experiences recalled by Jung which suggest that he was reliving, in his relationship with Freud, some of the conflicts which had developed in his relationship with his father. As these conflicts came to a head when Pastor Paul was dying, I will begin my discussion of Carl Jung's "creative illness" by describing his reaction to his father's fatal illness.

VIII. JUNG'S "CREATIVE ILLNESS"

> What has been spoiled by the father
> can only be made good by a father,
> just as what has been spoiled by the
> mother can only be repaired by a mother.
>
> --C. G. Jung
> (1953-1971, v. 9i, p. 102)

> The psyche is part of the inmost
> mystery of life, and it has its
> own peculiar structure and form . . .
> The structure . . . is the mother,
> the matrix--the form into which all
> experience is poured. The father,
> on the other hand, represents the
> dynamism of the archetype, for the
> archetype consists of both--form and
> energy.
>
> --C. G. Jung
> (1953-1971, v 9i, p. 102)

The Death of Jung's Father

I have described some of Jung's childhood dreams and daydreams as expressions of an innate potential for Self-realization struggling to overcome the crises of his psychosocial development. His sanctification of this oneiric realm--his trust in its direction and his commitment to preserving its secrecy--satisfied many of his developmental needs. As a result of his childhood experiences in this realm, young Carl came to an understanding of the human psyche which was later to provide the basis for Jung's psychology. It might be paraphrased

as follows. Our inner nature, expressing itself in our dreams and fantasies, strives blindly and against feelings of mistrust, shame, guilt or inferiority to grow through the stages and crises of life towards its final goal: Self-realization or individuation. It does this without regard for conventional ethics or ideologies and with a force that overpowers the resistance of the ego. To the ego this agency seems not only overpowering, but frighteningly amoral and destructive. If the ego does not sumbit it may itself be destroyed. Jung felt that this is what happened to his father.

He described his father as a pastor who was consumed by inward doubts which he could not accept. He was a man taking refuge from himself in the sterile religion of which he was a minister. When this defense weakened, the man himself succumbed to a fatal illness, which his son suspected was psychosomatic. His father's unrest had a powerful effect on the young man. Reflecting on it, Jung recognizes that he had reacted more to the atmosphere of his parental environment than to any particular aspect of his relationship with his parents. His secret experiences were reactions to this atmosphere and compensated for its conflicts and tensions. And so it was with his father's religious doubts. Though he never discussed them openly with his son they put him in a state of unrest which communicated itself to the youth.

The youth's psyche reacted involuntarily with the peculiar psychic experiences and religious ideas that came to him. From his vantage point at the end of his life, it seemed to Jung (1965) that these compensatory childhood experiences had "paved the way for modes of adaptation to my father's religious collapse as well as to the shattering revelation of the world as we see it today (p. 91)." Jung felt that as a child he had been prepared by his unconscious psyche to adapt to the collective problems of the age in which he was to live his adulthood--the troubled first half of the twentieth century, which was to witness the continuing collapse of the Christian tradition and the phenomenon of mass-minded totalitarianism.

Pastor Paul Jung was not so well prepared. He tried to deny his own doubts, clinging desperately to his crumbling conventional religiosity. In his son's eyes, he tried to adjust to convention rather than to God and thus betrayed himself. For he developed more respect for convention than for his own experience. It was a project destined for tragedy, serving only as a lesson for his son, who stood witness to his collapse. When this son was near the end of his own vastly more successful life he made the following assessment of Pastor Paul Jung:

> As a country parson he lapsed into a sort of sentimental idealism and into reminiscences of his golden student days, continued to smoke a long student's

> pipe, and discovered that his marriage was not all he had imagined it to be. He did a great deal of good--far too much--and as a result was usually irritable. Both parents made great efforts to live devout lives, with the result that there were angry scenes between them only too frequently. These difficulties, understandably enough, later shattered my father's faith (Jung, 1965, pp. 91-92).

While Carl Jung was in his late teens, Pastor Paul's irritability and discontent increased to the point where he was often given to outbursts of rage. His wife and son grew concerned and tried to avoid upsetting him. He had complained for a number of years about abdominal pains, although his doctor had been unable to diagnose it. Now he complained about the sensation of having "stones in the abdomen" and the doctor became quite concerned. Young Carl was convinced that he was really suffering from religious doubts, and in spite of the danger of upsetting him further, would sometimes try to strike up a conversataon about his religious ideas.

There probably was some hostility mixed with his concern and curiosity. Jung (1965) remembers that, although it was the wisest course not to engage him in disputes, "often I could not keep my own temper in check. I would remain passive during his outbursts of rage, but when he seemed to be in a more accessible mood I sometimes tried to strike up a conversation with him (p. 92)." Yet he also hoped to help him:

> I saw that my critical questions made him sad, but I nevertheless hoped for a constructive talk, since it appeared almost inconceivable to me that he

should not have had experience of God, the most evident of all experiences. I knew enough about epistemology to realize that knowledge of this sort could not be proved, but it was equally clear to me that it stood in no more need of proof than the beauty of a sunset or the terrors of the night. I tried, no doubt very clumsily, to convey these obvious truths to him, with the hopeful intention of helping him to bear the fate which had inevitably befallen him. He had to quarrel with somebody, so he did it with his family and himself. Why didn't he do it with God, the dark author of all created things, who alone was responsible for the sufferings of the world? God would assuredly have sent him by way of an answer one of those magical, infinitely profound dreams which He had sent to me even without being asked, and which had sealed my fate (Jung, 1965, p. 92).

In the following recollection of the boy's abortive struggle to present his secret knowledge of God to his father there is a remarkable convergence of the powerful contradictory emotions which this effort entailed--a sense of superiority and of pathetic inadequacy, a disrespect for his father and compassion for him:

> This was a great secret which I dared not and could not reveal to my father. I might have been able to reveal it had he been capable of understanding the direct experience of God. But in my talks with him I never got that far, never even came within sight of the problem, because I always set about it in a very unpsychological and intellectual way, and did everything possible to avoid the emotional aspects. Each time this approach was like a red rag to a bull and led to irritable reactions which were incomprehensible to me. I was unable to understand how a perfectly rational argument could meet with such emotional resistance.
>
> These fruitless discussions exasperated my father and me, and in the end we abandoned them, each burdened with his own specific feeling of inferiority. Theology had alienated my father and me from one another. I felt that I had once again suffered a fatal defeat, though I sensed I was not alone. I had a dim premonition that he was inescapably succumbing to his fate (Jung, 1965, p. 93).

XUM

The end came when Carl was twenty. He had come home at the conclusion of a school session and was present when his father died. Jung (1965) remembers the days that followed as powerful and gloomy and recalls a remarkable communication from his mother:

> Once my mother spoke to me or to the surrounding air in her "second" voice and remarked, "He died in time for you." Which appeared to mean,"You did not understand each other and he might have become a hindrance to you" (p. 96).

Jung recalls that the words "for you" hit him terribly hard. He "felt that a bit of the old days had now come irrevocably to an end (Jung, 1965, p. 96)." But a conflicting emotion also emerged. He felt a bit of manliness and freedom, which was actualized in the fact that he moved into his father's room and took his place in the family.

That the young man may have felt some guilt over his pleasure in this new position is suggested by a dream he had six weeks after his father's death (Jung, 1965, pp. 96-97). In this dream his father suddenly stood before him and said that he was coming back from his holiday. He had made a good recovery and was now coming home. Carl thought he would be annoyed with him for having moved into his room. But he was not. Nevertheless, the young man felt ashamed because he had imagined that his father was dead. That this dream may be a reflection of guilt feelings seems corroborated by the fact that it was

repeated two days later and again provoked the young man to reproach himself for having thought that his father was dead. He was now free of his father's unrest and free to take his place in the family. But he was not free from the sense of guilt which had plagued him throughout his youth. Although Carl could blame his father's demise on a failure to accept his own nature, the knowledge that he had failed to help him seems to have colored his new freedom with a sense of guilt. The dream seems to compensate for these feelings, as his father dismisses the young man's apologies. But his guilt lingered on.

Perhaps we may find in these unresolved guilt feelings the motive for Jung's future work. It could be that Jung made up for failing to help his father by solving in his own life and in his work the problems his father couldn't solve. A sense of guilt may develop into a degree of Self-restriction capable of destroying the initiative necessary for creative work. But Jung's work may have been a creative means of doing something about his guilt. Perhaps he transformed his sense of guilt into a sense of obligation which justified his initiative and liberated his creativity. This mode of resolution may have found theoretical expression in his theory of archetypes. The archetypes could be understood as problems passed on to us by our ancestors. Perhaps his psychological theory is itself a way of accepting

and carrying forward the life of his father (and, for that matter, the life of his previous ancestors as well). In a sense, then, the will of the Father Above and Within was identical with the unfinished tasks of his earthly father (or fathers). His conception of archetypal situations as inherited and unconscious may have been due to the fact that his father never expressed his problems directly to Carl. Instead the young man picked up the unrest in the atmosphere and, with it, a sense that he had to fight out "inherited" psychic battles, that he belonged to the past as much as to the present, and that his seemingly personal problems were actually transpersonal or "collective."

Freud as Father

As I suggested above, some of the problems Jung experienced in his relationship with his father were actualized again in his relationship with Freud. I do not intend to examine their relationship in detail--only to demonstrate how, in his relationship with Freud, Jung was reliving, and attempting to resolve, an archetypal developmental crisis which had been evoked in his relationship with his own father and only partially resolved.

To Jung, Freud sometimes seemed as obsessed with his psychoanalytic "dogma" as Pastor Paul Jung had been with his theological dogma:

> There was no mistaking the fact that Freud was emotionally involved in his sexual theory to an extraordinary degree. When he spoke of it, his tone became urgent, almost anxious, and all signs of his normally critical and skeptical manner vanished. A strange, deeply moved expression came over his face, the cause of which I was at a loss to understand. I had a strong intuition that for him sexuality was a sort of numinosum. This was confirmed by a conversation which took place some three years later (in 1910), again in Vienna.
>
> I can still recall vividly how Freud said to me, "My dear Jung, promise me never to abandon the sexual theory. That is the most essential thing of all. You see, we must make a dogma of it, an unshakable bulwark." He said that to me with great emotion, in the tone of a father saying, "And promise me this one thing, my dear son: that you will go to church every Sunday." In some astonishment I asked him, "A bulwark--against what?" To which he replied, "Against the black tide of mud"--and here he hesitated for a moment, then added--"of occultism." First of all, it was the words "bulwark" and "dogma" that alarmed me; for a dogma, that is to say, an indisputable confession of faith, is set up only when the aim is to suppress doubts once and for all. But that no longer has anything to do with scientific judgment; only with a personal power drive.
>
> This was the thing that struck at the heart of our friendship. I knew that I would never be able to accept such an attitude (Jung, 1965, p. 150).

But Jung was unable to react effectively to Freud's attitude:

> In the face of such deep convictions one generally becomes shy and reticent. After a few stammering attempts on my part, the conversation soon came to an end.
>
> I was bewildered and embarrased (Jung, 1965, p. 151).

His uneasiness might be understood as a reflection of the situation in which he was caught. Jung respected Freud greatly and was in the position of a pupil. He felt that Freud's attitude was wrong but that he, Jung, was inferior in terms of knowledge and experience and so gave up his thoughts of correcting the master. He

thereby submitted, if only superficially and with an inner reservation, to Freud's authority. Caught again in a situation from which his father's death had once liberated him, the young doctor felt embarrassed and bewildered. Once again he felt obliged to correct a paternal authority, but once again he was unable to do so.

Perhaps it is a reflection of this pattern that Jung eventually came to understand Freud as he had understood his father--a tragic figure. The remarkable similarity between his perception of his father and his perception of Freud is apparent in the following description of Freud as a man who was plagued by an inner conflict as inescapable as the conflict which destroyed Pastor Paul Jung:

> Much later, when I reflected upon Freud's character .... There was one characteristic of his that preoccupied me above all: his bitterness. It had struck me at our first encounter, but it remained inexplicable to me until I was able to see it in connection with his attitude toward sexuality. Although, for Freud, sexuality was undoubtedly a numinosum, his terminology and theory seemed to define it exclusively as a biological function. It was only the emotionality with which he spoke of it that revealed the deeper elements reverberating within him. Basically, he wanted to teach--or so at least it seemed to me--that, regarded from within, sexuality included spirituality and had an intrinsic meaning. But his concretistic terminology was too narrow to express this idea. He gave me the impression that at the bottom he was working against his own goal and against himself; and there is, after all, no harsher bitterness than that of a person who is his own worst enemy. In his own words, he felt himself menaced by a "black tide of mud"--he who more than anyone else had tried to let down his buckets into those black depths.
>
> Freud never asked himself why he was compelled to

> talk continually of sex, why this idea had taken such possession of him. He remained unaware that his "monotony of interpretation" expressed a flight from himself, or from that other side of him which might perhaps be called mystical. So long as he refused to acknowledge that side, he could never be reconciled with himself. He was blind toward the paradox and ambiguity of the contents of the unconscious, and did not know that everything which arises out of the unconscious has a top and a bottom, an inside and an outside. When we speak of the outside--and that is what Freud did--we are considering only half of the whole, with the result that a counter-effect arises out of the unconscious.
>
> There was nothing to be done about this one-sidedness of Freud's. Perhaps some inner experience of his own might have opened his eyes; but then his intellect would have reduced any such experience to "mere sexuality" or "psychosexuality." He remained the victim of the one aspect he could recognize, and for that reason I seem him as a tragic figure. . . (Jung, 1965, pp. 151-153).

And Jung was powerless in the face of this tragic figure. As he failed his father, so Jung was to fail Freud.

A unique opportunity for dealing with these problems presented itself to Jung. In 1909 he and Freud travelled together to the United States. The trip lasted seven weeks. They were together every day and analyzed each other's dreams. But, just as Pastor Paul had refused to listen to his son's advice, so Freud put restrictions on Jung's analysis:

> Freud had a dream--I would not think it right to air the problem it involved. I interpretated it as best I could, but added that a great deal more could be said about it if he would supply me with some additional details from his private life. Freud's response to these words was a curious look--a look of the utmost suspicion. Then he said, "But I cannot risk my authority!" At that moment he lost it altogether. That sentence burned itself into my memory; and in it the end of our relationship was already foreshadowed. Freud was placing personal

authority above truth (Jung, 1965, p. 158).

Perhaps Freud lost his authority because he exhibited the same kind of defensive behavior which had eroded the authority of Jung's father.

Nevertheless, Freud for a time was like a father to Jung. Jung (1965) recalls that he enjoyed the father-son quality of their mutual analysis:

> At this time I had a number of important ones /dreams/, but Freud could make nothing of them. I did not regard this as any reflection upon him, for it sometimes happens to the best analyst that he is unable to unlock the riddle of a dream. It was a human failure, and I would never have wanted to discontinue our dream analysis on that account. On the contrary, they meant a great deal to me, and I found our relationship exceedingly valuable. I regarded Freud as an older, more experienced personality, and felt like a son in that respect (p. 158).

It seems clear that Jung wanted to learn from Freud and that he did not want to jeopardize their relationship. Although he found Freud's interpretations unsatisfactory, he continued to submit dreams for analysis.

This submission to Freud of experiences he had long held private may have been influenced by the unconscious activity of a "father complex." The importance of the father for human development has been movingly described by Erikson (1962):

> . . . children become aware of the attributes of maleness, and learn to love men's physical touch and guiding voice, at about the time when they have the first courage for an autonomous existence--autonomous from the maternal matrix in which they only <u>seem</u> to want to remain forever. Fathers, if

> they know how to hold and guide a child, function somewhat like guardians of the child's autonomous existence. Something passes from the man's bodily presence into the child's budding self. . . . For there is something which only a father can do, which is, I think, to balance the threatening and forbidding aspects of his appearance and impression with the guardianship of the guiding voice. Next to the recognition bestowed by the gracious face, the affirmation of the guiding voice is a prime element of man's sense of identity. Here the question is not so much whether in the judgment of others the father is a good model or a bad one, but whether or not he is tangible and affirmative. Intangibly good fathers are the worst.
>
> As we grow beyond our early childhood, more and more classes of men become the "fathers" of our newly-acquired insights and techniques: grandfathers, uncles, neighbors, and fatherly teachers (p. 124).

This "fathering" is something we seek in the various "fathers" we meet and greater than a nostalgia for our childhood father. Erikson (1962) cites Thomas Wolfe's description of this striving:

> . . . the deepest search in life, it seemed to me, the thing that in one way or another was central to all living was man's search to find a father, not merely the father of his flesh, not merely the lost father of his youth, but the image of a strength and wisdom external to his need and superior to his hunger, to which the belief and power of his own life could be united (p. 123).

In this passage Wolfe gives poetic expression to what, in the Jungian framework, might be described as an archetypal complex.

As a structure of becoming, the "father archetype" is an expression of the individual's need to be fathered and of his instinctual capacity to enter into a relationship with a father figure. When this need is unsatisfied, it

forms a complex of father-images and corresponding behavioral patterns which may be projected in relationships with various father-figures. Erikson (1962) has described how Luther projected this need and capacity onto the "Heavenly Father" and, by entering into a relationship with his God, fulfilled his father-needs. I have described how Jung as a child entered into a similar relationship with the "Heavenly Father." Here I am suggesting that some of his needs to be fathered were reactivated in his relationship with Freud, particularly in their mutual analysis, and that this is one reason why Jung was moved to submit to Freud's analysis even though he disagreed with it. In his adolescence, Jung's father and his father's ideology proved inadequate for his needs. I have described how certain of his experiences at that time may be understood as compensations which led Jung to find a Father Above and Within who gave him the sense of identity he needed. Yet this left him feeling isolated and lonely. He still lacked that sense of interpersonal confirmation which only a tangible father can provide. Now he had found a paternal figure who commanded his respect and whose ideology he could affirm, at least in part. And so his relationship with Freud took on the characteristics of an adolescent father-son or master-initiate relationship.

Yet his differences with Freud were fundamental

and beneath the surface the inevitable break was brewing. Jung (1965) recalls that the conflict was compounded because

> Freud frequently made allusions indicating that he regarded me as his successor. These hints were embarrassing to me, for I knew that I would never be able to uphold his views properly, that is to say, as he intended them. On the other hand I had not yet succeeded in working out my criticisms in such a manner that they would carry any weight with him, and my respect for him was too great for me to want to force him to come finally to grips with my own ideas (p. 157).

Jung was to be a son of Freud's only temporarily--in the service of his own Self-realization and not primarily in the service of Freud's ideas.

From the very beginning of their relationship, at the same time Jung was relating to Freud as to a father, he was also trying to formulate a critical perspective on Freud's ideas. In 1909, during the period of their mutual analysis, Jung was preoccupied with certain questions about Freud's psychology:

> They were: On what premises is Freudian psychology founded? To what category of human thought does it belong? What is the relationship of its almost exclusive personalism to general historical assumptions? (Jung, 1965, p. 161).

He had a dream which was to provide an answer for these questions:

> This was the dream. I was in a house I did not know, which had two stories. It was "my house." I found myself in the upper story, where there was a kind of salon furnished with fine old pieces in rococo style. On the walls hung a number of precious paintings. I wondered that this should be my house,

and thought, "Not bad." But then it occurred to me that I did not know what the lower floor looked like. Descending the stairs, I reached the ground floor. There everything was much older, and I realized that this part of the house must date from about the fifteenth or sixteenth century. The furnishings were medieval; the floors were of red brick. Everywhere it was rather dark. I went from one room to another, thinking, "Now I really must explore the whole house." I came upon a heavy door, and opened it. Beyond it, I discovered a stone stairway that led down into the cellar. Descending again, I found myself in a beautifully vaulted room which looked exceedingly ancient. Examining the walls, I discovered layers of brick among the ordinary stone blocks, and chips of brick in the mortar. As soon as I saw this I knew that the walls dated from Roman times. My interest by now was intense. I looked more closely at the floor. It was of stone slabs, and in one of these I discovered a ring. When I pulled it, the stone slab lifted, and again I saw a stairway of narrow stone steps leading down into the depths. These, too, I descended, and entered a low cave cut into the rock. Thick dust lay on the floor, and in the dust were scattered bones and broken pottery, like remains of a primitive culture. I discovered two human skulls, obviously very old and half disintegrated. Then I awoke (Jung, 1965, pp. 158-159).

Jung presented this dream to Freud. In recalling their work on the dream, Jung is quite candid about the duplicity which their relationship seemed to require of him. He was afraid of losing Freud's friendship and preferred to listen to Freud's ideas rather than to assert his own unsure thoughts. But this could only be accomplished with a lie:

> What chiefly interested Freud in this dream were the two skulls. He returned to them repeatedly, and urged me to find a wish in connection with them. What did I think about these skulls? And whose were they? I knew perfectly well, of course, what he was driving at: that secret death-wishes were concealed in the dream. "But what does he

> really expect of me?" I thought to myself. Toward whom would I have death-wishes? I felt violent resistance to any such interpretation. I also had some intimation of what the dream might really mean. But I did not then trust my own judgment, and wanted to hear Freud's opinion. I wanted to learn from him. Therefore I submitted to his intention and said, "My wife and my sister-in-law"--after all, I had to name someone whose death was worth the wishing!
>
> I was newly married at the time and knew perfectly well that there was nothing within myself which pointed to such wishes. But I would not have been able to present to Freud my own ideas on an interpretation of the dream without encountering incomprehension and vehement resistance. I did not feel up to quarreling with him, and I also feared that I might lose his friendship if I insisted on my own point of view. On the other hand, I wanted to know what he would make of my answer, and what his reaction would be if I deceived him by saying something that suited his theories. And so I told him a lie.
>
> I was quite aware that my conduct was not above reproach, but a la guerre, comme a la guerre! It would have been impossible for me to afford him any insight into my mental world. The gulf between it and his was too great. In fact Freud seemed greatly relieved by my reply. I saw from this that he was completely helpless in dealing with certain kinds of dreams and had to take refuge in his doctrine. I realized that it was up to me fo find out the real meaning of the dream (Jung, 1965, pp. 159-160).

The "real meaning of the dream" is perhaps less evident than the real meaning of the interaction between Freud and Jung. Jung might have revealed his feelings to Freud. He might have told Freud that he did not feel free to express his own ideas when they were together. This would have brought the dynamics of their relationship out into the open and the two men might have worked through some of their interpersonal problems. But Jung did not do so. Nor did he offer his own ideas about the dream. Perhaps his behavior can be understood as a desire to

maintain the sonship role he had assumed with Freud. Jung may have been submitting more to the archetype which was governing their relationship than to Freud the person. Jung needed and wanted to be a son. If he had expressed his own ideas or his feelings it would have endangered his "favourite son" position.

Yet his behavior could also be considered a means of overcoming Freud's paternalism. If he were relating more to the archetype than to the man, then he was circumventing the authority of the man for the authority of a factor within himself. If he had brought his feelings out into the open he might not have been able to defend them. Freud might have persuaded Jung to re-evaluate his attitudes. Or Freud might have rejected Jung for having such feelings. In any case, Freud would have gained authority within their relationship. By keeping his feelings hidden, Jung was maintaining his independence of Freud. But he was also increasing the distance between them.

His growing independence was synonymous with the first inklings of his own psychology. Jung (1965) understood the "real meaning of the dream" to be a prefiguration of his conception of the psyche:

> It was plain to me that the house represented a kind of image of the psyche--that is to say, of my then state of conscousness, with hitherto unconscious additions. Consciousness was represented by the salon. It had an inhabited atmosphere, in spite

of its antiquated style.

The ground floor stood for the first level of the unconscious. The deeper I went, the more alien and the darker the scene became. In the cave, I discovered remains of a primitive culture, that is, the world of the primitive man within myself--a world which can scarcely be reached or illuminated by consciousness. The primitive psyche of man borders on the life of the animal soul, just as the caves of prehistoric times were usually inhabited by animals before man laid claim to them (p. 160).

My dream thus constituted a kind of structural diagram of the human psyche; it postulated something of an altogether impersonal nature underlying that psyche. It "clicked," as the English have it--and the dream became for me a guiding image which in the days to come was to be corroborated to an extent I could not at first suspect. It was my first inkling of a collective a priori beneath the personal psyche. This I first took to be the traces of earlier modes of functioning. Later, with increasing experience and on the basis of more reliable knowledge, I recognized them as forms of instinct, that is, as archetypes (p. 161).

The dream also helped him to understand the difference between Freud and himself:

During this period I became aware of how keenly I felt the difference between Freud's intellectual attitude and mine. I had grown up in the intensely historical atmosphere of Basel at the end of the nineteenth century, and had acquired, thanks to reading the old philosophers, some knowledge of the history of psychology. When I thought about dreams and the contents of the unconscious, I never did so without making historical comparisons; in my student days I always used Krug's old dictionary of philosophy. I was especially familiar with the writers of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Theirs was the world which had formed the atmosphere of my first-story salon. By contrast, I had the impression that Freud's intellectual history began with Buchner, Moleschott, Su Bois-Reymond, and Darwin.

The dream pointed out that there were further reaches to the stage of consciousness I have just described: the long uninhabited ground floor in medieval style, then the Roman cellar, and finally

> the prehistoric cave. These signified past times and passed stages of consciousness (Jung, 1965, pp. 160-161).

It therefore became an answer for Jung to the questions he had been raising about Freudian psychology. The premises and assumptions underlying its "almost exclusive personalism" were to be found in cultural history. But there were further reaches to the foundations of modern consciousness than Freud was aware of.

The means for transcending Freud's reductionism now became clear to Jung. The dream-image of the house guided him to the concept of the collective unconscious and its archetypes, which became the basis for his constructive or synthetic method. But for Jung this insight was also a means for transcending his relationship with Freud. Now it was not necessary for Jung to dismiss Freud's ideas in order to make room for his own. It was possible to develop an historical perspective which showed Freud's relative position in the history of human culture. It was not necessary for Jung to prove Freud wrong, but simply a question of understanding the historical limits of Freud's thought. Jung did not have to violate his respect for Freud, his agreement with many of Freud's ideas, or his gratitude for Freud's guidance in order to express a point of view distinct from Freud's. Developing this transpersonal orientation was Jung's way of resolving the conflict between loyalty and independent

creativity which plagued his second sonship. It was also a way of affirming his own roots. Jung must have gained a renewed sense of identity by differentiating himself from Freud in terms of his educational background. He was affirming the whole of his life as that which had made him an individual with his own insights into human psychology.

In Eriksonian terms, Jung has liberated his initiative and re-established his sense of identity. His energy was freed and given some direction. There now began a period of great intellectual excitement. The dream of the house revived his interest in ancient cultures and, when he returned to Zurich, he became passionately absorbed in reading everything he could find on archaeology, mythology, and anthropology. This feverish reading stirred-up new ideas in Jung but they remained confused and chaotic until he discovered the fantasies of an American woman, "Miss Miller," published by his friend, Theodore Flournoy:

> I was immediately struck by the mythological character of the fantasies. They operated like a catalyst upon the stored-up and still disorderly ideas within me. Gradually, there formed out of them, and out of the knowledge of myths I had acquired, my book The Psychology of the Unconscious (Jung, 1965, pp. 162-163).

This was the work which led to the final separation between Jung and Freud.

Consequently, it is understandable that Jung (1965) recalls: "While I was working on this book, I had dreams

which presaged the forthcoming break with Freud (p. 163)."

He reveals one of the more important of these dreams:

> One of the most significant had its scene in a mountainous region on the Swiss-Austrian border. It was toward evening, and I saw an elderly man in the uniform of an Imperial Austrian customs official. He walked past, somewhat stooped, without paying any attention to me. His expression was peevish, rather melancholic and vexed. There were other persons present, and someone informed me that the old man was not really there, but was the ghost of a customs official who had died years ago. "He is one of those who still couldn't die properly." That was the first part of the dream (Jung, 1965, p. 163).

Jung associated the Austrian customs official with Freud and interpreted the dream as a compensation for his filial attitude towards Freud. He was still projecting the father archetype onto Freud, exaggerating Freud's stature in their relationship, and suppressing his own criticisms. This left him with divided feelings about continuing his relationship with Freud. The dream was a reaction to his situation and could be regarded as an unconscious attempt to correct his conscious attitude:

> I set about analyzing this dream. In connection with "customs" I at once thought of the word "censorship." In connection with "border" I thought of the border between consciousness and the unconscious on the one hand, and between Freud's views and mine on the other. The extremely rigorous customs examination at the border seemed to me an allusion to analysis. At a border suitcases are opened and examined for contraband. In the course of this examination, unconscious assumptions are discovered. As for the old customs official, his work had obviously brought him so little that was pleasurable and satisfactory that he took a sour view of the world. I could not refuse to see the analogy with Freud.

> At that time Freud had lost much of his authority for me. But he still meant to me a superior personality, upon whom I projected the father, and at the time of the dream this projection was still far from eliminated. Where such a projection occurs, we are no longer objective; we persist in a state of divided judgment. On the one hand we are dependent, and on the other we have resistances. When the dream took place I still thought highly of Freud, but at the same time I was critical of him. This divided attitude is a sign that I was still unconscious of the situation and had not come to any resolution of it. This is characteristic of all projections. The dream urged upon me the necessity of clarifying this situation.
>
> Under the impress of Freud's personality I had, as far as possible, cast aside my own judgments and repressed my criticisms. That was the prerequisite for collaborating with him. I had told myself, "Freud is far wiser and more experienced than you. For the present you must simply listen to what he says and learn from him." And then, to my own surprise, I found myself dreaming of him as a peevish official of the Imperial Austrian monarchy, as a defunct and still walking ghost of a customs inspector. . . . it was possible that the dream could be regarded as a corrective, as a compensation or antidote for my conscious high opinion and admiration. Therefore the dream recommended a rather more critical attitude toward Freud. I was distinctly shocked by it, although the final sentence of the dream seemed to me an allusion to Freud's potential immortality (Jung, 1965, pp. 163-164).

This final sentence--"He is one of those who still couldn't die properly"--might be interpreted differently. Perhaps it reflects the persistence of Jung's father complex. It was not so much that Freud was censoring Jung's creativity but that Jung was unable as yet to declare his independence from Freud. A complex of unsatisfied instinctual needs had been activated in his relationship with Freud. This relationship became characterized by the same conflict (between the desire to be "fathered," on the

one hand, and the demands of creativity and independence, on the other) which had marked his adolescent relationship with his father. The death of his father had not ended this conflict. It had only become dormant and was evoked again in his relationship with Freud. So the figure in the dream "was not really there, but was the ghost of a customs official who had died years ago." Jung was not being restrained by the person, Freud, so much as he was being inhibited by an impersonal, or archetypal, complex. This complex "still couldn't die properly" and so was lingering on in a "peevish, rather melancholic, and vexed" nature. Since Jung was projecting this complex onto Freud it served him well to equate it with Freud consciously and to re-evaluate the attitude he was taking in their relationship. This conscious realization encouraged him to pursue his work even though it was leading him beyond the boundaries of Freud's system.

His future development was prefigured in a second part of the dream:

> The dream had not reached its end with the episode of the customs offical; after a hiatus came a second and far more remarkable part. I was in an Italian city, and it was around noon, between twelve and one o'clock. A fierce sun was beating down upon the narrow streets. The city was built on hills and reminded me of a particular part of Basel, the Kohlenberg. The little streets which lead down into the valley, the Birsigtal, that runs through the city, are partly flights of steps. In the dream, one such stairway descended to Barfusserplatz. The city was Basel, and yet it was also an Italian city, something like Bergamo. It was summertime; the blazing sun stood at the zenith, and everything was bathed in an

> intense light. A crowd came streaming toward me, and I knew that the shops were closing and people were on their way home to dinner. In the midst of this stream of people walked a knight in full armor. He mounted the steps toward me. He wore a helmet of the kind that is called a basinet, with eye slits, and chain armor. Over this was a white tunic into which was woven, front and back, a large red cross.
>
> One can easily imagine how I felt: suddenly to see in a modern city, during the noonday rush hour, a crusader coming toward me. What struck me as particularly odd was that none of the many persons walking about seemed to notice him. No one turned his head or gazed after him. It was as though he were completely invisible to everyone but me. I asked myself what this apparition meant, and then it was as if someone answered me--but there was no one there to speak: "Yes, this is a regular apparition. The knight always passes by here between twelve and one o'clock, and has been doing so for a very long time /for centuries, I gathered/ and everyone knows about it"(Jung, 1965, pp. 164-165).

He came to understand this part of the dream as symbolizing the intuitions which were to lead him out of "Freud's world" and into his own:

> The knight and the customs official were contrasting figures. The customs official was shadowy, someone who "still couldn't die properly"--a fading apparition. The knight, on the other hand, was full of life and completely real. The second part of the dream was numinous in the extreme, whereas the scene on the border had been prosaic and in itself not impressive; I had been struck only by my reflections upon it.
>
> In the period following these dreams I did a great deal of thinking about the mysterious figure of the knight. But it was only much later, after I had been meditating on the dream for a long time, that I was able to get some idea of its meaning. Even in the dream, I knew that the knight belonged to the twelfth century. That was the period when alchemy was beginning and also the quest for the Holy Grail. The stories of the Grail had been of the greatest importance to me ever since I read them, at the age of fifteen, for the first time. I had an inkling that a great secret still lay hidden behind those stories. Therefore it seemed quite natural to me that the dream

> should conjure up the world of the Kinghts of the Grail and their quest--for that was, in the deepest sense, my own world, which had scarcely anything to with Freud's (Jung, 1965, p. 165).

The great secrets of Jung's "own world" were still unknown to him. He had yet to find a father who could help him give form to his intuitions. Jung (1965) writes, "My whole being was seeking for something still unknown which might confer meaning upon the banality of life (p. 165)." Freud's psychoanalytic school did not provide Jung with an ideological framework capable of guiding his quest. There was nothing left for him but to strike out on his own. He used the Miller fantasies to order and give form to his ideas and tried to demonstrate the spiritual and religious aspects of psychological phenomena which Freud had explained reductively in terms of the sexual theory:

> I planned to set down. . . my own conception of incest, the decisive transformation of the concept of libido, and various other ideas in which I differed from Freud. To me incest signified a personal complication only in the rarest cases. Usually incest has a highly religious aspect, for which reason the incest theme plays a decisive part in almost all cosmogonies and in numerous myths. But Freud clung to the literal interpretation of it and could not grasp the spiritual significance of incest as a symbol. I knew that he would never be able to accept any of my ideas on this subject (Jung, 1965, p. 167).

Knowing that Freud would reject his ideas and that publishing them might destroy their relationship, Jung found it difficult to pursue his plans. But by now he had gathered the inner strength for a declaration of

independence and went ahead:

> For two months I was unable to touch my pen, so tormented was I by the conflict. Should I keep my thoughts to myself, or should I risk the loss of so important a friendship. At last I resolved to go ahead with the writing--and it did indeed cost me Freud's friendship.
>
> After the break with Freud, all my friends and acqaintances dropped away. My book was declared to be rubbish; I was a mystic, and that settled the matter (Jung, 1965, p. 167).

The break had been created by Jung's publication of ideas that he was not yet sure of. It cost him the friendship of a man who had been a second father. Perhaps he felt somewhat confused by his own actions and the reactions they generated. He was now outside the psychoanalytic circle, which had given him his professional identity and had served as a theoretical orientation for his work. Not surprisingly, a "period of inner uncertainty" began (Jung, 1965, p. 170). Erikson might describe it as a period of "identity confusion." Perhaps such identity confusion indicates a deintegration of the Self. Jung had identified with the psychoanalytic school. Now there was a gulf between this ideology and those personal intuitions which had emerged in his own development. His identity as a psychoanalyst had been false because psychoanalysis could not recognize his individuality. Having realized the inadequacy of this identity, Jung experienced a deintegration of his psyche. He relived many of the conflicts he had integrated in his previous development. Jung emerged from this "creative illness" only after he

had once again resolved these conflicts and a new integration of his psyche was constellated.

A Father Within

During this period a "stream of fantasies" was released. Jung's understanding of these fantasies became the basis for his own psychology. I wish now to describe these fantasies in terms of their developmental significance. I have been discussing the role of a father complex in Jung's development, suggesting the factors in his relationship with Freud which reactivated it. But in describing the compensatory expressions of this complex, I have tried to illustrate how its behavior may be understood as independent and purposive--having as its core an archetypal process of Self-realization striving to be actualized. Jung at first projected this archetype onto Freud, but eventually withdrew it. This left Freud without authority, but the archetypal complex reappeared in the "stream of fantasies" reported by Jung (1965). It took the form of fatherly figures, the most prominent of which Jung named "Philemon."

Philemon first appeared to Jung in the following dream:

> There was a blue sky, like the sea, covered not by clouds but by flat brown clods of earth. It looked as if the clods were breaking apart and the blue water of the sea were becoming visible between them. But the water was the blue sky. Suddenly there appeared from the right a winged being sailing across the sky. I saw that it was an old man with the horns of a bull. He held a bunch of four keys, one of which he clutched as if he were about to open a lock. He had the wings

of the kingfisher with its characteristic colors.

Since I did not understand this dream-image, I painted it in order to impress it upon my memory (Jung, 1965, pp. 182-183).

Jung not only painted this figure, he developed a relationship with him:

> Philemon and other figures of my fantasies brought home to me the crucial insight that there are things in the psyche which I do not produce, but which produce themselves and have their own life. Philemon represented a force which was not myself. In my fantasies I held conversations with him, and he said things which I had not consciously thought. For I observed clearly that it was he who spoke, not I. He said I treated thoughts as if I generated them myself, but in his view thoughts were like animals in the forest, or people in a room, or birds in the air, and added, "If you should see people in a room, you would not think that you had made those people, or that you were responsible for them." It was he who taught me psychic objectivity, the reality of the psyche. Through him the distinction was clarified between myself and the object of my thought. He confronted me in an objective manner, and I understood that there is something in me which can say things that I do not know and intend, things which may even be directed against me.
>
> Psychologically, Philemon represented superior insight. He was a mysterious figure to me. At times he seemed to me quite real, as if he were a living personality. I went walking up and down the garden with him, and to me he was what the Indians call a guru. . . . I could have wished for nothing better than a real live guru, someone possessing superior knowledge and ability, who would have disentangled for me the involuntary creations of my imagination. This task was undertaken by the figure of Philemon, whom in this respect I had willy-nilly to recognize as my psychagogue. And the fact was that he conveyed to me many an illuminating idea.
>
> More than fifteen years later a highly cultivated Indian visited me, a friend of Ghandi's, and we talked about Indian education--in particular, about the relationship between guru and chela. I hesitantly asked him whether he could tell me anything about the person and character of his own guru, whereupon he replied in a matter-of-fact tone, "Oh yes, he was Shankaracharya."
>
> You don't mean the commentator on the Vedas who died centuries ago?" I asked.

> "Yes, I mean him," he said, to my amazement.
> "Then you are referring to a spirit?" I asked.
> "Of course it was his spirit," he agreed.
> At that moment I though of Philemon.
> "There are ghostly gurus too," he added. "Most people have living gurus. But there are always some who have a spirit for teacher."
>
> This information was both illuminating and reassuring to me. Evidently, then, I had not plummeted right out of the human world, but had only experienced the sort of thing that could happen to others who made similar efforts (Jung, 1965, pp. 183-184).

What Jung had experienced was that father, or master of initiation, he had failed to find in his encounters with living men. His needs to be fathered, to submit to the guidance of a paternal authority, were satisfied intrapsychically rather than interpersonally. Perhaps this is one reason why he stressed intrapsychic, rather than interpersonal or psychosocial, dimensions in his descriptions of personality development. But an individual like Jung, whose development becomes an intrapsychic process, does not necessarily remain cut-off from interpersonal and psychosocial processes. One only has to consider the many people for whom Jung became a father, in his therapeutic work, to realize that the intrapsychic process may be a way of liberating our interpersonal and psychosocial capacities, rather than a way of withdrawing from relationships with others or from the social context.

Through his encounters with Philemon Jung discovered an ideology he could affirm wholeheartedly. In his conversations with Philemon Jung came to the conclusion "that there are things in the psyche which I do not produce but which produce themselves and have their own life

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(Jung, 1965, p. 183)." Later, Jung referred to these phenomena as archetypes and complexes. These concepts became the foundation for his personal ideology or "myth."

The need for a "myth" was much on Jung's mind at the outset of his "creative illness":

> . . . the question arose of what, after all, I had accomplished. I had explained the myths of peoples of the past; I had written a book about the hero, the myth in which man has always lived. But in what myth does man live nowadays? In the Christian myth, the answer might be, "Do you live in it?" I asked myself. To be honest, the answer was no. For me, it is not what I live by. "Then do we no longer have any myth?" "No, evidently we no longer have any myth." "But then what is your myth--the myth in which you do live." At this point the dialogue with myself became uncomfortable, and I stopped thinking. I had reached a dead end (Jung, 1965, p. 171).

Jung also experienced this void as the need for an orientation in his work. The entire process upon which he embarked might be understood as a search for a sense of identity. To belong to a community also gives one a sense of identity, but Jung had been excluded from that social group with which he had identified--the psychoanalytic circle. Now he had to find his community within himself--in the collective unconscious. And this experience of an inner collective was to become the basis for an ideology around which a new outer collective was formed--the Society of Analytical Psychologists and others who have identified with Jung's ideas. Perhaps this Jungian orientation has stressed intrapsychic factors because it first emerged

from an intrapsychic process--the "stream of fantasies" which Jung experienced and tried to understand after his break with Freud. Some other aspects of this "creative illness" or "moratorium" will now be considered.

Play, Fantasy, and the Transcendent Function

The "stream of fantasies" was released when Jung decided to play childish building games. All his attempts to understand his sense of disorientation had failed. In an effort to overcome this impasse he resolved to do whatever occurred to him. The result is worth quoting at length:

> The first thing that came to the surface was a childhood memory from perhaps my tenth or eleventh year. At that time I had a spell of playing passionately with building blocks. I distinctly recalled how I had built little houses and castles, using bottles to form the sides of gates and vaults. Somewhat later I had used ordinary stones, with mud for mortar. These structures had fascinated me for a long time. To my astonishment, this memory was accompanied by a good deal of emotion. "Aha," I said to myself, "there is still life in these things. The small boy is still around, and possesses a creative life which I lack. But how can I make my way to it?" For as a grown man it seemed impossible to me that I should be able to bridge the distance from the present back to my eleventh year. Yet if I wanted to re-establish contact with that period, I had no choice but to return to it and take up once more that child's life with his childish games. This moment was a turning point in my fate, but I gave in only after endless resistances and with a sense of resignation. For it was a painfully humiliating experience to realize that there was nothing to be done except play childish games.
>
> Nevertheless, I began accumulating suitable stones, gathering them partly from the lake shore and partly from the water. And I started building: cottages, a castle, a whole village. The church was still missing, so I made a square building with a hexagonal

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drum on top of it, and a dome. A church also requires an altar, but I hesitated to build that.

Preoccupied with the question of how I could approach this task, I was walking along the lake as usual one day, picking stones out of the gravel on shore. Suddenly I caught sight of a red stone, a four-sided pyramid about an inch and a half high. It was a fragment of stone which had been polished into this shape by the action of the water--a pure product of chance. I knew at once: this was the altar! I placed it in the middle under the dome, and as I did so, I recalled the underground phallus of my childhood dream. This connection gave me a feeling of satisfaction.

I went on with my building game after the noon meal every day, whenever the weather permitted. As soon as I was through eating, I began playing, and continued to do so until the patients arrived; and if I finished with my work early enough in the evening I went back to building. In the course of this activity my thoughts clarified, and I was able to grasp the fantasies whose presence in myself I dimly felt.

Natually, I thought about the significance of what I was doing, and asked myself, "Now, really, what are you about? You are building a small town, and doing it as if it were a rite!" I had no answer to my question, only the inner certainty that I was on the way to discovering my own myth. For the building game was only a beginning. It released a stream of fantasies which I later carefully wrote down (Jung, 1965, pp. 173-175).

It is significant that the building game released these fantasies. Through converting his emotional stress into imagery Jung was able to overcome his sense of disorientation:

> An incessant stream of fantasies had been released, and I did my best not to lose my head but to find some way to understand these strange things. I stood helpless before an alien world; everything in it seemed difficult and incomprehensible. I was living in a constant state of tension; often I felt as if gigantic blocks of stone were tumbling down upon me. . . .
>
> I was frequently so wrought up that I had to do certain yoga exercises in order to hold my emotions in check. But since it was my purpose to know what

> was going on within myself, I would do these exercises only until I had calmed myself enough to resume my work with the unconscious. As soon as I had the feeling that I was myself again, I abandoned this restraint upon the emotions and allowed the images and inner voices to speak afresh. . . .
>
> To the extent that I managed to translate the emotions into images--that is to say, to find the images which were concealed in the emotions--I was inwardly calmed and reassured. Had I left those images hidden in the emotions, I might have been torn to pieces by them. There is a chance that I might have succeeded in splitting them off; but in that case I would inexorably have fallen into a neurosis and so been ultimately destroyed by them anyhow. As a result of my experiment I learned how helpful it can be, from the therapeutic point of view, to find the particular images which lie behind emotions (Jung, 1965, pp. 176-177).

He was learning to master the experiences which had been unleashed and which had been beyond his control.

This controlled release of fantasy could be interpreted as a means of acquiring ego mastery. Forming the emotions into images, or allowing the imagery inherent in the emotions to emerge, might be described as "active mastery of a previously passive event." The emotional stress had overwhelmed Jung's disoriented ego. But now he was exerting some control over these forces and actually doing something with them--giving them form. But from the Jungian point of view such controlled fantasy is not just a function of the ego. It is a function which transcends the dissociation between the ego and the autonomous, or involuntary, unconscious processes. The formation of the images was something that Jung let happen and observed, not something he directed or created. It was a symbolization

of the unconscious processes and concomitant emotions into forms perceivable by the ego. This development of a communication between dissociated aspects of the psyche became a means of integrating the Self. Jung had entered a period of Self-deintegration. There followed a period in which previously suppressed or repressed processes broke forth into his consciousness like flood waters from a broken dam. He was to find his way to a new integration of the Self by means of the controlled release of fantasy--or, the development of a transcendent function. In the process he was also re-experiencing the archetypal structure of becoming first evoked in the mother-child relationship and "regressing" to a developmental modality which emerges at that stage.

A Mother Within

In Erikson's schematization of psychosocial development each stage is characterized by the emergence of a particular mode of interaction with the world. These modes remain as potentialities even after their period of dominance has passed. They may be reactivated during periods of crisis. The earliest modality is the passivity which the infant assumes in its relationship with its mother. Such passivity is suppressed, especially by men, as the human being strives to achieve a more active and independent life. But it is actually a vital mode capable of reuniting us with the sources of our being:

> Paradoxically, many a young man . . . becomes a great man in his own sphere only by learning that deep passivity which permits him to let the data of his competency speak to him. As Freud said in a letter to Fliess, "I must wait until it moves in me so that I can perceive it. . . ." This may sound feminine, and, indeed, Luther bluntly spoke of an attitude of womanly conception. . . . Yet it is clear that men call such attitudes and modes feminine only because the strain of paternalism has alienated us from them; for these modes are any organism's brithright, and all our partial as well as our total functioning is based on a metabolism of passivity and activity. Mannish man always wants to pretend that he made himself, or at any rate, that no simple women bore him, and many puberty rites (consider the rebirth from a kiva in the American Southwest) dramatize a new birth from a spiritual mother of a kind that only men understand.
>
> . . . But he cannot remember and will not acknowledge that long before he had developed those willful modes which were specifically suppressed and paradoxically aggravated by a challenging father, a mother had taught him to touch the world with his searching mouth and his probing senses. What to a man's man, in the course of his development, seems like a passivity hard to acquire, is only a regained ability to be active with his oldest and most neglected modes.
>
> . . . I think that the difference between the old modalities of passive and active is really that between. . . being in the state of experiencing or of acting. Meaningful implications are lost in the flat word passivity--among them the total attitude of living receptively and through the senses, of willingly "suffering" the voice of one's intuition and of living a Passion: that total passivity in which man regains, through considered self-sacrifice and self-transcendence, his active position in the face of nothingness, and thus is saved (Erikson, 1962, pp. 207-209).

According to Erikson (1962) the decisive transformation in Martin Luther's life was made possible by regaining the passive or experiencing mode. His training in scholastic disputations had caused him to lose his faith:

> He put the problem in terms of organ modes, by describing scholastic disputations as dentes and linguae: the teeth are hard and sinister, and form words in anger and fury; the tongue is soft and suavely persuasive. Using these modes, the devil can evoke purely intellectual mirages (Erikson, 1963, p. 207).

Luther learned to supplant these aggressive modes with a more receptive one:

> But the organ through which the word enters to replenish the heart is the ear. . . . one must hear before one sees, believe before one understands, be captivated before one captures. . . . This had certainly been said before; but Luther's emphasis is not on Augustinian "infusion," or on a nominalistic "obedience," but . . . on a self-verification through a God-given inner "apparatus." This . . . . apparatus has its own way of seeking and searching--and it succeeds insofar as it develops its own passivity. . . .
>
> The theology as well as the psychology of Luther's passivity is that of man in the state of prayer. . . .
>
> In two ways. . . rebirth by prayer is passive: it means surrender to God the Father; but it also means to be reborn ex matrice scripturae nati, out of the matrix of the scriptures. "Matrix" is as close as such a man's man will come to saying "mater." . . . I think that in the Bible Luther at last found a mother he could acknowledge: he could attribute to the Bible a generosity to which he could open himself, and which he could pass on to others. . . (Erikson, 1962, pp. 207-208).

While Luther's salvation came from listening to the scriptures, Jung's transformation came from listening to the stream of fantasies which were deluging his consciousness. Each had a different spiritual mother--Luther, the Bible; Jung, the unconscious processes--but each achieved his rebirth through a mode of receptivity. Their respective returns to earlier, more passive modes of becoming enabled them to renew themselves--or, their Selves--in relationship to new modalities of "The Mother." Each of these "mothers"

may be described as the embodiment of an archetype which corresponds to the structure of the mother-child relationship.

It is interesting that just prior to his own re-experience of "The Mother," Jung had published his conception of this archetypal structure and of the process of psychic transformation through its reactivation in later stages of life.

Jung's Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido was largely concerned with the kind of transformation process he himself was to undergo. In this work he discusses the meaning of regressive developments in which a person's interest is withdrawn from the world and turned inwards. Such regressions seem to be the product of a complex which disrupts the normal balanced alternation between extraversion and introversion and pulls the individual's energy inwards. According to Jung, Freud interpreted this problem as an unresolved Oedipal complex and maintained that the regressive tendency represented an incest wish, a sexual desire for the mother. Jung interprets it as a more fundamental and dangerous "passion"--a tendency to revert to the original passive state of infancy. Such regressive tendencies, however, may lead to psychic rebirth.

Jung (1953-1971, v. 5, chs IV-VIII) delineated the major stages of the archetypal rebirth process,

illustrating the universal and timeless quality of its central themes with references from mythology, world literature, and the history of religions. Abstracting central themes from his wide-ranging exposition, I will summarize the stages he discusses. To begin with, there is a relatively mature person who has freed himself from the inertia of the maternal relationship by developing an independent personality. Then this personality collapses or is sacrificed and a state of introversion ensues. The old, consciously directed orientation gives way to a more passive, introverted attitude. This state is dangerous. The individual's development may be arrested by fixation at this level. But the person may find within previously unconscious processes a substitute for his previous conscious orientation. The regression then appears to have been a desire for rebirth, and the state of passivity a search for a new mother. It seems that the desire for a new maternal relationship is not so much a desire for cohabitation as a desire for re-entering the womb to be born again. Actually the person enters the womb of his own unconscious psychic processes and finds therein the way to new life. He discovers through his passivity a new direction for his active energies. But this rebirth can only be achieved through a difficult struggle and a new sacrifice. The person must struggle to maintain his independence of the unconscious processes even as he becomes

passive enough to become aware of them. He must not allow a new inertia to envelop him in a web of fantasy. The unconscious processes themselves may compensate if his attitude becomes overly passive. Nightmarish images will generally appear as if to warn him of the dangers of sinking into a state of dependence upon the new mother. The individual must sacrifice his second infantile attitude if his second birth is to be completed.

This dynamic archetypal process is discernible in Jung's own experiences. Toward the beginning of his "creative illness," in December 1913, Jung had the following dream:

> I was with an unknown, brown-skinned man, a savage, in a lonely, rocky mountain landscape. It was before dawn; the eastern sky was already bright, and the stars fading. Then I heard Siegfried's horn sounding over the mountains and I knew that we had to kill him. We were armed with rifles and lay in wait for him on a narrow path over the rocks.
>
> Then Siegfried appeared high up on the crest of the mountain, in the first ray of the rising sun. On a chariot made of the bones of the dead he drove at furious speed down the precipitous slope. When he turned a corner, we shot at him, and he plunged down, struck dead.
>
> Filled with disgust and remorse for having destroyed something so great and beautiful, I turned to flee, impelled by the fear that the murder might be discovered. But a tremendous downfall of rain began, and I knew that it would wipe out all traces of the dead. I had escaped the danger of discovery; life could go on, but an unbearable feeling of guilt remained (Jung, 1965, p. 180).

He was immediately compelled to understand this dream and gained the insight that it was necessary for him to make a significant personal sacrifice:

> When I awoke from the dream, I turned it over in my mind, but was unable to understand it. I tried therefore to fall asleep again, but a voice within me said, "You must understand the dream, and must do so at once!" The inner urgency mounted until the terrible moment came when the voice said, "If you do not understand the dream, you must shoot yourself!" In the drawer of my night table lay a loaded revolver, and I became frightened. Then I began pondering once again, and suddenly the meaning of the dream dawned on me. "Why, that is the problem that is being played out in the world." Siegfried, I thought, represents what the Germans want to achieve, heroically to impose their will, have their own way. "Where there is a will there is a way!" I had wanted to do the same. But now that was no longer possible. The dream showed that the attitude embodied by Siegfried, the hero, no longer suited me. Therefore it had to be killed.
>
> After the deed I felt an overpowering compassion, as though I myself had been shot: a sign of my secret identity with Siegfried, as well as of the grief a man feels when he is forced to sacrifice his ideal and his conscious attitudes. This identity and my heroic idealism had to be abandoned for there are higher things than the ego's will, and to these one must bow.
>
> These thoughts sufficed for the present, and I fell asleep again.
>
> The small, brown-skinned savage who accompanied me and had actually taken the initiative in the killing was an embodiment of the primitive shadow. . . . Although at the time I was not able to understand the meaning of the dream beyond these few hints, new forces were released in me which helped me to carry the experiment with the unconscious to a conclusion (Jung, 1965, pp. 180-181).

Jung had become an independent and socially successful adult by exerting his will and maintaining certain ideals and attitudes. His individuality had achieved a separation from its matrix but this individuality was now inadequate and had to be sacrificed for a return to its source. Seigfried might be taken as an ideal representative of Jung's persona. Jung had adjusted to society by adopting cultural ideals such as "will power" and

suppressing contrary tendencies. These suppressed tendencies remained active unconsciously and achieved a degree of autonomy as a "shadow complex." Now the shadow had its day. With the sacrifice of the persona, the previously unconscious forces were released and Jung was able to experience the archetypal process of rebirth symbolizing itself in his "stream of fantasies."

Immersing himself in these fantasies was Jung's way of returning to "The Mother"--to the psychic source of his being. In doing so, he experienced again some of the same difficulties which had characterized his childhood relationship with his mother, but now in relation to the "anima" complex:

> When I was writing down these fantasies, I once asked myself, "What am I really doing? Certainly this has nothing to do with science. But then what is it?" Whereupon a voice within me said, "It is art." I was astonished. It had never entered my head that what I was writing had any connection with art. Then I thought, "Perhaps my unconscious is forming a personality that is not me, but which is insisting on coming through to expression." I knew for a certainty that the voice had come from a woman. I recognized it as the voice of a patient, a talented psychopath who had a strong transference to me. She had become a living figure within my mind.
>
> Obviously what I was doing wasn't science. What then could it be but art? It was as though these were the only alternatives in the world. That is the way a woman's mind works.
>
> I said very emphatically to this voice that my fantasies had nothing to do with art, and I felt a great inner resistance. No voice came through, however, and I kept on writing. Then came the next assault, and again the same assertion: "That is art." This time I caught her and said, "No, it is not art! On the contrary, it is nature," and prepared myself for an argument. When nothing of the

> sort occurred, I reflected that the "woman within me" did not have the speech centers I had. And so I suggested that she use mine. She did so and came through with a long statement.
>
> I was greatly intrigued by the fact that a woman should interfere with me from within. My conclusion was that she must be the "soul," in the primitive sense, and I began to speculate on the reasons why the name "anima" was given to the soul. Why was it thought of as feminine? Later I came to see that this inner feminine figure plays a typical, or archetypal, role in the unconscious of a man, and I called her the "anima" (Jung, 1965, p. 186).

According to Jung, the anima represents our function of relationship to our unconscious processes. Jung's anima seems to have been characterized by a tendency to relate his ego to these processes in an inflationary way. This complex seems to have had the same kind of inflationary influence on Jung's adult ego that Emilie Jung sometimes had on his childhood ego. Perhaps it was formed in his relationship with her. In his return to "The Mother," Jung experienced the dangers of this complex:

> What the anima said seemed to me full of deep cunning. If I had taken these fantasies of the unconscious as art, they would have carried no more conviction than visual perceptions, as if I were watching a movie. I would have felt no moral obligation toward them. The anima might then have easily seduced me into believing that I was a misunderstood artist, and that my so-called artistic nature gave me the right to neglect reality. If I had followed her voice, she would in all probability have said to me one day, "Do you imagine the nonsense you're engaged in is really art? Not a bit." Thus the insinuations of the anima, the mouthpiece of the unconscious, can utterly destroy a man (Jung, 1965, p. 187).

The danger represented by the anima's "cunning" was that Jung would not try to understand or integrate the

meaning of what he was writing down. It was by developing a conscious relationship to this autonomous complex that Jung learned how to transform unconscious processes into images he could understand:

> But the anima has a positive aspect as well. It is she who communicates the images of the unconscious to the conscious mind, and that is what I chiefly valued her for. For decades I always turned to the anima when I felt that my emotional behaviour was disturbed, and that something had been constellated in the unconscious. I would then ask the anima: "Now what are you up to? What do you see? I should like to know." After some resistance she regularly produced an image. As soon as the image was there, the unrest or the sense of oppression vanished. The whole energy of these emotions was transformed into interest in and curiosity about the image. I would speak with the anima about the images she communicated to me, for I had to try to understand them as best I could, just like a dream (Jung, 1965, pp. 187-188).

By personifying this autonomous activity Jung found an interlocutor between his ego and the unconscious processes. But he could trust the anima no more than he had been able to trust his mother's No. 2 personality when, as a child, he had needed her for an interlocutor. Jung did not accept the images which came to him at face value. He sought to understand their source in the archetypal structure of the collective unconscious. In this matrix of our psychic life Jung at last found a Mother he was willing to trust.

The Self and a Sense of Identity

Through his efforts, Jung also developed a more complete integration of his personality. In pursuing his

social and professional life, Jung had set aside the childhood conflict between personalities No. 1 and No. 2. He had largely suppressed the concerns of No. 2 and concentrated on developing personality No. 1. Now the world of No. 2 was coming into focus again. But Jung could not return to the passive, other-worldliness of No. 2:

> I saw that so much fantasy needed firm ground underfoot, and that I must first return wholly to reality. For me, reality meant scientific comprehension. I had to draw concrete conclusions from the insights the unconscious had given me--and that task was to become a life work (Jung, 1965, p. 188).

He was receptive to the manifestations of unconscious processes but submitted them to his conscious understanding.

Jung felt he had to develop his own way of comprehending his experiences:

> The knowledge I was concerned with, or was seeking, still could not be found in the science of those days. I myself had to undergo the original experience, and, moreover, try to plant the results of my experience in the soil of reality; otherwise they would have remained subjective assumptions without validity (Jung, 1965, p. 192).

This sense of being a pioneer left Jung with a feeling of isolation:

> The consequence of my . . . involvement with things which neither I nor anyone else could understand, was an extreme loneliness. I was going about laden with thoughts of which I could speak to no one: they would only have been misunderstood. I felt the gulf between the external world and the interior world of images in its most painful form. I could not yet see that interaction of both worlds which I now understand. I saw only an irreconcilable contradiction between "inner" and "outer."
>
> However, it was clear to me from the start that I could find contact with the outer world and with people only if I succeeded in showing--and this

> would demand the most intensive effort--that the contents of psychic experience are real, and real not only as my own personal experiences, but as collective experiences which others also have. Later I tried to demonstrate this in my scientific work, and I did all in my power to convey to my intimates a new way of seeing things. I knew that if I did not succeed, I would be condemned to absolute isolation (Jung, 1965, pp. 194-195).

He found contact with the outer world through his conception of the collective foundations of experience. Jung's way of comprehending his experiences was to compare them with similar experiences in various historical and cultural contexts. He gained a sense of identity with the human community by understanding his continuity with the past. This mode of understanding was the basis for his personal "myth" of the archetypal process of Self-realization.

Here is Jung's recollection of how his own Self-realization reached its conclusion:

> In 1918-19 I was in Chateaux d'Oex as Commandant de la Region Anglaise des Internes de Guerre. While I was there I sketched every morning in my notebook a small circular drawing, a mandala, which seemed to correspond to my inner situation at the time. With the help of these drawings I could observe my psyche transformations from day to day. . . .
>
> My mandalas were cryptograms concerning the state of the self which were presented to me anew each day. In them I saw the self--that is, my whole being--actively at work. To be sure, at first I could only dimly understand them; but they seemed to me highly significant, and I guarded them like precious pearls. I had the distinct feeling that they were something central, and in time I acquired through them a living conception of the self. The self, I thought, was like the monad which I am, and which is my world. The mandala represents this monad, and corresponds to the microcosmic nature of the psyche.

> I no longer know how many mandalas I drew at this time. There were a great many. While I was working on them, the question arose repeatedly: What is this process leading to? Where is its goal? From my own experience, I knew by now that I could not presume to choose a goal which would seem trustworthy to me. It had been proved to me that I had to abandon the idea of the superordinate position of the ego. After all, I had been brought up short when I had attempted to maintain it. I had wanted to go on with the scientific analysis of myths which I had begun in Symbols of Transformation. That was still my goal--but I must not think of that! I was being compelled to go through this process of the unconscious. I had to let myself be carried along by the current, without a notion of where it would lead me. When I began drawing the mandalas, however, I saw that everything, all paths I had been following, all the steps I had taken, were leading back to a single point--namely, to the mid-point. . . .
>
> During those years, between 1918 and 1920, I began to understand that the goal of psychic development is the self. There is no linear evolution; there is only a circumambulation of the self. Uniform development exists, at most, only at the beginning; later, everything points toward the center. This insight gave me stability, and gradually my inner peace returned. I knew that in finding the mandala as an expression of the self I had attained what was for me the ultimate. Perhaps someone else knows more, but not I (Jung, 1965, pp. 195-197).

This "ultimate" insight became the basis for Jung's personal "myth" of Self-realization as an archetypal process which actualizes itself in changing forms throughout mankind's history. With this "myth" Jung anchored his personal Self-realization in a sense of identity with those who had experienced this process in other forms at various times throughout mankind's collective history.

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